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I

It goes without saying that I do not deny--unless I am a
fool--that many actions called immoral ought to be avoided
and resisted, or that many called moral ought to be done and
encouraged--but I think the one should be encouraged and the
other avoided for other reasons than hitherto
Nietzsche, Daybreak

TABLE OF CONTENTS
iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Chapter
1.

2.

NIETZSCHE'S HAMMER: REVALUATION, RECURRENCE,
AND KANT
• . . . . • • •
. . . • . •
Introduction

1

Statement of Purpose and Thesis

7

Some Interpretive Considerations.

13

Nietzsche's Hammer Metaphor •

15

Nietzsche's Hammer and Kant's Categorical
Imperative . . . . • • • • • . . . • • •

23

THE NATURALISTIC BASIS OF NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE
OF KANT • . . . • • • . . . . • . .
• . •

27

Introduction

27

What Naturalism Might Be: Some Suggestions.

32

What Naturalism is Not

37

What is Antinatural?

. .. .
"

The Anti-Naturalness of Epistemology.
The Anti-Naturalness of Metaphysics .
The Anti-Naturalness of Universal
Moral Norms

3.

1

47
47
50
53

What is Naturalism? The Will to Power as
Basic Principle
. . . . . . . . . .

58

The Consequences of Naturalism: "Long Live
Physics!" and the Prioritization of
Legislative Discourse . . . . . . . • •

71

NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN MORALITY .

87

Introduction

87

Making Room for Art: Nietzsche's Early
Opposition to Kant . . . . . • . . .

90

Nietzsche on Kant's "Moral Fanaticism".

100

iv

Kant and Nietzsche on the Rational
Foundation of the Moral Consciousness.

4.

.

110

Legislation Versus Judgment: Nietzsche's
Master-Slave Dialectic . . . • • • . . .

127

THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE AND NIETZSCHE'S
NATURALIZATION OF AUTONOMY •
. • . • .

145

Introduction

145

The Theoretical Interpretation of the
Eternal Re.currence . . . . .
. • . •

151

The Practical Interpretation of the
Eternal Recurrence .

158

"The Most Scientific of All Possible
Hypotheses"
• . . .
. . • . .

177

The Naturalization of Epistemology. .
The Naturalization of Metaphysics • .
The Naturalization of Autonomy. .
Conclusion
WORKS CITED . .

178
184
188
201

. . .

205

v

CHAPTER ONE
NIETZSCHE'S HAMMER: REVALUATION, RECURRENCE, AND KANT
Introduction
It might at first appear quixotic to attempt to locate
a positive moral doctrine in Nietzsche's philosophy.

No

philosopher before Nietzsche, and perhaps none since, has
given his "antimoral propensity" such unbridled expression. 1
It is specifically in opposition to morality, and the moral
interpretation of existence, that Nietzsche develops his
conception of an "artists' metaphysics" in The Birth of
Tragedy. 2

In this work Nietzsche rejects the idea that

morality is humanity's "truly metaphysical activity." 3

It

is only as an aesthetic phenomenon, Nietzsche contends, and
not as a moral phenomenon, that the existence of the world
is justified. 4

In The Gay Science and Thus Spoke

1

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, in Basic
Writings of Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: The
Modern Library, 1968), "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," no. 5,
23.
2

Ibid., 24: "It was against morality that my
instinct turned with this questionable book, long ago; it
was an instinct that aligned itself with life and that
discovered for itself a fundamentally opposite doctrine and
valuation of life--purely artistic and anti-Christian."
3

4

Ibid., 22.

Ibid.: "
. the existence of the world is
justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon."

2

Zarathustra, Nietzsche proclaims the death of God, and
thereby removes the metaphysical foundation upon which
morality, especially Christian morality, rests. 5

In later

works, such as On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche
attempts to divest morality of any remaining vestige of
metaphysical significance by tracing the moral consciousness
to the internalization of the instinct of cruelty. 6

In

Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche makes his hostility toward
morality absolutely unambiguous: "We sail right over
morality," he writes,
we crush, we destroy perhaps the remains of our
own morality by daring to make our voyage there-but what matter are we! 7
Passages such as this give an indication of the difficulties
faced by anyone who would attempt to locate a positive
morality in Nietzsche's writings.
It is undeniable that Nietzsche is opposed to morality,
as traditionally conceived.

But what is implied by the

phrase "traditionally conceived"?

From Nietzsche's

perspective, traditionally conceived morality refers
primarily to Plato, whose "invention" of "the pure spirit
5The

Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York:
Vintage Books, 1974), no. 108, 167. See also Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, in The Portable Nietzsche, trans. Walter
Kaufmann (New York: Viking Press, 1968), "Zarathustra's
Prologue," no. 2, 124.
6

0n the Genealogy of Morals, in Basic Writings,
second essay, 493-532.
7Beyond

221.

Good and Evil, in Basic Writings, no. 23,

3

and the good as such" Nietzsche calls "the worst, most
durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far.

118

Traditionally conceived morality also includes Christianity,
i.e., "Platonism for 'the people.

1119

According to

Nietzsche, the world view of Christian morality offers an
interpretation of existence that is both antithetical to art
and hostile to life:
Christianity was from the beginning, essentially
and fundamentally, life's nausea and disgust with
life, merely concealed behind, masked by, dressed
up as, faith in 'another' or 'better' life. 10
Nietzsche's opposition to traditionally conceived morality
is, in other words, a rejection of any type of idealistic
doctrine that locates the value of the world outside of the
world itself.

It is also a rejection of traditionally

conceived morality's absolute value standards and universal
moral norms, which Nietzsche takes to be at odds with the
finite, limited, and perspectival nature of human existence.
Nietzsche's opposition to traditionally conceived
morality cannot, however, be restricted to a rejection of
Platonism and Christianity.

Nietzsche also rejects

Schopenhauer's morality of pity as a life-denying "new
Buddhism." 11
8

Nietzsche maintains that Schopenhauer's

Ibid., preface, 193.

1

°'rhe Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a SelfCriticism," no. 5, 23.
11

0n the Genealogy of Morals, preface no. 5, 455.

4

glorification of pity, self-abnegation, and self-sacrifice
is an example of "the will turning against life, the tender
and sorrowful signs of the ultimate illness . . • . 1112
Schopenhauer's morality of pity and metaphysical doctrine of
the will represent a self-devaluation and self-denial of the
will that is nihilistic and ultimately self-destructive. 13
The ideas underlying Nietzsche's rejection of the
absolute metaphysical values of Platonism and Christianity
and of Schopenhauer's morality of pity combine in his
rejection of Kant's moral philosophy.

On the one hand,

Nietzsche maintains that Kant's fundamental moral principle,
the categorical imperative, which holds that a will can only
be considered good if it acts for the sake of duty is, like
Schopenhauer's morality of pity, a destructive self-denial
of the will. 14

on the other hand, by insisting on the moral

necessity of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul,
Kantian morality represents a variation on the metaphysical

12

Ibid. : "What was especially at stake was the value
of the 'unegoistic,' the instincts of pity, self-abnegation,
self-sacrifice, which Schopenhauer had gilded, deified, and
projected into a beyond for so long that at last they became
for him 'value-in-itself,' on the basis of which he said No
to life and to himself."
13

Ibid. : "It was precisely here that I saw the great
danger to mankind, its sublimest enticement and seduction-but to what? to nothingness?"
~The Antichrist, in The Portable Nietzsche, no. 11,
577: "How could one fail to feel how Kant's categorical
imperative endangered life itself!"

5

themes of traditionally conceived morality. 15
When Nietzsche writes that art and not morality is
humanity's genuine metaphysical activity he places himself
in stark opposition to Kant.

For Kant, morality is the

genuine metaphysical activity of human beings.

Kant's

critique of Pure Reason limits pure speculative reason to
the domain of possible sense experience.

Any pretension of

speculative reason to extend its reach beyond the bounds of
sense experience is rejected as dogmatic and unjustified.
The objects of metaphysical reasoning, i.e., God, freedom,
and the immortality of the soul, are thinkable only through
the practical application of reason.
cognoscendi" of freedom. 16

Morality is the "ratio

The moral life is completed by

the concept of the highest good, i.e., happiness in
proportion to virtue, which, on Kant's view, requires the
postulation of God and the immortality of the soul.
Speculative reason is not extended in this postulation of
God and immortality.

That is, we cannot make any knowledge

claims about them, but their possibility cannot be ruled
out, and in fact is required by morality, according to Kant.
Therefore, it is in morality, rather than in theoretical
speculation, that we find humanity's genuine metaphysical
uibid., no. 10, 577: "Kant's success is merely a
theologians' success: like Luther, like Leibniz, Kant was
one more clog for German honesty, which was none too steady
in the first place."
16

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans.
Lewis White Beck (New York: Macmillan, 1989), preface, 4.

6

activity, on Kant's view.
Nietzsche is directly opposed to Kant's view that
morality is humanity's genuine metaphysical activity.

But

when we look closer at Nietzsche's texts, and the substance
of his philosophy, it becomes necessary to qualify his
opposition to Kant.

This is important for my purposes

because I believe that it is in Nietzsche's critical
relationship to Kant, specifically Kantian morality, that we
will find the basis of Nietzsche's positive conception of
morality.
Like Kant, Nietzsche places special emphasis on the
role of autonomy, i.e., the will's self-legislation, as the
criterion of authentic human moral agency.

For Kant, only a

will that is autonomous, i.e., one that freely and
rationally legislates for itself, without being determined
by external, material considerations, has genuine moral
worth.

For Nietzsche, similarly, only a will that actively

creates values for itself expresses the nobility of soul
characteristic of "master morality.

1117

On the basis of this mutual emphasis on autonomy some
argue that Nietzsche's conception of autonomy is a
radicalization of Kant's conception of autonomy.

Ludwig

Nagl, for example, states that "[one] could pointedly say
17

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 260, 395: "The noble type
of man experiences itself as determining values; it does not
need approval; it judges, 'what is harmful to me is harmful
in itself'; it knows itself to be that which first accords
honor to things; it is value-creating."

7

that the center of Nietzsche's 'immoralism' is an
(excessively radicalized) version of Kant's 'autonomy,'
situated in an artistically redesigned Leibnizian world.
1118

such statements are misleading, however, if no account

is given of Nietzsche's persistent and systematic opposition
to Kantian morality. 19

This ambiguity in Nietzsche's

relationship to Kant generates the following question: Can
we understand both Nietzsche's general rejection of Kant's
moral philosophy and the similarities of their conceptions
of autonomy in terms of something more fundamental than a
simple "radicalization"?
statement of Purpose and Thesis
In this study I will argue that Nietzsche's idea of the
eternal recurrence, like Kant's categorical imperative,
serves as a self-given directive principle of autonomous
human action.

In their discussions of Nietzsche's idea of

the eternal recurrence, many commentators have attempted to
separate it into theoretical and practical aspects.

Some

treat the eternal recurrence as a cosmological theory that
holds that all events repeat in identical and unending

18

Ludwig Nagl, "The Enlightenment--A Stranded
Project? Habermas on Nietzsche as a 'Turning Point' to
Postmodernity," History of European Ideas 11 (1989): 748.
19

0n the Genealogy of Morals, preface no. 3, 453.
This opposition is clearly expressed in Nietzsche's
description of his genealogical inquiry into the origin of
moral values as the command of an "anti-Kantian, enigmatic
'categorical imperative' . . . . 11

8

cycles.

I refer to this interpretation (in all its forms)

as the "theoretical" interpretation of the eternal
recurrence because it contends that Nietzsche is attempting
to demonstrate that the eternal recurrence is a true or
factual account of reality.
On the other hand, the eternal recurrence is also often
treated as an ethical prescription that holds that we ought
to live our lives as if all events repeated in an unending
cycle, whether or not this is in fact the case.

I refer to

this as the "practical" interpretation of the eternal
recurrence because of its emphasis on the role the eternal
recurrence can play as a self-given directive principle of
action.

The practical interpretation of the eternal

recurrence gives priority to the prescriptive rather than
the descriptive value of the eternal recurrence.
Those who advocate the practical interpretation of the
eternal recurrence often suggest that there is a parallel
between it and the categorical imperative.

As I briefly

mentioned briefly, the categorical imperative is Kant's
supreme moral principle.

It tests the moral worth of

subjective principles of action (maxims) by asking whether
we can will our maxims to be universal laws:
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at
the same time as a principle establishing universal
law. 20
Like the categorical imperative, the eternal recurrence
20

critigue of Practical Reason, 30.

9

appears to function as a practical imperative:

Whatever you

do, do it in such a way that you can will its eternal
recurrence.

In this sense, the eternal recurrence can be

construed as an imperative of authenticity. 21

Just as the

categorical imperative serves as a test determining moral
worth, the eternal recurrence tests our ability to
authentically affirm our actions by asking us to imagine
their infinite repetition.
Nietzsche seems to encourage a Kantian interpretation
of the eternal recurrence by occasionally formulating it in
the language of Kant's categorical imperative.

For example,

in a note from 1881, Nietzsche writes:
Meine Lehre sagt: so leben, dass du wtinschen musst,
wieder zu leben ist die Aufgabe--du wirst es
jedenfalls ! 22
But it is important not to read too much into Nietzsche's
quasi-Kantian formulation of the eternal recurrence.

To do

so would be to overlook a fundamental antithesis in
Nietzsche's and Kant's general moral frameworks.

We can

begin to understand this antithesis when we recognize
Nietzsche's opposition to what he refers to as "antinatural"
ncf. Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential
Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978),
passim.
22

Nietzsche, Nachqelassene Fragmente 1880-1882,
Kritische Studienausgabe, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino
Montinari (Mtinchen: Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1988),
vol. 9, no. 11(163], 505. Subsequent references to this
edition of Nietzsche's collected works will be abbreviated
"KSA," and will be followed by volume, aphorism, and page
numbers.

10

morality.

Roughly speaking, antinaturalism is comprised of

three basic features.

First, antinaturalism is found in the

unconditional will to truth as the highest value.

Second,

antinaturalism is found in the faith in opposite values that
places the source of the highest values outside of the
empirical world of nature and history in a transcendent
"true world."

Finally, antinaturalism is found in the

presumption of moral equality which grounds all conceptions
of universal moral norms.

I will argue that the essence of

an antinatural morality is that it gives priority to acts of
value judgment over acts of value legislation.

In other

words, following Nietzsche, we could say that antinatural
morality emphasizes a reactive, rather than an active, mode
of value positing.
For Nietzsche, Kant's moral philosophy represents the
epitome of antinaturalism.

The unconditional will to truth

is reflected in Kant's effort to establish the foundations
of morality on a priori grounds.

The faith in opposite

values is found in Kant's denial of knowledge "in order to
make room for faith."n

Finally, Kant's conception of

autonomy, as formulated in the categorical imperative, is
antinatural, according to Nietzsche, because it identifies
autonomy of the will with the universalizability of the

nKant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp
Smith {New York: St. Martin's, 1965), B xxx: "I have_
therefore found it necessary to deny knowledge, in order to
make room for faith."

11
will's subjective principles of action.
of principles presupposes moral equality.

Universalizability
On Nietzsche's

view, however, universalizability is harmful to human beings
if, as he maintains, they are not in fact morally equal.~
Nietzsche contends that the presumption of moral equality,
and, consequently, the idea of universal moral norms,
represent a secret will to revenge and judgment on the part
of those who are incapable of creating values. 25

Thus,

Nietzsche holds that despite Kant's emphasis on autonomy and
self-legislation, his emphasis on the universalizability of
maxims as the content of autonomy places him in a moral
framework in which judgment is tacitly and inadvertently
given priority over legislation.

In other words, on

Nietzsche's view, Kant's account of autonomy implicitly
undermines itself.
The primary thesis that I argue for in this study is
that the eternal recurrence represents Nietzsche's attempt
to ground a conception of autonomy on a naturalistic basis.
Nietzsche's eternal recurrence offers a reconceptualization
of human autonomy in light of the experience of modern
physics.

The eternal recurrence represents the lesson of

~Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas," 213:
"I do not wish to be mixed up and confused with these
preachers of equality. For, to me justice speaks thus: 'Men
are not equal.' Nor shall they become equal! What would my
love of the overman be if I spoke otherwise?"

Ibid. , 212: "Out of every one of their compl~ints
sounds revenge; in their praise is always a sting, and to be
a judge seems bliss to them."
25

12
modern physics that we can find no independent laws within
nature and that, consequently, we must give ourselves laws
in the face of the experience of total, recurring
meaninglessness, if we want to have coherently organized and
meaningful existence. 26

With its emphasis on self-

legislation over moral judgment, Nietzsche's conception of
autonomy remains Kantian, in a broad sense, but Nietzsche
rejects both the Kantian model of the moral subject and
Kant's moral metaphysics as antinatural.

Nietzsche creates

a norm of autonomy in which value legislation is given
priority over value judgment without the need of postulating
a fixed, Cartesian self or a transcendent metaphysical
realm.

Another way of putting the same point, perhaps more

sharply, would be to say that, on the issue of autonomy,
Nietzsche is more consistently Kantian than Kant.
In support of my main thesis I will argue for the
secondary thesis that the 'foundation' of Nietzsche's
naturalism is located in the idea of the will to power.

I

read the will to power not as a metaphysical principle but
rather as a methodological principle of interpretation.

As

an interpretive principle, the will to power provides the
means to overcome the three basic antinatural positions that
Nietzsche associates with traditionally conceived morality.
It provides a non-dualistic conceptual framework that

26

Hans Seigfried, 11 Autonomy and Quantum Physics,
Philosophy of Science 57 (1990): 623-624.

11

13

opposes the unconditional will to truth and eliminates the
dualism of the faith in opposite values.

At the same time,

it provides the means to challenge the Kantian conception of
universal moral norms by undermining the presumption of
moral equality.
Some Interpretive Considerations
In this section I discuss the interpretive strategy
that will govern my study.

I will try to do this briefly,

but hopefully not so briefly as to appear dogmatic.
pairs of issues must be discussed.

Two

First, there is the

issue of the relative priority I will give to Nietzsche's
published texts over his posthumous writings, known as the
Nachgelassene Fragmente.

Second, there is the issue of

whether I will take a thematic or an historical approach to
Nietzsche's texts.
Regarding the first issue, I can state my position
briefly.

Generally speaking, I think that an author's

published texts should be given priority over texts that,
for whatever reason, the author chose not to publish.
Published texts represent the author's ideas as he or she
chose to represent them to the world.

Therefore, I give

precedence to Nietzsche's published works over the writings
contained in the Nachgelassene Fragmente.

In the event of a

conflict between these two sources, I will give the
published works priority.

The only exception to this.

general interpretive principle involves the eternal

14

recurrence.

Because of the relative paucity of material on

the eternal recurrence in Nietzsche's published texts, I
have employed both published texts and writings from the
Nachgelassene Fragmente in my reconstruction of the eternal
recurrence.
On the second issue, my position is perhaps more
controversial.

I do not subscribe to the view that

Nietzsche's philosophy must be understood in terms of
successive periods of development.

I think that such

periodization is arbitrary and artificial, and that it has
very little explanatory power.

I believe that Nietzsche's

philosophy is more unified and consistent than many
interpreters recognize.

Therefore, I believe that an

interpretation that emphasizes particular themes is the
appropriate manner to approach Nietzsche's texts, rather
than one that focuses on the chronological development of
these themes.
A thematic approach to Nietzsche's texts is not without
its problems, however.

It could be objected that a thematic

approach is problematic because it tends to artificially
systematize Nietzsche's thought.n

This becomes

questionable in light of Nietzsche's aphoristic style and
his opposition to systematic philosophy.

Therefore, it

ncf. Eric Blondel, Nietzsche's Style of Affirmation:
The Metaphors of Genealogy," in Nietzsche as Affirmative
Thinker, ed. Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1986), 134.

15

might appear that my interpretation of Nietzsche is somehow
"un-Nietzschean."
The search for a suitable framework in which to pursue
my project has led me to Nietzsche's hammer metaphor.

The

hammer metaphor unifies many of the diverse threads of
Nietzsche's philosophy.

I believe that this metaphor,

suitably interpreted, can also provide a unifying strategy
for my study.

In order to make this clear, I will conclude

this introductory chapter with a brief examination of this
metaphor.
Nietzsche's Hammer Metaphor
There is perhaps no more appropriate symbol of the
substance and spirit of Nietzsche's philosophy than the
hammer.

During the final years of Nietzsche's philosophical

activity the image of a hammer is found scattered throughout
his unpublished notes and it is a ubiquitous presence in
Twilight of the Idols, where it appears in the notorious
subtitle, How One Philosophizes With A Hammer.

In the

pref ace of this work Nietzsche downplays the eschatological
overtones of the title by characterizing the hammer as the
instrument of the philosophical physician, who diagnoses the
emptiness of traditional values, ideals, and institutions:
. . . regarding the sounding out of idols, this time
they are not just idols of the age, but eternal idols,
which are here touched with a hammer as with a tuning
fork: there are altogether no older, no more convinced,

16
no more puffed-up idols--and none more hollow. 28
In the course of his series of lectures on Nietzsche's
philosophy, Heidegger has attempted to discourage the
destructive reading of the hammer metaphor.

Heidegger

maintains that Nietzsche's intent is not "to go in swinging,
wrecking everything. 1129

Instead, he sees the hammer as

emblematic of the redemptive character of Nietzsche's
thought which "wants to give things weight and importance
again." 30
Heidegger's claim is supported by texts in which
Nietzsche discusses purely destructive philosophical
criticism.

Given Nietzsche's predilection for the rhetoric

of war and images that appear to celebrate destruction, it
is understandable that his claim to philosophize with a
hammer most naturally calls to mind destructive
philosophical criticism.

This manner of interpreting the

hammer metaphor makes it particularly amenable to
deconstructive strategies of interpretation. 31

But upon

28

Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols or, How One
Philosophizes With a Hammer, in The Portable Nietzsche,
preface, 466. Kaufmann's translation deviates from
Nietzsche's subtitle, which reads "Wie man mit dem Hammer
philosophirt."
2

9Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, trans. David Farrell
Krell (San Francisco: Harper, 1991), vol. 1, 66.
30
31

Ibid.

See, for example, Bernd Magnus, "The Deification of
the Commonplace: Twilight of the Idols," in Reading
Nietzsche, ed. Robert c. Solomon and Kathleen Higgins
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 156. Magnus

17

examination we discover that Nietzsche expresses disdain for
mere destruction that lacks an overriding creative
component.

The mutual implication of destruction and

creation in the philosophical sense can be said to be one of
Nietzsche's most fundamental principles:
If a temple is to be erected a temple must be
destroyed: that is the law--let anyone who can show me
a case in which it is not fulfilled! 32
The interaction between destruction and creation is
reflected in the manner in which the genuine philosopher
integrates the critical task of philosophical labor with
philosophical creativity.

Philosophical labor involves

gathering and codifying "former positings of values,
creations of value which have become dominant and are for a
time called 'truths'.""

According to Nietzsche, this is

the task that Kant performs with distinction.

Kant performs

the "wonderful" preliminary work of consolidating and
overcoming the past, but, according to Nietzsche, he fails
to progress adequately beyond critique.

Thus, even Kant,

"the great Chinese of K6nigsberg," is regarded by Nietzsche

remarks that Nietzsche applies his hammer to idols in a
manner that "destroys them in the sense of deconstructing
them . • . . " See also Jacques Derrida, "Tympan," in Margins
of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1982), xii-xv.
32
0n the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 24,
531.
See also The Gay Science, no. 58, 122.
"We can
destroy only as creators."
33

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 211, 326.

18

as "merely a great critic.-- 1134

critique is an instrument

of genuine philosophers who are also creators and
legislators of values: "they say, thus it shall be! 1135
In what manner does philosophical labor complement the
creative activity of genuine philosophers?

We can approach

this question by returning to Nietzsche's use of the hammer
metaphor in the preface of Twilight of the Idols.

In this

context, Nietzsche draws an analogy between the
philosopher's hammer and a tuning fork.

Just as a tuning

fork is used to test the pitch of a note as a means of
tuning a musical instrument, Nietzsche employs critique to
sound out idols, i.e., traditional values, norms, and
institutions, to see if they are hollow.
For once to pose questions here with a hammer, and,
perhaps, to hear as a reply that famous hollow sound. .
36

Nietzsche does not dogmatically presume the hollowness of
traditional idols, as is indicated by his use of the word
"perhaps."

Rather, the hammer functions here as a symbol of

the diagnostic, experimental quality of Nietzsche's
philosophy, the intent of which is not necessarily to
destroy values but to assess "the value of these values
themselves. 1137
~Ibid.,

It reveals an attitude of reflective,
no. 210, 325.

"Ibid., no. 211, 326.
36

Twilight of the Idols, preface, 465.

37

0n the Genealogy of Morals, preface no. 6, 456.

19

critical detachment regarding traditional values and
Nietzsche's openness to new and different ways of conceiving
of values.
This notion of rigorous testing by comparison describes
the work of consolidation carried out by the philosophical
laborer and accords well with the image of the hammer as a
tuning fork that critically sounds out idols.

But the

experimental testing of values to determine whether or not
they have retained any value is not an end in itself.
Extending Nietzsche's musical analogy we could say that just
as tuning an instrument with a tuning fork is preliminary to
actually playing the instrument, the sounding out of idols
points beyond itself to a creative act.
Nietzsche makes this clear by extending the hammer
metaphor to incorporate the activities of the genuine
philosopher.

Just as genuine philosophers must employ the

hammer as a laborer to critically test idols, they must also
use the hammer as a means to create new idols, or new
ideals:
With a creative hand they reach for the future, and all
that is and has been becomes a means for them, an
instrument, a hammer. Their 'knowing' is creating,
their creating is a legislation, their will to truth
is--will to power. 38
The hammer is a doubly appropriate symbol for the creative
task of the genuine philosopher.

On the one hand, it

represents the hardness of those who dare to create a new
~Beyond

Good and Evil, no. 211, 326.
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interpretation of existence. 39

On the other hand, it

represents the tool of the sculptor, who uses a hammer to
produce works of art from shapeless stone.

In this case,

the stone represents 'man,' "the as yet undetermined
animal.

1140

The work of art represents the overman, i.e. ,

Nietzsche's new ideal for humanity:
But my fervent will to create impels me ever again
toward man; thus is the hammer impelled toward the
stone. o men, in the stone there sleeps an image, the
image of my images. Alas, that it must sleep in the
hardest, the ugliest stone! Now my hammer rages
cruelly against its prison. Pieces of rock rain from
the stone: what is that to me? I want to perfect it;
for a shadow came to me--the stillest and lightest of
all things came to me. The beauty of the overman came
to me as a shadow. o my brothers, what are the gods to
me now? 41
The intrinsic relationship between critique and
creation, a relationship that is mirrored in the
relationship of philosophical labor and philosophical
creativity, is expressed by the multiple meanings latent
within the image of the hammer.

On the one hand the hammer

is thought of as a tuning hammer and symbolizes critique.
On the other hand the hammer is thought of a sculptor's
hammer and symbolizes the creative activity of the genuine
philosopher.
39

Twilight of the Idols, "The Hammer Speaks," 563.
"And if your hardness does not wish to flash and cut and cut
through, how can you one day create with me? For all
creators are hard."
40

41

199-200.

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 62, 264.

Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Upon the Blessed Isles,"

21

The fact that Nietzsche uses a single image, the
hammer, to metaphorically express both critique and creation
does not indicate their diametrical opposition, but rather
their deep interrelatedness.

This deep interrelatedness is

crucial to the concept of interpretation that is the basis
of Nietzsche's hypothesis of the will to power. 42
Interpretation unifies critique and creation in the sense
that the creation of a new interpretation necessarily
involves the transformation of an already existing
interpretation.
For Nietzsche, it is the possibility of alternative
interpretations of existence that makes possible a
revaluation of all values; it is the threat of nihilism that
makes this revaluation necessary.

Nietzsche maintains that

the greater part of human history has been dominated by a
single interpretation of existence, i.e, the interpretation
associated with traditionally conceived morality.

The

distinguishing characteristic of this interpretation is an
unshakable faith that it alone is the sole and exclusive
possessor of truth.

The spirit of truthfulness cultivated

by traditionally conceived morality has been fruitful.

It

has civilized humanity and it has instilled within human
beings a drive for knowledge, a will to truth.

The will to

truth, however, has also led to traditionally conceived

42

The will to power is discussed in the context of
Nietzsche's naturalism in chapter two.
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morality's undoing, according to Nietzsche, because it has
ruthlessly exposed the human, all too human basis of the
supposedly transcendent grounds of existence.

This is the

dialectic of nihilism--that "the highest values devaluate
themselves. " 43

It is potentially disastrous for humanity

because the collapse of this interpretation of existence,
which was thought to be the only possible one, is mistakenly
taken to imply the collapse of all

interpretations.~

The revaluation of values, made necessary by the threat
of nihilism, calls for the appearance of "spirits strong and
original enough to provide the stimuli for opposite
valuations . • • . "tj

The appearance of such spirits,

genuine philosophers in the sense discussed above, cannot be
taken for granted.

The possibility of their appearance

itself necessitates a revaluation of values,
• • • under whose new pressure and hammer a conscience
would be steeled, a heart turned to bronze, in order to
46
endure the weight of such responsibility. .
Among Nietzsche's innumerable sketches and plans for his
ultimately abandoned magnum opus, The Will to Power, there
is one that includes a section entitled "Der Hammer: Lehre

0

The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J.
Hollingdale (New York: Vintage, 1968), no. 2, 9.
~Ibid.,

no. 55, 35.

tjBeyond Good and Evil, no. 203, 307.
46

Ibid.
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von der ewigen Wiederkunft. " 47

In The Gay Science,

Nietzsche makes it clear that he believes that the eternal
recurrence is the hardest idea to accept; it is the greatest
weight, the idea that will "change you as you are or perhaps
1148

crush you.

The eternal recurrence is the idea that

will crush the pretensions of those who remain committed to
truth in the received, traditional sense.

It symbolizes the

idea that the "in vain" of their search will be eternally
repeated.

But the eternal recurrence also offers the

possibility of change.

It implicitly contains the idea that

we are responsible for our interpretations of existence and
must constantly re-affirm these interpretations if they are
to retain any value.

Thus, within the eternal recurrence we

find yet another expression of the critical and creative
aspects of revaluation that are metaphorically expressed in
the hammer image.
Nietzsche's Hammer and Kant's Categorical Imperative
Can the hammer metaphor be used to guide my study of
Nietzsche's relationship to Kant?

I think that it can.

We

have seen that the hammer metaphor functions as a symbol of
the critical and creative activity that characterizes the
activities of the genuine philosopher.

We have also seen

that Nietzsche implies that his relationship to Kant can be

~KSA

13, no. 13[4], 215.

~The

Gay Science, no 341, 274.
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understood in terms of the relationship of a genuine
philosopher to a philosophical laborer.

This may be a

questionable over-estimation on Nietzsche's part, but it
does not exhaust the possibilities of the hammer as an
interpretive guide.
In this study I will use the image of the hammer to
provide the framework for my examination of the relationship
of Nietzsche's and Kant's conceptions of autonomy and
morality in general.

The next two chapters focus primarily

on the critical aspects of Nietzsche's relationship to Kant,
while my last chapter focuses primarily on what I see as the
creative aspects of this relationship as embodied in the
eternal recurrence.
Chapter two initiates my exploration of the critical
aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy through an examination of
his naturalistic conception of morality and its opposition
to "antinatural" morality.

I argue that the principle of

Nietzsche's naturalism is found in the will to power.

The

will to power supplies an immanent principle of
interpretation that allows Nietzsche to reject metaphysical
dualism and moral views that rest on dualistic
presuppositions, such as Kant's.

The will to power also

provides the means for a shift from a teleological
conceptual framework to a more economical framework based on
a single explanatory principle.

In a practical context, the

will to power represents an attempt to prioritize the
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legislative act of interpretation over the act of moral
judgment, causing a fundamental change in the way moral
values are understood.

The most important aspect of this

change, I argue, is a rejection of moral equality and a
corresponding rejection of universal moral norms.

I

maintain that this is the primary source of Nietzsche's
opposition to Kant's identification of autonomy with the
universalizability of maxims, as formalized in the
categorical imperative.

Although Kant offers a morality of

self-legislation, Nietzsche contends that the antinatural
presuppositions of Kant's position undermine the genuinely
legislative content of his philosophy.
Chapter three continues my exploration of the critical
aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy through an examination of
his attempt to undermine the foundations of Kant's "majestic
moral structures."

I argue that the basis of Nietzsche's

critique lies in his opposition to Kant's adoption of the
consciousness of the moral law as a fact of reason, rather
than a fact of history.

In short, Nietzsche provides a

critique of Kantian moral rationalism from an empiricohistorical perspective.

Nietzsche uses a genealogical

examination of the moral consciousness to reveal its nonrational origins.

I discuss Nietzsche's assimilation of the

categorical imperative into the antinatural framework of
slave morality.

I argue that this assimilation is somewhat

problematic, given Kant's strong emphasis on autonomy, but
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that Nietzsche's critique remains a justifiable criticism of
the content of autonomy within the Kantian moral framework.
Chapter four turns to the creative aspect of
Nietzsche's relationship to Kant through an examination of
the relationship of the eternal recurrence to the
categorical imperative.

I reject both the conventional

theoretical and practical interpretations of the eternal
recurrence and argue that the eternal recurrence represents
Nietzsche's attempt to provide a positive response to
antinaturalism through a reconceptualization of autonomy
within the bounds of naturalism.

My interpretation of the

eternal recurrence focuses primarily on Nietzsche's
assertion that the eternal recurrence is "the most
scientific of all possible hypotheses."®

I interpret this

remark in three complementary senses, each of which
corresponds to a different facet of antinaturalism.
I am optimistic that the cumulative result of my
examination will be a new manner of understanding not only
the relationship between the eternal recurrence and the
categorical imperative but, more importantly, a new manner
of understanding the relationship between Nietzsche and
Kant.

It is this new way of understanding the relationship

between Nietzsche and Kant that makes this dissertation a
study in revaluation.
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The Will to Power, no. 55, 36.

CHAPTER TWO
THE NATURALISTIC BASIS OF NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF KANT
Introduction
Throughout Nietzsche's writings there is a consistent
rejection of all forms of moral norms and values that
require a metaphysical foundation for their legitimacy.
Nietzsche characterizes all forms of metaphysically based
moral norms and values as "antinatural."

Corresponding to

this rejection of antinatural morality is a call for what
Nietzsche refers to as the "naturalization" of morality. 1
Naturalistic and antinaturalistic moralities are
distinguished primarily by their differing estimations of
the value of "life."

A naturalistic morality, Nietzsche

writes, "is dominated by an instinct of life.

II

An

antinatural morality, on the other hand,
that is, almost every morality which has so far been
taught, revered, and preached--turns, conversely,
against the instincts of life: it is condemnation of
these instincts, now secret, now outspoken and
impudent. 2
Since antinaturalism is a feature of "almost every
1

The Will to Power, no. 462, 255: "In place of
'moral values,' purely naturalistic values. Naturalization
of morality."
2

Twilight of the Idols, "Morality as Anti-Nature,"
no. 4, 489-490.
27
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morality" hitherto, it does not refer exclusively to a
specific moral practice or moral philosophy.

Instead,

antinaturalism refers to a distinctive and recurring pattern
of epistemological, metaphysical, and normative
presuppositions.

Antinaturalism is found in epistemology in

the unconditional will to truth.

The unconditional will to

truth is the belief that truth, in the form of an objective
and definitive account of reality in-itself, is the supreme
human value.

This will to truth is antinatural because it

denies the interpretive, perspectival, creative, and
'artistic' character of human reason.

Nietzsche identifies

the unconditional will to truth very closely with Platonism
and Christian morality and suggests that it represents "'a
will to negate life. .

1

n3

The antinaturalism of metaphysics is a corollary of the
unconditional will to truth.

On the supposition that the

will to truth could not originate out of the will to
deception, a fictitious, transcendent realm is invented that
can serve as the object of the will to truth. 4

The

empirical worlds of nature and history are seen as mere
appearances, merely preliminary steps towards the true,
i.e., metaphysical, world.

The creation of a "true world"

is antinatural, according to Nietzsche, because it

3

The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a SelfCriticism," no. 5, 23.
4

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 2, 200.
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implicitly negates or devalues "this world, our world." 5
Finally, antinaturalism includes the presupposition of
moral equality that has dominated moral discussion and
debate at least since the time of Hobbes.

It is the

presumption of moral equality that makes possible universal
moral norms and values.

Universal moral norms and values

represent, on Nietzsche's view, a harmful denial of life if
human beings are not morally equal.

He holds that moral

inequality is suggested by the fact that some people can
create values while others cannot.

If human beings are not

morally equal, then universal moral norms and values will
serve a repressive function, denying the full expression of
life to those who can create new values.

In On the

Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche traces this repressive
function to the ressentiment of those who are incapable of
creating values.
In this chapter I will argue that Nietzsche's
naturalism is based upon the hypothesis of the will to
power.

I maintain that the will to power does not function

as a metaphysical principle about reality per se.

Rather, I

argue that the will to power functions as a methodological
principle of understanding or interpretation that makes
possible a transition from a conceptual framework organized
around superfluous metaphysical and teleological modes of
explanation toward a more economical conceptual framework
5The

Gay Science, no. 344, 283.
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organized around value of concepts for life. 6
Within a moral context, I argue that the most important
implication of Nietzsche's naturalism is that it shifts the
emphasis of moral deliberation from value judgment to value
legislation.

A naturalistic moral framework stresses the

active creation of values in accordance with self-given laws
rather than the reactive application of laws which we have
no hand in creating.

In other words, a naturalistic

conception of morality is synonymous with autonomy.

On

Nietzsche's view, a naturalistic moral framework would
contribute to the development of psychologically healthier
human beings, greater unity of cultural expression, and
perhaps, eventually, a universal conception of morality that
is not based on arbitrary metaphysical presuppositions, but
rather on actual knowledge of the conditions of life. 7
An examination of Nietzsche's naturalism is, so to
speak, the natural place to begin my study of Nietzsche's
critique and revaluation of Kantian morality because, for
Nietzsche, Kant represents the epitome of antinaturalism. 8
Therefore, if we can understand the opposition of
naturalistic and antinaturalistic moralities, we will be in

6

KSA 12, no. 9(86] (61), 380.

7Human,

All Too Human, trans. R. J. Hollingdale
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), no. 25, 25.
8

The Antichrist, no. 11, 578: "The instinct which
errs without fail, anti-nature as instinct, German decadence
as philosophy--that is Kant!"
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a better position to understand Nietzsche's opposition to
Kantian morality, which will be treated in the next chapter.
As will become clear, Nietzsche's naturalistic
prioritization of value legislation is not only crucial to
understanding his critique of morality in general, it is
also crucial to understanding his relationship to Kant.

The

idea of moral legislation, particularly in the sense of
autonomy or self-legislation of directive principles of
action, will serve as the common ground that will allow me
to place Nietzsche and Kant into productive dialogue with
each other.
Any discussion of Nietzsche's naturalism is complicated
by the lack of agreement among contemporary philosophers
about the meaning of Nietzsche's view.

I begin this chapter

with a brief survey of some prominent interpretations of
Nietzsche's naturalism that indicates the range of opinions
on this issue.

I then distinguish Nietzsche's naturalism

from what he takes to be quasi-naturalistic views, i.e.,
stoicism, essentialistic accounts of human nature, and
Rousseau's doctrine of the state of nature.

I proceed to a

discussion of the antinaturalism of the unconditional will
to truth, the hypothesis of the "true world," and the
presupposition of moral equality.

After this, I examine the

hypothesis of the will to power as the basis of Nietzsche's
naturalism.

The implications of naturalism for morality are

developed through an interpretation of a text from The Gay
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science entitled "Long Live Physics!" where Nietzsche
attempts to undermine traditional conceptions of moral
judgment and replace them with a conception of moral
discourse in which legislative conditions predominate.

I

conclude this chapter by indicating the relevance of "Long
Live Physics!," and related texts, for Nietzsche's
conception of autonomy and for understanding the
relationship of Nietzsche and Kant.
What Naturalism Might Be: Some Suggestions
Nietzsche's naturalism has been interpreted in a wide
variety of ways.

It would be helpful to survey briefly some

prominent views in order to get a sense of this diversity
and to determine which aspects of Nietzsche's position
remain unclear.

In this section I will discuss the

interpretations of Jilrgen Habermas, Hans Seigfried, Richard
Schacht, Robert

c.

Solomon, Theodore R. Schatzki, and

Michael J. Mattis.
On Habermas' view, Nietzsche fails in his attempt to
merge the contradictory presuppositions of naturalism and
positivism.

For Habermas, Nietzsche's naturalism involves a

recognition of the connection of knowledge and interests.
Nietzsche's positivism is found in his rejection of
metaphysics and in his restriction of legitimate knowledge
to the findings of the natural sciences.

Nietzsche's

naturalistic connection of knowledge and interests is
opposed to positivism's rigid fact-value distinction.
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Habermas argues that the tension between these two positions
is problematic.

As a positivist, Nietzsche's devaluation of

metaphysics leads to nihilism, while as a naturalist he is
unable to exclude any knowledge claims as invalid.
Consequently, Habermas concludes, Nietzsche's position
collapses into subjectivistic skepticism. 9
In opposition to Habermas, Seigfried emphasizes the
importance of natural science for Nietzsche's naturalism.
On his view, Nietzsche's attitude towards science cannot be
dismissed as merely positivistic.

Seigfried interprets

naturalism as a "radically experimental morality" that must
be sharply distinguished from traditional attempts to
isolate directives of action in "the tendencies and
propensities of our natural drives.

1110

On this view,

Nietzsche uses the experimental paradigm of modern science
as a model for moral reasoning.

As a result, Seigfried

concludes that, for Nietzsche, "insistence on naturalism in
moral matters can mean only one thing, namely, that
successful experimental interaction between us and nature
alone can tell what good and evil and the conditions of good

9

Jilrgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests,
trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 297:
"The basis of knowledge in interest affects the possibility
of knowledge as such. Since this gratification of all needs
is congruent with the interest in self-preservation, any
illusion at random can put forth the same claim to validity,
as long as some need interprets the world through it."
1

~ans Seigfried, "Nietzsche's Natural Morality,"
Journal of Value Inquiry 26 (1992): 423.
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society are.

"11

Schacht maintains that naturalism is a
"reinterpretation of nature and humanity" in light of
Nietzsche's "de-deification of nature.

1112

Schacht links

this project to an "anthropological shift" in Nietzsche's
philosophy.

The purpose of this shift is "to arrive at an

understanding and appreciation of the kind of creature we
fundamentally are" in order to determine "what we may
become." 13

In other words, for Schacht, Nietzsche's

naturalism is a theory of human nature that has decisive
normative implications.
Solomon locates Nietzsche's naturalism in his shift
away from traditional rule-governed ethics to a concern with
personal style.

Solomon's interpretation stresses the role

of nihilism in Nietzsche's thought.

He offers a positive

interpretation of nihilism that emphasizes its "demand for
freedom from certain values as moral commands, namely,
'other worldly values'. 1114

Other-worldly values impose

"false needs and desires," while naturalistic values are
11

I b'd
1 •

,

429.

12

Richard Schacht, "Nietzsche's Gay Science, Or,
How To Naturalize Cheerfully," in Readina Nietzsche, ed.
Robert c. Solomon and Kathleen M. Higgins (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1988), 68.
13

Ibid., 75.

uRobert c. Solomon, "Nietzsche, Nihilism, and
Morality," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical Essays,
ed. Robert c. Solomon (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University
Press, 1973), 207.
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life-affirming, personal virtues arising from the
individual's needs, desires, aspirations, and interests. 15
According to Solomon, the gratification of needs and, the
integration of values within a whole personality replaces
the justification of actions or intentions by means of rules
and principles that characterizes traditional morality.
For Schatzki, Nietzsche's naturalism consists in "the
adoption of a biologically and physiologically informed
viewpoint on human life and history.

1116

The biological

dimension of Nietzsche's thought is found in his emphasis on
the Darwinian notion of the struggle for existence and in
his emphasis on "life."

In accordance with this biological

emphasis, values are seen as conditions of life that can
help or hinder the human species in its struggle for
existence.

Schatzki locates the physiological dimension of

Nietzsche's naturalism in his materialistic emphasis on the
body.

This is reflected in Nietzsche's concern with

diagnosing various forms of life as either strong or weak,
healthy or unhealthy . 17

It is also reflected in his concern

with the material aspects of life such as "heredity, racemixing, diet, climate, age, emigration, and disease.
15 I

b.1 d

•

I
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MTheodore R. Schatzki, "Ancient and Naturalistic
Themes in Nietzsche's Ethics," Nietzsche-studien 23 (1994):
150.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.

I
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As could be expected, Nietzsche's view is not without
its critics.

Mattis discusses Nietzsche's position within

the context of ethical naturalism.~

His thesis is that

Nietzsche's philosophy is inherently antinaturalistic.

The

primary tenet of ethical naturalism, according to Mattis, is
that value statements are reducible to factual statements
about natural qualities such as pleasure or happiness.

On

this view, moral values and actions are evaluated in
quantitative terms, based on whether or not they add to or
subtract from the natural quality in question.

Some forms

of ethical naturalism also involve developmental or
teleological notions of human perfectibility.

Although many

of Nietzsche's statements about ethics appear compatible
with both of these forms of ethical naturalism, Mattis
argues that the essence of Nietzsche's philosophy is
contrary to ethical naturalism because of the priority
Nietzsche gives to becoming.

Mattis concludes that

"Nietzsche's anti-naturalism (sic], then, consists in the
priority that he gives to becoming, a priority that
precludes the measurement of growth, and thus the
determination of value that naturalism presupposes is
possible."w

~ichael J. Mattis, "Nietzsche as AntiNaturalist [sic]," Philosophy Today (Summer, 1993): 170.
1

Wlbid., 175.
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What Naturalism Is Not
The preceding survey sketched the spectrum of opinion
concerning Nietzsche's naturalism.

While all of the

philosophers I have discussed agree that naturalism is a
significant feature of Nietzsche's philosophy, each of them
characterizes Nietzsche's naturalism in a different way.
Habermas describes it as an overcoming of the fact-value
distinction, Seigfried as the moral adoption of the
experimental spirit of science, Schacht as an inquiry into
human nature, Solomon as individualistic self-affirmation,
and Schatzki as materialistic biologism.

In opposition to

these interpretations, Mattis argues that Nietzsche's
emphasis on becoming is inherently antinaturalistic.
Given the lack of agreement about Nietzsche's
naturalism it appears necessary to continue the
investigation into its meaning.

An appropriate way to

continue this investigation is to look at texts where
Nietzsche discusses philosophical views in which the concept
of nature plays a significant role.

This will show how

Nietzsche's naturalism differs from some philosophical
positions that have been considered naturalistic.

In this

section I discuss Nietzsche's critique of stoicism,
essentialistic accounts of human nature, and Rousseau's
concept of the state of nature.

This will allow me to

establish what Nietzsche's naturalism is not before I go on
to discuss what I think is a plausible and comprehensive
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account of Nietzsche's positive view of naturalism that
builds upon the work of the commentators in the preceding
section.
Before discussing Nietzsche's critique of stoicism I
must consider the theory of truth that is presupposed by his
critique.

Nietzsche's early writings contain a metaphorical

conception of truth that is opposed to the view that truth
is the correspondence of words with reality.

On Nietzsche's

view, words relate us to the world through a two-step
process in which perceptions are transformed into nerve
stimuli and these stimuli are transformed into sound.
Because sense data must pass through these disparate
mediums, words bear only a metaphorical relationship to
things as they are in-themselves. 21

Therefore, truth should

not be understood as the correspondence of words and objects
but as an agreement within a linguistic community to use
language in accordance with communally agreed upon
conventions. 22
Nietzsche's critique of the correspondence theory of

21

Nietzsche, "On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral
Sense," in Philosophy and Truth: Selections from Nietzsche's
Notebooks of the Early 1870's, ed. and trans. Daniel
·
Breazeale (New Jersey: Humanities Paperback Library, 1979),
82-83: "It is this way with all of us concerning language:
we believe that we know something about the things
themselves when we speak of trees, colors, snow, and
flowers; and yet we possess nothing but metaphors for
things--metaphors which correspond in no way to the original
entities."
22

Ibid. , 84.
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truth extends to the realistic view that scientific laws are
descriptive of nature in-itself.

In Beyond Good and Evil he

challenges the view that physics reads-off laws that are
inscribed in nature.

Nietzsche cannot assert that the

realist's conception of nature's conformity to law is false
without tacitly presupposing some sort of privileged access
to nature, which is precisely what he wants to deny.
Therefore, he challenges the realist indirectly.

He argues

that physics is not an explanation of natural occurrences,
but rather a pragmatically justified interpretation of these
occurrences. 23

He defends this claim by proposing an

alternative interpretation of scientific laws which can
achieve the same results as the realist's view without the
realist's dogmatic assumptions.
Nietzsche contends that the realist's notion of
"nature's conformity to law" is the product of an
anthropomorphic interpretation of nature under the influence
of the "democratic instincts of the modern sou1. 11 M

He does

not object to this interpretation, per se, but rather to the
claim that this interpretation is the only possible
naeyond Good and Evil, no. 14, 211: "It is perhaps
just dawning on five or six minds that physics, too, is only
an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to suit us, if
I may say so!) and not a world explanation . . . . "
24

Ibid., no. 22, 220: '"Everywhere equality before
the law; nature is no different in that respect, no better
off than we are'--a fine instance of ulterior motivation, in
which the plebeian antagonism to everything privileged and
autocratic as well as a second and more refined atheism are
disguised once more."
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interpretation.

He points out that one could conceivably

interpret nature in terms of "the tyrannically inconsiderate
and relentless enforcement of claims of power" and yet reach
the same conclusion as the realist:
. an interpreter . . . might, nevertheless, end by
asserting the same about this world as you do, namely,
that it has a 'necessary' and 'calculable' course, not
because laws obtain in it, but because they are
absolutely lacking, and every power draws its ultimate
consequences at every moment. 25
On Nietzsche's view, the laws of nature cannot simply
be read-off from nature.

Laws of nature are not simply

generalizations based on the passive observation of
regularities in nature.

What we learn from nature,

according to Nietzsche, is a function of a transaction with
nature in which we approach nature through active
experimentation based on research programs that we have
designed.

What is crucial to recognize is that on this view

it is human beings and not nature that poses the
questions. 26

This does not result in mere constructivism

because the laws that are established in this way are
functions of interactions between intelligent beings and
nature.

Laws are not "imposed," i.e., they are not merely
25

Ibid.

~Cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxiii: "· . .
a light broke upon all students of nature. They learned
that reason has insight only into that which it produces
after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself
to be kept, as it were, in nature's leading-strings, but
must itself show the way with principles of judgment based
upon fixed laws, constraining nature to give answers to
questions of reason's own determining."
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free-floating constructions, but neither are they "found,"
i.e., they are not conceiver-independent natural realities.
This brief discussion of Nietzsche's views on truth is
sufficient to provide the background needed to understand
his critique of the stoic conception of nature.

It is

important to keep in mind that Nietzsche is not attacking
any specific formulation of stoicism, but rather a kind of
generalized stoic position.

Roughly speaking, the view that

Nietzsche has in mind is that there is a rational principle
operative within nature that can be known and that can be
used to guide human action.

If we accept this

characterization of stoicism, then Nietzsche's critique can
be anticipated based on the conception of truth sketched
above.
If the rational principle operative in nature, i.e.,
nature's apparently law-like behavior, is the product of
human interpretation, then attempting to conform to nature,
or attempting to locate objective norms of action within the
workings of nature, must be understood as fundamentally
mistaken.

This explains Nietzsche's hostility to stoicism,

which he views as an elaborate form of self-deception:
. while you pretend rapturously to read the canon
of your law in nature, you want something opposite, you
strange actors and self-deceivers! Your pride wants to
impose your morality, your ideal, on nature--even on
nature--and incorporate them in her; you demand that
she should be nature 'according to the Stoa,' and you
would like all existence to exist only after your own
image--as an immense eternal glorification and
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generalization of Stoicism.n
Analogously, if our conception of nature is the result
of a transaction between nature and our experiments, then
the same must be true for human nature as well.

Nietzsche

discusses the concept of human nature in Human. All Too
Human within the context of a critique of philosophical
method.

He refers to the lack of a sense of history, the

belief in absolute facts and eternal truths, as the "family
failing of philosophers."u

One of the consequences of this

lack of historical sense is that philosophers assume that
human nature is fixed and unchanging.

Rejecting this view,

Nietzsche maintains that a fully developed sense of history
would show that philosophical analyses of human nature have
been restricted to human nature as it appears within
narrowly circumscribed historical contexts. 29

Nietzsche

concedes that the basic features of humanity probably have
not altered much during the course of recorded history.
Nevertheless, he also maintains that this does not justify
the conclusions of the historically unconscious
metaphysician who finds
. . . 'instincts' in man as he now is and assumes that
these belong to the unalterable facts of mankind and to
that extent could provide a key to the understanding of
the world in general: the whole of teleology is
constructed by speaking of the man of the last four
27

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 9, 205-206.
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Human. All Too Human, no. 2, 12.
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millennia as of an eternal man towards (sic) whom all
things in the world have had a natural relationship
from the time he began. 30
Nietzsche's critique of Rousseau's doctrine of the
state of nature builds on his criticisms of stoicism and the
idea of human nature.

The idea of a state of nature

originally served as a means employed by social contract
theorists to explain the origin of civil society and the
state.

Thomas Hobbes argues in Leviathan that human

equality in the state of nature leads to competition for
scarce goods, resulting in a continual state of war "of
every man, against every man. " 31

In the Discourse on the

Origin and Foundations of Inequality and The Social Contract
Rousseau argues, in contrast to Hobbes' position in
Leviathan, that the natural state of humanity is one of
equality, peace, and goodness.

In contrast to Hobbes,

Rousseau maintains that it is civilization, not natural
competition, that is morally corrupting. 32
One of the implications of Nietzsche's position is that
a state of natural humanity such as that referred to by both
Hobbes and Rousseau does not exist.
30
31

Ibid.

I

On his view, Rousseau's

13.

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (London: Penguin, 1987),

185.
32

Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin
and Foundation of Inequality, in The First and Second
Discourses, trans. Roger D. and Judith R. Masters (New York:
st. Martin's Press, 1964), 193: "Men are wicked; sad and
continual experience spares the need for proof. However,
man is naturally good; I believe I have demonstrated it."
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doctrine of the state of nature is "a kind of attempt to
read moral Christian 'humanity' into nature--.
Elsewhere,~

1133

Nietzsche argues that Rousseau's thesis

regarding the harmful effects of civilization upon morality
in the Discourse on the Arts and Sciences constitutes a
revealing reversal of cause and effect.

In Daybreak he

notes that it is equally likely that morality is responsible
for the present state of social decline and the only way to
settle the matter is by experiment. 35

While Rousseau uses

the notion of a state of nature as a hypothetical standpoint
from which to criticize society, Nietzsche takes it as a
symptom of the desire "to have a corner of the world into
which man and his torments could not enter.

.

1136

For Nietzsche, each of these purportedly naturalistic
positions, i.e., stoicism, essentialistic account of human
nature, and the idea of a state of nature, manifests a
pattern of presuppositions that undermines their
naturalistic pretensions.

Appeals to the moral order of

nature, the timeless essence of human nature, or to an

33

The Will to Power, no. 340, 186.

~Daybreak, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1982), no. 17, 16.

"Ibid., no. 163, 100: "The truth cannot possibly
be on both sides: and is it on either of them? Test them
and see."
36

In the next chapter I discuss Nietzsche's effort
to avoid the charge that he is arguing ad hominem in this
and similar cases.
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idyllic state of nature tacitly express the desire to flee
from the empirical world of nature and history, thereby
absolving humanity of any ultimate responsibility for its
actions.

In other words, a "true world" is constructed in

relation to which the only accepted attitude is one of
passive conformity.

Nietzsche refers to this as the

mentality of an antinatural morality.
Antinatural morality is the expression of an
interrelated set of epistemological, metaphysical, and
normative presuppositions.

These antinatural components

feed back into and reinforce each other, thus creating a
kind of closed system.

Antinatural presuppositions become

reified in cultural and social institutions (especially
religion and morality) which then work to support and
protect them.

This circularity is an important reason why

Nietzsche criticizes traditional philosophical attempts to
ground morality on an a priori foundation.

If philosophy

and reason are based on antinatural assumptions, then
grounding morality upon a foundation of a priori reason
reduces to an exercise in question-begging. 37

37

As a result,

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 186, 288: "What
philosophers called 'a rational foundation for morality' and
tried to supply was, seen in the right light, merely a
scholarly variation on the common faith in the prevalent
morality; a new means of expression for this faith; and thus
just another fact within a particular morality; indeed, in
the last analysis a kind of denial that this morality might
ever be considered problematic--certainly the very opposite
of an examination, analysis, questioning, and vivisection of
this very faith."
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the real problem of morality is left unresolved.

This

problem reveals itself only when many different moralities
are compared on the basis of their value for life. 38
But why does Nietzsche place so much emphasis on the
need for a critique of moral values from a perspective that
is not implicated in antinaturalism?

Nietzsche maintains

that an escape from the perspective of antinaturalism might
create the conditions for moral values that affirm and
foster life in a psychologically cleaner and healthier sense
than has been the case up until now.

Nietzsche repeatedly

asserts that the human beings cultivated within antinatural
morality are of a degenerate, unhealthy type.

Moreover, he

maintains that the logic of antinaturalism is now drawing
its ultimate conclusions and that the lack of any
alternative value system threatens a decline into nihilism.
As Nietzsche puts it in his notes, "[one] interpretation has
collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation
it now seems as if there were no meaning at all in
existence, as if everything were in vain."D
What is Antinatural?
~Ibid.
See also On the Genealogy of Morals,
preface no. 3, 453.
39

The Will to Power, no. 55, p. 35. These basic
factors also amplify each other. For example, Nietzsche
argues that the degenerate form of humanity cultivated
within herd morality is unlikely to even recognize the onset
of nihilism, let alone offer a positive response to it.
See, e.g., Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Prologue,"
no. 5, 130.
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The most fundamental reason for Nietzsche's opposition
to traditionally conceived morality is that it is in some
sense antinatural.

But what does Nietzsche mean when he

says that morality is antinatural?

In this section I will

formulate an answer to the question 'What is Antinatural?'
through an examination of its epistemological, metaphysical,
and normative features.
The Antinaturalism of Epistemology
The antinaturalness of epistemology is found in the
unconditional will to truth.

According to Nietzsche, the

basis of knowledge consists in the interaction of logical
fictions, "the purely invented world of the unconditional
and self-identical," with the absolute randomness of the
universe, which organizes it into coherent experience. 40
Thinking about the world in terms of these logical fictions,
e.g., "thing," "substance," "body," is indispensable for
human survival, but the truth value of these logical
fictions cannot be measured against an ultimately correct
perception of reality because we lack access to any such
reality. 41

In other words, we must come to acknowledge

"untruth as a condition of life. 110

If, as Nietzsche

maintains, untruth is a condition of life, then it follows

40

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 4, 202.

41

The Gay Science, no. 110, 169.

42

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 4, 202.
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that the insistence on the unconditional value of truth must
be seen as contrary to the basic interests of life.
Given the necessity of conceptual simplification and
falsification, Nietzsche infers that "[the] falseness of a
judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a
1143

judgment.

He proceeds to speculate that the

"falsest" judgments, among which he includes Kant's
synthetic a priori judgments, might be the most necessary
for human survival.«

What matters in a judgment is not its

truth, but "to what extent it is life-promoting, lifepreserving, species-preserving, perhaps even speciescul ti vating. 1145
The pragmatic value of conceptual falsification
underlies one of the central antitheses in Nietzsche's
philosophy--the antithesis of art and morality.

Morality,

especially Christian morality, insists on absolute truth:
"it says stubbornly and inexorably, 'I am morality itself,
and nothing besides is morality.'"%

Consequently,

traditionally conceived morality, is inherently critical of

~Ibid.,

no. 4, 201.

«Ibid., 202: "And we are fundamentally inclined to
claim that the falsest judgments (which include the
synthetic judgments a priori) are the most indispensable for
US•

•

•

•II
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%Ibid., no. 202, 306.
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everything artistic, relegating art to the realm of

lies.~

In morality's hostility to art Nietzsche locates a hostility
to life,
. a furious, vengeful antipathy to life itself: for
all life is based on semblance, art, deception, points
of view, and the necessity of perspectives and error. 48
Life, which requires perspective and error, in the form of
conceptual falsification, must be in error when viewed from
the absolute standards of morality.

Thus, for Nietzsche,

morality represents a "will to negate life," and, possibly,
"the danger of dangers.

1149

In contrast, art, viewed from the perspective of the
artist, recognizes the importance of falsification for life.
Art represents the "good will to appearance" which removes
morality from the realm of being and relegates it to the
realm of deception "as semblance, delusion, error,
interpretation, contrivance, art."~

In other words,

morality is viewed as a fiction used for the management of
human affairs.
The relegation of morality to the realm of
interpretation is also a consequence of the progress of
science.

Without the cultivation of art, and the artistic

47

The Birth of Tragedy, "Attempt at a SelfCriticism," no. 5, 23.
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recognition of the interpretive, perspectival character of
human mental life, the results of science, i.e., "the
realization that delusion and error are conditions of human
knowledge and sensation," would, Nietzsche maintains, "lead
us to nausea and suicide. 1151

Since art and not morality

provides the means to counteract the nihilistic threat of
science, it is art that deserves our ultimate gratitude. 52
The Antinaturalism of Metaphysics
The antinatural will to negate life is also present in
metaphysics.

Metaphysics places the source of the highest

values in a fictitious realm of being, a "true world," which
lowers the value of this world and human life to a
corresponding degree.

The most directly perceivable reason

for the creation of a true world is found in two erroneous
assumptions which, Nietzsche maintains, underlie all
metaphysical reasoning.

The first is the assumption of the

validity of logic that leads us to assume the existence of
value oppositions such as good and evil, true and false.
This is the faith that Nietzsche refers to as "the faith in

51

The Gay Science, no. 107, 163.

llrbid.: "If we had not welcomed the arts and
invented this kind of cult of the untrue, then the
realization of general untruth and mendaciousness that now
comes to us through science--the realization that delusion
and error are conditions of human knowledge and sensation-would be utterly unbearable. Honesty would lead us to
nausea and suicide. But now there is a counterforce against
our honesty that helps us to avoid such consequences: art as
the good will to appearance."
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opposite values.

1153

The second assumption is that something

cannot originate from its opposite, e.g., good out of evil.
If the positive pole of these value oppositions cannot have
originated out of the negative, then a fortiori the highest
values cannot have an earthly origin, but must instead have
a "peculiar" source in "the lap of Being, the intransitory,
the hidden god, the 'thing-in-itself'--there must be their
basis, and nowhere else." 54

This, in turn, necessitates the

postulation of a transcendent, "true world" which can serve
as the locus of the highest values.

On Nietzsche's view,

Plato's realm of the forms, the Christian after-life, and
Kant's thing-in-itself serve as the prime examples of true
worlds.
In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche sums up his
objections to the hypothesis of the true world in four
elementary propositions.

These four propositions illustrate

how Nietzsche vacillates between criticism of the conceptual
difficulties associated with the true world and criticism of
the hidden motives latent in this doctrine.

Nietzsche's

first proposition states that the reasons cited for
distinguishing the world of appearance from reality are the
same reasons that demonstrate the reality of appearance. 55

~Beyond

55

no. 6, 484.

Good and Evil, no. 2, 200.

Twilight of the Idols, "'Reason' in Philosophy,"

52

The hypothesis of the true world begins with the premise
that there is a different type of reality than that of
appearance.

But Nietzsche asserts that the existence of any

type of reality other than that of appearance is "absolutely
indemonstrable. " 56

Therefore, the distinction between a

true and an apparent world collapses.
The reasoning behind Nietzsche's first proposition is
expanded in a second proposition that states that the
criteria which have been used to determine the "true being"
of a thing, e.g., substance and permanence, are actually the
criteria of non-being in the realm of appearance.

As

Nietzsche puts it, "the 'true world' has been constructed
out of contradiction to the actual world.

.

1157

This

reduces the true world to the status of the apparent world
"insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion."~
The transition from the second to the third of
Nietzsche's propositions marks the transition from his
conceptual critique of the true world to a critique of its
underlying assumptions.

Nietzsche's third proposition

states that "fables" about the inaccessible realm of true
being are meaningless, "unless an instinct of slander,
detraction, and suspicion against life has gained an upper

56

Ibid.
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hand in us.

• . . 1159

Nietzsche's fourth proposition sums-up

this line of criticism by stating that any distinction
between a "true" and an "apparent" world is a sign of
decadence and "a symptom of the decline of life." 60
The Antinaturalism of Universal Moral Norms
The final aspect of antinaturalism that I will discuss
concerns Nietzsche's opposition to universal moral norms.
Nietzsche's association of universal moral norms with
antinaturalism is clear from remarks such as one, found in
The Antichrist, where he writes that the conception of the
good as "impersonal and universally valid" is both a chimera
and the expression of the "final exhaustion of life.
1161

In order to see why Nietzsche associates universal

moral norms with antinaturalism it is important to recognize
that any conception of universal moral norms must presuppose
moral equality among agents.

That is, despite obvious

physical and mental differences, some morally relevant
characteristic common to all agents must be assumed if moral
demands are to be universalizable.

In Kantian morality, for

example, agents are morally equal due to their rational
nature, while in John Stuart Mill's writings it is the
common human desire to attain pleasure and avoid pain that

59
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Antichrist, no. 11, 577.
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makes it possible for Mill to formulate a universal standard
of right and wrong action. 62
Nietzsche maintains that if people were, in fact,
morally equal, i.e., "similar in strength and value
standards," then the idea of "placing one's will on a par
with that of someone else" would be a reasonable demand upon
individuals. 63

If people are not morally equal, however,

then the desire to impose universal moral norms takes on an
arbitrary quality that Nietzsche interprets as symptomatic
of a more basic, but disguised, sentiment.
One of the distinguishing features of Nietzsche's
conception of morality is his outright rejection of moral
equality.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, for example, he makes

the following declaration:
• • . to me justice speaks thus: 'Men are not equal.'
Nor shall they become equal! What would my love of the
overman be if I spoke otherwise?M
Elsewhere, Nietzsche remarks that the acceptance of equality
as a fundamental principle of society represents "a will to
the denial of life, a principle of disintegration and
decay.

1165

The desire for equality is taken as symptomatic

of a will to revenge on the part of those who are morally

62

John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism,
Hackett, 1979), 7.
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MThus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas,-" 213.
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inferior.

Nietzsche refers to those who preach equality as

"tarantulas," i.e., creatures who kill slowly by injecting
their victims with poison.M

The tarantulas are morally

inferior, not in the sense of being bad, but in the sense of
being incapable of legislating their own values.

Thus their

will to revenge expresses itself as the desire to pass
judgment and condemn those who are capable of legislating
their own values:
Out of every one of their complaints sounds revenge; in
their praise there is always a sting, and to be a judge
seems bliss to them. 67
This secret will to revenge on the part of those who
defend moral equality is not sufficient to explain why
Nietzsche associates moral equality and universal moral
norms with the antinatural denial of life.

To understand

this association it must be recognized that, for Nietzsche,
life is the highest "value."

All other values are to be

determined only in reference to their value for life.

The

value of life itself, however, cannot be estimated.
Consequently, "judgments of value, concerning life, for it
or against it, can, in the end, never be true: they have

Daybreak,
bitten by
spiritual
Nietzsche

Mrn passing I note that in the pref ace to
no. 3, 3, Nietzsche remarks that Kant had been
the "moral tarantula" Rousseau, who, as the
father of the French Revolution, represents to
the preacher of equality par excellance.
~Thus

Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas," 212.

56
value only as symptoms.

1168

Because life is the

highest value, anything that elevates, enhances, or affirms
it becomes valuable as a means.

Conversely, "(w)hatever is

not a condition of life harms it. .

"

69

Within

antinaturalism, Nietzsche maintains that this evaluation of
life is not recognized because there it is truth and not
life that holds the highest value.

Within antinaturalism,

whatever is most harmful to life is thought to have the
highest value and is called "true," while "whatever elevates
it, enhances, affirms, justifies it, and makes it
triumphant, is called 'false.

11170

Antinaturalism assumes moral equality as a precondition of universal moral norms.

To Nietzsche this

represents a radical and life-denying reversal of values
because life requires inequality, conflict, and obstacles to
overcome. 71

Why does Nietzsche think that life requires

inequality?

Because, as he puts it in Beyond Good and Evil:

. . • life is essentially appropriation, injury,
overpowering of what is alien and weaker; suppression,
hardness, imposition of one's own forms, incorporation
and at least, at its mildest exploitation. . . . 72
Focusing for the moment on the idea that life essentially
68

Twiliqht of the Idols, "The Problem of Socrates,"
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involves the "imposition of one's own forms," it immediately
becomes clear why Nietzsche would be fundamentally opposed
to any conception of universal moral norms.

If life is

understood as value-positing activity, then accepting values
that are imposed from an external source must be viewed as
antithetical to the essence of life.

And Nietzsche equates

any conception of universal moral norms as an imposition of
external values.
In opposition to universal moral norms, Nietzsche
maintains that virtues must be personal creations or they
are harmful to life.

As he says in The Antichrist, "[a]

virtue must be our own invention, our most necessary selfexpression and self-defense, any other kind of virtue is
merely a danger."n

This conclusion helps us get a sense of

why Nietzsche places himself in opposition to Kantian
morality.

On Nietzsche's view, Kant's conception of virtue

is impersonal, "prompted solely by a feeling of respect for
the concept of 'virtue,'" and a "sacrifice to the Moloch of
abstraction.nu

Thus, for Nietzsche, Kantian morality is

not merely antinatural, it is the epitome of antinaturalism:
"How could one fail to feel how Kant's categorical
imperative endangered life itself! 1175
Thus far I have given a negative characterization of
nThe Antichrist, no. 11, 577.
74
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Nietzsche's naturalism as it arises out of his opposition to
antinaturalism.

The opposition of naturalism and

antinaturalism is the opposition of two alternative
conceptions of life.

The naturalist interprets life as

essentially value-positing activity:
When we speak of values, we speak with the inspiration,
with the way of looking at things, which is part of
life: life itself forces us to posit values; life
itself values through us when we posit values. 76
If we are to gain a positive understanding of naturalism,
and what Nietzsche means by a naturalistic morality, we must
reach a better understanding of this value-positing activity
that he identifies with life.

Fortunately, this task is not

as difficult as it may at first appear because Nietzsche
provides us with an important clue to understanding what he
means by life.

"Life," he writes in Beyond Good and Evil,

"simply is will to power. 1177

Therefore, a positive

characterization of Nietzsche's conception of naturalism
cannot be separated from an account of Nietzsche's idea of
the will to power.
What is Naturalism?

The Will to Power as Basic Principle

The purpose of Nietzsche's naturalism is to provide the
means to create an alternative conceptual framework within
which to reconstruct "the laws of life and action" that is
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not implicated in antinaturalism.

As we have already seen,

the critique of antinaturalism is an important aspect of
Nietzsche's position.

But Nietzsche's naturalism also has a

positive aspect that involves a determination of the
conditions of life which can serve as the standard for the
creation of new values, laws, and ideals.
Positively speaking, Nietzsche's naturalism is an
attempt to integrate the techniques of critical analysis
used in the historical disciplines with the interpretive and
experimental strategies of the natural sciences into a
unified philosophical method.

In Human. All Too Human

Nietzsche refers to his naturalistic method as "historical
philosophy. 1178

This name is somewhat misleading, however.

Nietzsche's notion of historical philosophy should not be
confused with historicism, like that which forms the basis
of Dilthey's attempt to provide a conceptual foundation for
the human sciences.

Dilthey attempts to develop a rigorous

method for the human sciences distinct from the mechanistic
mode of understanding that he associates with the natural
sciences. 79

In contrast to Dilthey's radical separation of

the historical and natural sciences, Nietzsche maintains
that historical philosophy "· . . can no longer be separated

78

Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, no. 1, 12.

~Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics (Evanston:
Northwestern University Press, 1969), 98ff.
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from natural science. .

What must be clarified is

precisely how Nietzsche merges the conceptual strategies of
historical inquiry and natural science into a coherent
philosophical method.

Nietzsche does this by providing a

principle which creates the basis for a unified explanatory
framework.

The will to power serves as this unifying

principle. 81
The will to power is intended as a means of tempering
the mechanistic mode of explanation Nietzsche associates
with positivistic science and the teleological mode of
explanation he associates with the historical sciences.

The

hypothesis of the will to power is inspired by
methodological considerations that bear a strong resemblance
to William of Ockham's strictures against the needless
multiplication of entities.

Nietzsche's methodological

assumption is contained in the following statement from
Beyond Good and Evil:
Not to assume several kinds of
experiment of making do with a
pushed to its utmost limit . .
method which one may not shirk

causality until the
single one has been
. that is a moral of
today--it follows 'from
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The following operational and interpretational
account of the will to power is inspired by Hans Seigfried,
"Law, Regularity, and Sameness: A Nietzschean Account," Man
and World 6 {1973): 372-389. My discussion of the will to
power will be guided by the account found in Nietzsche's
published works and focuses primarily on the formulations
found in Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of
Morals.
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its definition,' as a mathematician would say.~
The hypothesis of the will to power begins with the
premise that the only "reality" that we have access to is
the world of our desires and passions and their
interaction. 83

If this is the case, then Nietzsche's

methodological principle dictates that the experiment be
undertaken to determine whether the model of efficient
interaction of forces provided by the interplay of our
drives and passions is sufficient to interpret the
mechanistic world of causal relations.

Nietzsche maintains

that if all aspects of conscious life and organic functions,
such as nourishment and procreation, could be interpreted as
manifestations of one fundamental form of the will, namely
the will to power, then
• . . one would have gained the right to determine all
efficient force univocally as--will to power. The
world viewed from inside, the world defined and
determined according to its 'intelligible character'-it would be 'will to power' and nothing else.--M
The point of Nietzsche's argument seems to be that the
ideal of inquiry should be a single explanatory principle
and that this principle would do nothing more (but nothing
less) than make appearance intelligible.

This principle is

limited to making appearance intelligible, it has no
pretensions of transcendent validity.

In other words, the
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will to power acts as a methodological principle of
interpretation and not as a metaphysical principle.

It does

not describe the essence or nature of reality, but rather
provides a principle by means of which we can understand
appearance.
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche refers to the
will to power as a "major point of historical method" which
can be used to reject the teleological mode of
explanation. 85

He illustrates this through an examination

of the origin and purpose of punishment.

Typically,

Nietzsche argues, moral historians seek a purpose in
punishment, e.g., revenge or deterrence, which is then reinterpreted as the cause of punishment's origin. 86
Nietzsche contends, however, that this manner of
investigation is based on a faulty methodological
assumption.

The origins of a concept or a practice are

different from its actual employment, purpose, or utility at
any given moment:
. . . whatever exists, having somehow come into being,
is again and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken
over, transformed, and redirected by some power
.
t o 1' t • • • • ~
superior
The same is true, Nietzsche argues, within the organic world
as well.

All events reflect a subduing and "becoming
85
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master," i.e., a new interpretation or adaptation overcomes
a previously dominant meaning.

Thus the purpose or utility

presently possessed by something cannot be taken as the
expression of a telos inherent in the thing, but only as a
sign that "a will to power has become master of something
less powerful and imposed upon it the character of a
function.

. • . " 88

The history of the thing or concept can

be understood as a "continuous sign-chain" of mutually
independent interpretations which, taken as a whole, does
not develop in any necessary, law-like, or logical manner. 89
As Nietzsche sums up this point, "[the] form is fluid, but
the 'meaning' is even more so." 90
Within this framework, progress is not the result of an
increase in utility, but "in the shape of the will and a way
to greater power and is always carried through at the
expense of numerous smaller powers. " 91

It is this sense of

the will to power that also opposes the mechanistic mode of
scientific explanation that prioritizes the reactive concept

88
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of adaptation and, as a result, loses the essential concept
of activity.

Adaptation, i.e., activity of the second rank,

is placed in the foreground, rather than the form-giving
interpretive activity of the will to power. 92
The will to power as an explanatory principle comes to
fruition in the form of genealogy.

Once again this can be

illustrated by reference to the concept of punishment.

The

present meaning of the concept of punishment is a synthesis
of numerous successive interpretations that have crystalized
into a unity that resists analysis.

Such concepts elude

univocal definition because they compress an entire range of
historically variable and mutually independent meanings.

As

a result, it is impossible to justify punishment because the
concept itself is indefinable: "·
history is definable.""

only that which has no

In order to resolve this problem,

Nietzsche introduces the idea of genealogy as an inquiry
into the history of origins.
Genealogy frees a conceptual horizon for normative
reconstruction by penetrating beneath the accrued
sedimentation of meanings contained in moral concepts and
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Ibid., 515: "Thus the essence of life, its will
to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority
of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving
forces that give new interpretations and directions,
although 'adaptation' follows only after this; the dominant
role of the highest functionaries within the organism itself
in which the will to life appears active and form-giving is
denied."
93

I b'd
i
•

,

no. 13 , 516 .

65

calling into question their necessary validity.

As we have

seen, the present meaning of a concept, such as punishment,
is the result of a tangled history of successive meanings:
At an earlier stage, on the contrary, this synthesis of
'meanings' can still be disentangled, as well as
changed; one can still perceive how in each individual
case the elements of the synthesis undergo a shift in
value and rearrange themselves accordingly, so that now
this, now that element comes to the fore and dominates
at the expense of others; and under certain
circumstances one element (the purpose of deterrence
perhaps) appears to overcome all the remaining
elements. 94
This passage neatly sums up the reasoning behind Nietzsche's
genealogical investigation into the origin of slave morality
in On the Genealogy of Morals. 95

Nietzsche's intent is not

to show that slave morality is false or incorrect by tracing
its origins to the ressentiment of the weak against the
strong.

Rather, Nietzsche's intent is two-fold.

On the one

hand, he wants to undermine slave morality's claim to
absolute validity and necessity by tracing its origin to
contingent historical events.

On the other hand, Nietzsche

is trying to show that more than one type of morality is
possible.
The genealogical study of moral concepts introduces the
enormous task of tracing the origins of individual moral
concepts and writing the history of their development.
"Where," Nietzsche asks, "could you find a history of love,
94
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"Nietzsche's characterization of master and slave
moralities is discussed extensively in chapter three, below.
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of avarice, of envy, of conscience, of pious respect for
tradition, or of cruelty?"%

Nietzsche proposes research

programs to study the moral effects of the regular division
of the day, of different foods, human co-habitation, and the
manners of scholars, artists, and businessmen.~

He

contends that if these and many other investigations were
carried out, then "the most insidious question of all" would
arise:
• • . whether science can furnish goals of action after
it has proved that it can take such goals away and
annihilate them; and then experimentation would be in
order that would allow every kind of heroism to find
satisfaction--centuries of experimentation that might
eclipse all the great projects and sacrifices of
history to date. So far, science has not yet built its
cyclopic buildings; but the time for that, too, will
come. §s
According to Nietzsche, we have entered a period of
moral interregnum, between an era dominated by moral
feelings and judgments and a new era whose ideals will be
based on knowledge of human life and the conditions of
culture as determined by "the sciences of physiology,
medicine, sociology, and solitude . . . . " 99

During this

period of moral interregnum, Nietzsche contends that "the
best we can do . .

. is to be as far as possible our own

reges and found little experimental states.
%The Gay Science, no. 7, 81.
~Ibid.,

81-82.
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experiments: let us also want to be them!

11100

Nietzsche's rejection of traditional forms of morality
has, of course, been the subject of much controversy.

It

has been argued that the loss of absolute moral standards
has led to the rise of subjectivistic immoralism and that
Nietzsche is, in some sense, responsible for this situation.
Variations of this claim are found in the writings of
Alasdair Macintyre and Kurt Rudolf Fischer.
Macintyre's interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophy in
After Virtue is found within an extensive analysis and
critique of contemporary ethical discourse.

According to

Macintyre, modern ethical discourse has become detached from
its meaning-giving ground in a society organized around the
shared presuppositions of an Aristotelian conception of
ethical virtue.

Without this foundation in a shared

community of virtues, ethical discourse loses its objective
source of legitimacy and authority.

The result is an

emotivistic moral environment in which the rational
resolution of moral problems becomes impossible.

This

conclusion motivates Macintyre's effort to reconstruct the
basis of moral discourse by integrating a notion of the
virtues into the structure of modern society.
Nietzsche's role in Macintyre's discussion is pivotal,
00

Ibid., 191. See also The Gay Science, no. 319,
253: "But we, we others who thirst after reason, are
determined to scrutinize our experiences as severely as a
scientific experiment--hour after hour, day after day. We
ourselves wish to be our experiments and guinea pigs."
'
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but ambiguous.

On Macintyre's view, Nietzsche's primary

philosophical distinction is
• • . to understand . . • not only that what purported
to be appeals to objectivity were in fact expressions
of subjective will, but also the nature of the problems
that this poses for moral philosophy . 101
But Nietzsche's prescient diagnosis of the problems within
contemporary moral discourse leads to a worsening of the
disease rather than a cure.

Although Macintyre believes

that Nietzsche recognizes the subjectivistic/emotivistic
bases of modern morality, his attempt to address this
situation only exacerbates it:
The underlying
as follows: if
expressions of
will creates •
existence 'new
In short,

Macin~yre

structure of (Nietzsche's) argument is
there is nothing to morality but
will, my morality can only be what my
• . I myself must now bring into
tables of what is good. ' 102
concludes that Nietzsche supplants moral

reason with a form of "prophetic irrationalism" that finds
its most extreme expression in "that at once absurd and
dangerous fantasy, the Ubermensch. " 103
Fischer argues that Nietzsche's experimental
perspective is responsible for the rise of modern moral
irrationalism.

Fischer claims that Nietzsche's philosophy

is not only inflammatory, but that it is also indirectly
responsible for the rise of National Socialism in Germany.
~Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, second edition
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), 106.
102
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Fischer maintains that Nazism is "a phenomenon of postNietzschean culture." 104

He argues that the existential

element of Nietzsche's notion of experimentalism, especially
when taken in conjunction with his antidemocratic
sentiments, paves the way for Nazism and, ultimately, for
Auschwitz, by making possible a consciousness "that excluded
nothing anyone might think, feel, or do, including
unimaginable atrocities carried out on a gigantic order." 1 ~
I believe that Kathryn Pyne Parsons provides an
effective means to address Fischer's and Macintyre's
criticisms.

Parsons sees a connection between Nietzsche's

views and the Aristotelian notion of the "great souled man."
Within the Nietzschean framework, genuine values are not the
product of a pre-existing moral code.

They must instead be

created by the individual who overcomes the model of the
self that holds sway within the dominant moral paradigm.

As

Parsons puts it, "In this self-overcoming, one creates
himself (sic] anew, and creates values." 106

On Parsons'

view, traditional forms of moral justification by means of
moral principles act as "a sort of post hoc rationalization,
taking this rationalization as essential to morality." 107
104
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Nietzsche urges a paradigm shift away from traditional
morality's concern with questions of obligation, rules, and
principles, and toward the character of the individual moral
agent. 1 ~

Within the dominant moral paradigm, however,

Nietzsche's moral revolution cannot be recognized as moral
because within this paradigm morality is synonymous with
universal moral norms.

This explains why Nietzsche's moral

philosophy cannot be recognized as such from the perspective
of Macintyre and Fischer.
Parsons has provided an important clue to understanding
Nietzsche's position by characterizing it as a shift away
from the traditional moral paradigm and the historically
dominant form of moral judgment.

But I believe that she has

mistakenly characterized this paradigm shift as a move away
from moral laws and principles per se and towards a concern
with character and style on the model of Aristotelian
virtue.

The virtue-based conception that Parsons attempts

to impose on Nietzsche appears to be at odds with
Nietzsche's characterization of the change in moral
reasoning he is attempting to carry out.

Nietzsche does not

advocate the elimination of principles, rules, and laws, but
rather a radical reconceptualization of our relationship to
the principles, rules, and laws with which we govern our
lives.
As an indication of this reconceptualization consider
1 •
·~ I b'd
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Nietzsche's remarks toward the end of "Long Live Physics!"
from The Gay Science. 1w

Nietzsche urges the elimination of

traditional forms of moral judgment:
Sitting in moral judgment should offend our taste. Let
us leave such chatter and such bad taste to those who
have nothing else to do but drag the past a few steps
further through time and who never live in the rresent-which is to say the many, the great majority. 11
Moral judgment appears to have a peculiarly reactive quality
because we can only pass judgments on actions that have
already occurred.

In contrast to the reactivity of moral

judgment Nietzsche proposes a more active alternative:
We • . . want to become those we are--human beings who
are new, unique, incomparable, who give themselves
laws, who create themselves. 111
In the next and concluding section of this chapter I will
discuss what I take to be the meaning of Nietzsche's move
away from moral value judgment and toward value legislation
and indicate the relevance of this move for understanding
Nietzsche's critique of Kant.
The Consequences of Naturalism: "Lonq Live Phvsics!"
and the Prioritization of Legislative Discourse
In the context of the regulation of human conduct and
action we can understand a law in the most general sense as
an exceptionless rule or directive principle.

A moral law

is expressed in the form of a command or imperative that
iwThe Gay Science, no. 335, 266.
llOibid.
111
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places whoever is subject to it under a binding obligation.
Thus, the idea of a law implicitly contains elements of both
commanding and obeying.

An autonomous will is one that

unites the activities of commanding and obeying by being
both the source of the command and that which obeys.

In

other words, an autonomous will is self-legislative: it is
both the author and the subject of the law.
Commanding and obeying are the psychological
counterparts of the juridical functions of legislation and
judgment.

Commanding and obeying can be called the

subjective forms of legislation and judgment.

Legislation

is the act of issuing commands that will serve as rules or
directives and judgment is the act of subsuming an action or
intention under pre-existing rules or directive principles.
Legislation and judgment are both necessary features of laws
of conduct.

Any complete conception of autonomy as self-

legislation must, therefore, contain both the creative
element of legislation and the administrative aspect of
judgment.
Although legislation and judgment are both necessary
features of laws of conduct, it is not necessary that both
elements be present to the same degree in every moral
system.

From a logical point of view, moral judgment

presupposes some form of prior value legislation.

We cannot

make a moral judgment without at least some pre-existing
standards or principles to direct our judgment.

From a
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historical point of view, however, the role of legislation
in morality has been relatively minor.

On Nietzsche's view,

the moral tradition founded by Plato and disseminated by the
spread of Christianity has prioritized judgment over
legislation in characterizing the deliberation of moral
agents.

Legislative activity is curtailed by the presumably

transcendent origin of the moral law.

Within this moral

tradition, the legislative power of the moral law derives
from its non-natural status and purity.

Nietzsche sums up

his position regarding this conception of the moral law in a
passage from Daybreak:
[Up to now] the moral law has been supposed to stand
above our own likes and dislikes: one did not want
actually to impose this law upon oneself, one wanted to
take it from somewhere or discover it somewhere or have
Iteommanded to one from somewhere. 112
-In other words, within this moral tradition, Nietzsche
maintains that the dominant relationship to the moral law is
one of reactive passivity that reflects a slavish attitude.
We should not conclude from the preceding discussion
that Nietzsche depreciates the value of a moral framework in
which judgment predominates.

In Beyond Good and Evil, for

example, he criticizes the anarchist who complains about
being subject to "capricious" laws:
But the curious fact is that all there is or has been
on earth of freedom, subtlety, boldness, dance, and
masterly sureness, whether in thought itself or in
government, or in rhetoric and persuasion, in the arts
just as in ethics, has developed only owing to the
112
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'tyranny of such capricious laws'; and in all
seriousness, the probability is by no means small that
precisely this is "nature" and "natural"--and not that
laisser-aller . 113
It is not the fact of law that Nietzsche rejects.

Nietzsche

sees the "tyranny" of law as indispensable to the education
of the human spirit. 114

As the passage quoted above

suggests, human nature is not a concept that is antithetical
to law.

Rather, human nature is the product of the laws

that human beings give themselves.

Nietzsche's model is

that of the artist, who is most natural and inspired
precisely when obeying thousandfold laws,
• . . laws that precisely on account of their hardness
and determination defy all formulations through
concepts (even the firmest concept is, compared with
them, not free of fluctuation, multiplicity, and
ambiguity) . 115
The model of the artist is also true of morality as well,
according to Nietzsche.

The "moral imperative of nature"

requires long obedience to laws as a means of spiritual
discipline . 116

This moral imperative of nature, however, is

sharply distinguished from Kant's categorical imperative in
that it is neither categorical nor directed to the

113
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individual. 117
From this we can conclude that Nietzsche does not
necessarily reject moral frameworks in which judgment and
obedience are present.

Rather, what he objects to are moral

frameworks in which considerations of judgment are given
precedence over legislative considerations.

On Nietzsche's

view there are deep philosophical difficulties bound up with
a conception of morality in which judgment is given
priority.

In order to see this it is necessary to consider

Nietzsche's critique of moral judgment contained in "Long
Live Physics!"
In "Long Live Physics!" Nietzsche attempts a reductio
ad absurdum of traditional conceptions of moral judgment. 118
The model of moral reasoning that Nietzsche discusses is
contained in the following passage:
To come to the point: when a human being judges 'this
is right' and then infers 'therefore it must be done,'
and then proceeds to do what he has thus recognized as
right and designated as necessary--then the essence of
his action is moral (263).
Nietzsche's characterization of this form of moral
reasoning is missing several key premises.

These premisses

can be supplied and the position that Nietzsche is
criticizing can be reconstructed in the following manner
(Nietzsche's version appears as steps four through nine of

118
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this reconstruction):
{l) If person P judges actions of a certain type to be
morally right, and if P desires to act morally, then P
must perform actions of that type.
{2) P judges actions of type X to be morally right.
{3) Therefore, P ·must perform actions of type X, if P
desires to act morally.
{4) Action A is judged by P to be of type X.
{5) Therefore, A is morally right.
{6) Therefore, P must perform A, if P desires to act
morally.
{7) P desires to act morally.
{8) P must do A.
{9) P does A.
On this model, actions are morally justified by being
subsumed under a category of action type that is deemed
morally correct.

The proposed action then becomes the

subject of a series of inferences that culminate in an
action-guiding judgment.

On Nietzsche's view, however, this

model of moral reasoning is seriously flawed because its
conception of action is unnecessarily restricted:
But my friend, you are speaking of three actions
instead of one. When you judge 'this is right,' that
is an action, too. Might it not be possible that one
could judge in a moral and in an immoral manner? (263)
As actions, acts of judgment and inference can also be moral
or immoral, according to Nietzsche.

Thus, acts of judgment

and inference cannot serve to justify our actions without
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being justified themselves.

Therefore, on Nietzsche's view,

if we remain at the level of judgment and inference, then
this model of moral reasoning is threatened with an infinite
regress.

The attempt to morally justify an action in turn

necessitates actions (judgments and inferences) which
themselves must be justified, and so on, ad infinitum.

The

question then becomes, can we bring this regress to a halt?
How can we justify our acts of moral judgment and inference
and thereby justify our actions?
Nietzsche turns to the claim that we can stop the
regress of justification by appealing to non-cognitive
grounds that are immediate and hence do not require acts of
judgment.

In particular, he discusses the appeal to moral

conscience to justify our moral principles:
Why do you consider this, precisely this, right?
'Because this is what my conscience tells me; and the
voice of conscience is never immoral, for it alone
determines what is to be moral' (263).
Nietzsche objects that such intuitionistic appeals do not
halt the regress of justification, but merely push it back a
step.

This is the case because the intuitionist's appeal to

the voice of conscience to justify moral principles must
itself be justified:
But why do you listen to the voice of your conscience?
And what gives you the right to consider such a
judgment true and infallible? (263)
On Nietzsche's view, the moral conscience is not a pure
source of moral rightness; it has a "pre-history in your
instincts, likes, dislikes, experiences, and lack of
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experiences" (263-264).

If this origin were fully

understood, however, it would not provide an answer to the
more fundamental question--why listen to the voice of
conscience?

Even if the voice of conscience exists, it must

be interpreted before it can be applied in specific moral
judgments.

Conscience can be listened to in a variety of

ways, e.g., blindly, lovingly, stupidly, and badly {264).
The voice of conscience may simply be the outward form of a
secret prejudice or self-interest.

Thus, the firmness or

decisiveness of the moral conscience may, in fact, be a sign
of its immorality:
And, briefly, if you had thought more subtly, observed
better, and learned more, you certainly would not go on
calling this 'duty' of yours and this 'conscience' of
yours duty and conscience. Your understanding of the
manner in which moral judgments have originated would
spoil these grand words for you . . . {264).
To sum up: Nietzsche's criticisms pose a dilemma for
the moral justification of action.

On the one hand, if we

attempt to justify the appeal to the voice of conscience or
moral intuition by means of judgment or inference we are
threatened with circularity: our appeal to conscience was
designed to halt the regress of justification of action in
terms of judgment or inference.

On the other hand, if we

justify our appeal to conscience with yet another appeal to
conscience, we find ourselves in yet another regress.
The difficulties raised by his critique of moral
judgment prompt Nietzsche to propose an alternative mode of
moral discourse in which legislative considerations
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predominate.

We have already seen that Nietzsche proposes

that we strive to become self-legislative, self-creative
beings.

Nietzsche's intent is not to eliminate moral

judgment, but to reverse the priority of judgment over
legislation.

We must come to recognize the importance of

legislative considerations and take an active part in
legislation by giving ourselves goals of action.

Only after

this is done, Nietzsche argues, would it be possible for
there to be universal moral laws:
Only if mankind possessed a universally recognized goal
would it be possible to propose 'thus and thus is the
right course of action': for the present there exists
no such goal.
It is thus irrational and trivial to
impose the demands of morality upon mankind.
--To
recommend a goal to mankind is something quite
different: the goal is then thought of as something
which lies in our own discretion; supposing the
recommendation appealed to mankind, it could in pursuit
of it also impose urion itself a moral law, likewise at
its own discretion. 19
As this passage makes clear, however, Nietzsche's goal is
not merely a reversal of the priority of judgment over
legislation.

If it were, then Nietzsche's view would reduce

to a constructivistic morality that would not be an advance
over the metaphysically based view that he is trying to
supplant.

Nietzsche's point is not that legislation implies

the imposition of goals of action upon human beings, but
rather that legislation recommends goals of action, the
adoption of which is left up to our discretion, and is
subject to future revision.
119

Unlike a mere imposition, a
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recommendation is contextual; it cannot be determined in
abstraction from the concrete circumstances of life.
only be adopted in an experimental fashion.

It can

If it turns out

that a particular goal is detrimental to life, then it
should either be modified or abandoned in favor of another
goal that furthers the interest of life. 120
The passage quoted above is also significant because it
helps to clarify both the similarities and differences
between Nietzsche's idea of self-legislation and Kant's
conception of autonomy.

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic

of Morals Kant defines autonomy of the will as "the property
the will has of being a law to itself.

11121

Many of

Nietzsche's formulations of his conception of selflegislation are reminiscent of Kant's.

For example, in

Daybreak Nietzsche asks us to consider the possibility of a
future treatment of criminal behavior in which a wrongdoer
. . • calls himself to account and publicly dictates
his own punishment, in the proud feeling that he is
thus honoring the law which he himself has made, that
by punishing himself he is exercising his power, the
122
power of the lawgiver. .
Nietzsche maintains that this state of affairs presupposes a
conception of lawgiving based on the idea that "'I submit
only to the law which I myself have given, in great things

12
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and in small. '" 123
Kant's moral philosophy represents to Nietzsche a
failed attempt to prioritize the self-legislative power of
the will over considerations of moral judgment.

In Kant's

writings this prioritization has its roots in his
realization that "reason has insight only into that which it
produces after a plan of its own . . . . 11124

In the context

of Kant's theory of practical reason, the shift from
judgment to legislation is clear.

Things in nature act in

accordance with laws, argues Kant, but only a rational being
"has the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws-that is, in accordance with principles--and only so has he a
will. 11125

An autonomous will is one that has the power "of

being a law to itself." 1M

Self-legislation takes on a

special form in the human will because we are not completely
rational beings.

The human will is divided between its

rational and its material sources of motivation.

Such a

will cannot be genuinely self-legislative, according to
Kant, unless it is able to free itself from all sensuous
determinations and material motivations and direct itself by
a rational, a priori principle.

Thus, on Kant's view, a

human will is autonomous only when the faculty of choice is
123
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directed by pure practical reason.

The moral law derived

from pure practical reason is experienced by the ordinary
moral consciousness as duty and is formalized in Kant's
supreme moral principle, the categorical imperative:
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at
the same time as a principle establishing universal
law. u121
What makes Kant's effort so ironical to Nietzsche is
that it is carried out completely a priori, in total
isolation from all empirical considerations.

In Human, All

Too Human Nietzsche remarks that Kant constructs his moral
theory "as if everyone knew without further ado what mode of
action would benefit the whole of mankind . . . . 11128

In

fact, on Kant's view, separating the metaphysics of morals
from empirical considerations derived from anthropology and
physics is indispensable to both moral theorizing and
action.u9

For Nietzsche, in contrast, it is precisely to

these sciences that we must turn in order to gather
knowledge about human life and culture that can serve as a
"scientific standard" for setting for ourselves ecumenical
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execution of moral precepts."
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goals. 130

As he remarks at the end of "Long Live Physics! ",

all previous values and ideals "have been based on ignorance
of physics or were constructed so as to contradict it. 11131
But in order to become legislators in Nietzsche's sense,
i.e., those who create values, "we must become the best
learners and discoverers of everything that is lawful and
necessary in the world.

.

"132

Therefore, Nietzsche

concludes, we must become physicists . 133
I don't think that Nietzsche's call to us to become
physicists should be taken literally.
absurd.

This would be plainly

I think that when Nietzsche says that in order to

become autonomous we must become physicists he is implying
that the laws of morality need not be understood as being
essentially different in kind from the laws of physics.

The

laws of nature determined by physics are not simply the
result of an imposition of an interpretation by the
physicist, but rather the product of a transaction between
an experimental set-up on the one hand and nature on the
other.

While the laws of nature cannot be understood in

isolation from the creative activity of the physicist, they
cannot simply be reduced to this creativity either, without

13
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falling into constructivism.

Nietzsche contends that the

same is true of moral laws as well.

They cannot simply be

read-off of nature (or human nature), but neither can they
simply be imposed upon human beings without running the risk
of disaster.

Rather, moral laws must be understood as self-

imposed, and therefore as autonomous, but they must also be
understood from within the context of the empirical
circumstances in which they are adopted as ecumenical goals,
and therefore not simply as constructivistic.
From a metaphysical point of view, Nietzsche's position
entails the compatibility of freedom and causality.

In

other words, for Nietzsche, autonomy and the laws of physics
do not exclude each other.
opposed to Kant's position.

This view is diametrically
According to Kant, the world of

appearance is strictly determined by the laws of causality.
The type of freedom required by morality is thinkable only
as existing in the intelligible realm of the thing-initself.

Thus, for Kant, the realm of physics and the realm

of morality are absolutely separate. 1M
This explains why Nietzsche believes that Kant remains
within an antinatural moral framework despite the fact that
Kant introduces legislative considerations into morality.
Because Kant views freedom and causality as separate, he is
required to postulate a "true world" in which freedom can be
located.

On Nietzsche's view, however, Kant has exploited
IMKant, Groundwork, 78.
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his incompatibilism as a means to regain the metaphysical
realm excluded by the limitations placed on reason by the
first Critique.

Nietzsche's opposition to Kant is best

expressed in "Long Live Physics!":
--And now don't cite the categorical imperative, my
friend!
This term tickles my ear and makes me laugh
despite your serious presence.
It makes me think of
the old Kant who had obtained the "thing in itself" by
stealth--another very ridiculous thing!--and was
punished for this when the "categorical imperative"
crept stealthily into his heart and led him astray-back to "God," "soul," "freedom," and "immortality,"
like a fox who loses his way and goes astray back into
his cage. Yet it had been his strength and cleverness
that had broken open the cage! 135
Nietzsche's naturalism culminates with a radical
rejection of a separation of autonomy and causality, as well
as an insistence that empirical considerations cannot be
eliminated from morality.

This implies a fundamental

opposition to Kant's grounding of morality on a metaphysical
foundation and calls for a radical reconceptualization of
the Kantian conception of the autonomous moral self . 136

In

the next chapter I will explore the implications of
Nietzsche's naturalization of morality for Kant's moral
theory.

I will examine Nietzsche's attempt to undermine

Kant's "majestic moral structures"

by his attack on what he

sees as the antinaturalism of Kantian morality.

Various

aspects of Nietzsche's critique will be discussed, but I
1

"The Gay Science, no. 335, 264.

13

6victoria Wike, "Metaphysical Foundations of
Morality in Kant," Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (1983): 225234.
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will give particular attention to Nietzsche's interpretation
of Kant's categorical imperative.

As we will see,

Nietzsche's critique of the categorical imperative centers
on Kant's identification of autonomy of the will with duty,
i.e.,

the will's ability to universalize its subjective

principles of action.

CHAPTER THREE
NIETZSCHE'S CRITIQUE OF KANTIAN MORALITY
Introduction
In the transcendental dialectic of the Critique of Pure
Reason Kant states that his task is,
• . • to level the ground, and to render it
sufficiently secure for moral edifices of .
majestic dimensions. For this ground has been
honeycombed by subterranean workings [Maulwurfsgange)
which reason, in its confident but fruitless search for
hidden treasures, has carried out in all directions,
and which threaten the security of the
superstructures. 1
The metaphor of levelling the ground describes the dual
intent of Kant's critical project--to secure the foundations
of synthetic a priori knowledge within the bounds of
experience and, thereby, to make room for morality and
religious faith. 2

In the preface to Daybreak, Nietzsche

defines his philosophical objectives in opposition to Kant.
Nietzsche refers to himself as an underground man, a
subterranean creature, and a mole (Maulwurf), i.e., "one who
tunnels and mines and undermines. 113

This image captures

Nietzsche's intention to burrow into the foundations of
1

Critigue of Pure Reason, A 318-319/B 376-377.

2

Ibid., B xxx.

3

Daybreak, preface no. 1, 1.
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philosophical systems and expose the prejudices that they
rest upon.

It also captures the spirit of Nietzsche's aim

of toppling Kant's moral edifice by undermining the
foundation upon which it rests.
Nietzsche's critique of Kant's moral philosophy
proceeds indirectly.

Nietzsche rarely attacks Kant's

arguments on the grounds of their internal or logical
consistency.

This is not to say that Nietzsche completely

ignores this manner of criticism, but that the main focus of
his critique lies elsewhere.

He does not dispute Kant's

account of the consciousness of duty and categorical
imperative if this account is taken merely as a descriptive
analysis of how the prevailing form of morality actually
operates.

What Nietzsche objects to is Kant's view that his

account of morality reveals the a priori foundation of
morality.

In other words, Nietzsche wants to challenge the

view that morality must operate this way.

Nietzsche is

interested in determining how the form of morality given
philosophical expression by Kant came to be dominant, and in
determining whether or not a different form of morality,
conceived along naturalistic lines, might be possible.
Nietzsche's critique of Kant's moral philosophy takes
place within the framework created by his naturalistic
opposition to antinatural moralities.

On Nietzsche's view,

Kant's moral philosophy epitomizes the three aspects of
antinaturalism discussed in the previous chapter.

The
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unconditional will to truth is found in Kant's effort to
establish the a priori foundations of morality.

The true

world is represented by Kant's limitation of the scope of
pure reason, which allows for the postulation of the
necessary ideas of practical reason--God, freedom, and the
immortality of the soul.

The normative aspects of

antinaturalism are found in Kant's identification of an
autonomous will with one whose subjective principles are
determined by pure reason and are therefore suitable to
serve as universal laws of nature.
I will argue that Nietzsche's opposition to the
categorical imperative does not ultimately rest on an
incompatibility of his conception of autonomy and Kant's.
As I indicated in the previous chapter, Nietzsche follows
Kant in attempting to create a framework for human moral
agency in which the self-legislative activity of the will is
given priority over moral judgment.

Nietzsche's opposition

to Kant's conception of morality lies in the content of
Kant's theory of autonomy.

Kant links autonomy to the

universalizability of an individual's subjective principles
of action.

Universalizability in turn presupposes the moral

equality of agents.

As I suggested in the previous chapter,

however, Nietzsche rejects the presupposition of moral
equality because he believes that it inherently gives
greater emphasis to moral judgment over moral legislation.
On Nietzsche's view, therefore, universalizability and moral
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equality are incompatible with autonomy.

In other words,

from Nietzsche's naturalistic perspective, there is a deep
contradiction in Kantian morality between the will's
autonomy and the content of the will's autonomy, namely
universalizability, that serves to undermine Kant's account
of autonomy.
I begin this chapter with an examination of Nietzsche's
early rejection of Kant's denial of knowledge to make room
for faith.

This lays the foundation for an examination of

Nietzsche's attack on Kant's "moral fanaticism" and on the
uncritical moral prejudices he believes are reif ied in
Kant's conception of the moral consciousness.

In the

following section I contrast Kant's and Nietzsche's
positions regarding the a priori foundations of ordinary
moral knowledge.

I then turn to an examination of

Nietzsche's master-slave dialectic in On the Genealogy of
Morals and apply the results of my analysis to Kant's
conception of autonomy as formalized in the categorical
imperative.

I conclude this chapter with a brief critical

discussion of Nietzsche's critique of Kantian morality.
Making Room for Art: Nietzsche's Early
Opposition to Kant
In this section I examine Nietzsche's opposition to
Kant's transcendental idealism.

To understand Nietzsche's

relationship to Kant it is crucial to recall Kant's remark
in the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure
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Reason that he has found it necessary "to deny knowledge in
order to make room for faith. " 4

This can be taken as the

motto of Kant's attempt to revolutionize metaphysics and
transform it into a scientific discipline while at the same
time making possible a metaphysical basis for morality.

He

does this by limiting the legitimate claims of synthetic g
priori reason to objects of possible sense experience.
Kant's limitation of reason has direct practical
implications.

The effort of traditional metaphysics to

extend the speculative principles of reason beyond the
bounds of sensibility threatens to make reality identical
with the sensible. 5

But the practical employment of pure

reason inevitably goes beyond the limits of sensibility,
according to Kant.

Therefore, if left unlimited,

speculative reason actually reduces the scope of reason as a
whole by eliminating the possibility of pure practical
reason.

In short, limiting speculative reason has a

positive effect in that it finds room within reality in
which to postulate the necessary objects of practical
reason, i.e., God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul,
without in any way extending knowledge beyond the limits of
sensibility. 6

In Kant's words, knowledge is denied to make

room for faith.
4Critigue

5Ibid.,
6

of Pure Reason, B xxx.

B xxiv-xxv.

Ibid., B xxv.
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Nietzsche's early reception of Kant's critical
philosophy is inseparable from his effort to address what he
interprets as the widespread cultural fragmentation
resulting from the rise of a positivistic conception of
knowledge.

Nietzsche's understanding of the wider

implications of positivism can be summarized as follows.
Positivism maintains that natural science is the only source
of universally true statements (natural laws) about reality.
It therefore invades the hitherto privileged domain of
metaphysics and harbors pretentions to absolute knowledge.
As a result of positivism's absolutism, metaphysical
knowledge is left without rational support and cannot
therefore serve as a ground for norms, values, and ideals.
Moreover, these norms, values, and ideals themselves lose
their rational support.
Science is a potential source of cultural degeneration,
according to Nietzsche, because it can undermine traditional
religious, moral, and aesthetic values while putting nothing
in their place. 7

Moreover, by assuming reality is co-

extensive with the sensible world of appearance,
positivistically conceived science undermines the
possibility of providing its own search for knowledge with a

7See,

e.g., Schopenhauer as Educator, in Untimely
Meditations, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983), no. 4, 148: "The sciences, pursued
without any restraint and in a spirit of the blindest .
laissez-faire are shattering and dissolving all firmly held
belief . . . . "
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normative ideal or purpose.

In other words, positivism

implicitly contradicts its claims of pr1ority for its form
of rationality by becoming a fragmented and desperate search
for knowledge without any unifying purpose or human
relevance.

Within this environment the critical task for

philosophy, as Nietzsche conceives it, is to restore the
unity of knowledge and life, to establish a unifying goal of
existence in the face of the positivistic devaluation of the
highest values, and, thereby, to re-establish the basis for
a genuine culture.

To achieve this end, Nietzsche turns in

The Birth of Tragedy to the culture of ancient Greece in his
search for an historical precedent that can, perhaps, point
the way out of the crisis.
In The Birth of Tragedy Nietzsche locates the origin of
Attic tragedy in the satyr chorus and follows its
development through the golden age of Greek philosophy.
Attic tragedy is the product of a peace treaty between the
opposing art deities Apollo and Dionysus.

Representational

arts, i.e., sculpture and epic poetry, as well as the realm
of dreams, belong to Apollo.

Music, lyric poetry, and

intoxication belong to Dionysus.
as the principle of individuation.

Apollo is also described
The peace treaty that

unites Apollo and Dionysus is disrupted by the introduction
of dialectic into the tragic drama by Euripedes, and by
Socrates.

Socrates disrupts the balance that makes the

tragic experience possible--the ability of the dramatic
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chorus to allow the spectator to behold in Apollinian
rapture the presence of Dionysus--and thereby causes the
death of tragedy.
Socrates' role in The Birth of Tragedy is analogous to
the destructive potential of positivism in modern society.
Socrates is the "prototype of the theoretical optimist" who
believes that reality in-itself can be known via science. 8
Socrates' optimism parallels the belief that Nietzsche
associates with positivistic science, i.e., that reality initself can be completely captured in the net of logic and
science.

The optimistic belief in science is destructive

because it rules out the possibility of other realms of
experience where the values that we create could apply and
make sense.

But it is precisely within the optimism of

positivistic science that Nietzsche locates the possibility
of the re-birth of tragic culture.

The scope of knowledge

is constantly expanding and with every increase in knowledge
the perimeter shared by the known and the unknown increases.
Therefore, Nietzsche contends, the positivistic dream of
absolute knowledge must continuously be frustrated.
Nietzsche believes that this unending, and increasingly more
desperate, search for knowledge can eventually lead to
skeptical despair among the practitioners of science who

8

The Birth of Tragedy, no. 15, 97.
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might then turn to art "as a protection and remedy.

119

Thus

at the heart of scientific optimism lies the potential for
tragic insight.
On Nietzsche's view, the critical philosophies of Kant
and Schopenhauer provide the basis for a critique of
posi ti vistic science. 10

As I mentioned above, Kant rejects

the identification of the real with the sensible, and limits
the claims of pure, a priori reason to the realm of
appearance.

For Kant, this limitation of theoretical

knowledge has the positive effect of allowing for a realm of
reality distinct from appearance in which the necessary
ideas of morality and faith can be postulated, without in
any way extending our knowledge to the suprasensible.

In

The Birth of Tragedy, the issue is not a priori reason, but
rather the destruction of tragedy at the hands of scientific
Socratism.

Nevertheless, in the following passage Nietzsche

adopts a quasi-Kantian formulation of the problem while
translating it into his own idiom:
Anyone who has ever experienced the pleasure of
9

Ibid., 98: "· . . when they see to their horror
how logic coils up at these boundaries and finally bites its
own tale--suddenly the new form of insight breaks through,
tragic insight which, merely to be endured, needs art as
protection and remedy."
'°Ibid., no. 19, 120-121: "Let us recollect . . .
that Kant and Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit
of German philosophy . . . to destroy scientific Socratism's
complacent delight in existence by establishing its
[Socratism's] boundaries; how through this delimitation was
introduced an infinitely profounder and more serious view of
ethical problems and of art . . . . "
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Socratic insight and felt how, spreading in everwidening circles, it seeks to embrace the whole world
of appearances, will never again find any stimulus
towards existence more violent than the craving to
complete this conquest and weave the net impenetrably
tight. 11
Just as for Kant the dogmatic identification of the
real and the sensible leaves no room for faith, positivism
weaves the net of knowledge too tightly, leaving no room for
art to flourish and reveal the tragic ground of existence.
Kant circumvents his version of the problem by limiting the
scope of reason, thus allowing the postulation of a
metaphysical world beyond the world of appearance.
Despite the fact that Nietzsche incorporates Kant's
language into his analysis of the problems of
positivistically conceived science, he does not accept
Kant's solution to the problem.

Rather than simply denying

knowledge in order to make room for art, thus implicitly
assuming a distinction between knowledge and art, Nietzsche
suggests that we look at knowledge, particularly scientific
knowledge in a new way.

He suggests that we "look at

science in the perspective of the artist.

1112

In other

words, on Nietzsche's view, it might be possible to view
knowledge, not from the passive perspective of a neutral
observing spectator, but from a more active, i.e., artistic
point of view.

Knowledge must be transformed from the

11

Ibid., no. 15, 97.

12

Ibid., "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," no. 2, 19.
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neutral, value-free collection of facts to an active,
experimental, transactional relationship with our subject
matter.

This view of knowledge is more active and artistic

because it recognizes that our experiments are the product
of research programs that we have designed.

In other words,

science, like religion and myth, becomes simply one of the
numerous ways in which appearance can be interpreted in
order to give meaning to existence.

Viewed in this way it

becomes possible to weave the net of knowledge "more tightly
and delicately," increasing, rather than limiting its scope,
without falling into the trap of traditional metaphysics. 13
Looking back on this period in his "Attempt at a Selfcriticism," added to the 1886 edition of The Birth of
Tragedy, Nietzsche expresses regret at trying to incorporate
his artists' metaphysics into the framework of Kantian and
Schopenhauerian philosophy:
How I regret now that in those days I still lacked the
courage (or immodesty?) to permit myself in every way
an individual language of my own for such individual
views and hazards--and that instead I tried laboriously
to express by means of Schopenhauerian and Kantian
formulas strange new valuations which were basically at
odds with Kant's and Schopenhauer's spirit and
taste! 1114
As early as Schopenhauer as Educator Nietzsche's enthusiasm
for Kant begins to wane.

Here Nietzsche characterizes

Kant's denial of knowledge as a means of "fashioning an idle

13

Ibi'd., n o • 15 , 98 .

uibid., "Attempt at a Self-Criticism," no. 6, 24.
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skepticism that will soon be of no interest to anybody.

1115

By the time of Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche's opposition
to Kant is already well-established.

In the introduction to

the first Critique Kant frames his inquiry as a means to
answer the question "How are a priori synthetic judgments
possible? 1116

Nietzsche objects to the "Tartuffery" implicit

in Kant's answer to this question:
'How are synthetic judgments a priori possible?' Kant
asked himself--and what really is his answer?
'~
virtue of a faculty'--but unfortunately not in five
words, but so circumstantially, venerably, and with
such a display of German profundity and curlicues that
people simply failed to note the comical niaiserie
allemande involved in such an answer. 17
In order to highlight the "German foolishness" of Kant's
answer, Nietzsche compares it to the answer of the doctor in
Moliere's Tartuffe.

Nietzsche recounts how in response to

the question "'How does opium induce sleep?'" the doctor
replies that it possesses a sleepy faculty "'whose nature it
is to put the senses to sleep. '

1118

In other words,

Moliere's doctor begs the question by merely reformulating
the question in his answer.
Nietzsche maintains that a similar kind of questionbegging is apparent in Kant's denial of knowledge in order
to make room for faith.

According to Nietzsche, Kant's

15

Schopenhauer as Educator, no. 8, 188.

16

Cr i tigue of Pure Reason, B 19 .

17Beyond
18

Ibid.

Good and Evil, no. 11, 208.
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effort to establish the metaphysical bases of morality is
problematic for a number of reasons.

On Nietzsche's view,

Kant's moral philosophy undermines the critical philosophy
as a whole by implicitly returning it to the horizon of
traditional metaphysics.

Kant's distinction between

appearances and things-in-themselves limits speculative
reason to the domain of possible experience, while at the
same time making it possible for reason, in its practical
application, to postulate God, freedom, and immortality.

By

allowing practical reason to have suprasensible application,
however limited, Nietzsche believes that Kant simply gives
back with one hand what he had taken away with the other:
A path had been found on which one could sneak back to
the old ideal. The conception of a "true world," the
conception of morality as the essence of the world
(those two most malignant errors of all time!), were
once again, thanks to a wily and shrewd skepticism, if
not provable, at least no longer refutable. Reason,
the right of reason, does not extend that far.
Reality
had been reduced to mere "appearance," and a
mendaciously fabricated world, the world of being, was
honored as reality. Kant's success is merely a
19
theologians' success. .
According to Nietzsche, this helps to explain why Kant's
"discovery" of a faculty of synthetic a priori judgment was
greeted with jubilation by the ensuing generation of
Tilbingen seminarians--who soon began to beat the bushes "all
looking for 'faculties'."w
19

The Antichrist no. 10, 577.
Science, no. 335, 264.
20

See also The Gay

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 11, 208.
Antichrist, no. 10, 576.

See also The
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Kant's attempt to establish the metaphysical bases of
morality is also problematic on Nietzsche's view because it
takes morality for granted.

Kant denies knowledge to make

room for faith and morality, but morality is uncritically
accepted as a "fact of reason. " 21

In other words, Kant

accepts morality as a fact and apparently never questions
its basic soundness.

Thus, in Nietzsche's eyes, Kant's

critical philosophy reduces to an elaborate instrument the
purpose of which is to provide a post hoc justification for
the ordinary moral consciousness:
. • . to create room for his 'moral realm' [Kant] saw
himself obliged to posit an undemonstrable world, a
logical 'Beyond'--it was for precisely that that he had
need of his critique of pure reason!
In other words:
he would not have had need of it if one thing had not
been more vital to him than anything else: to render
the 'moral realm' unassailable, even better
incomprehensible to reason--for he felt that a moral
order of things was only too assailable by reason! 22
In the next section I discuss Nietzsche's view that Kant's
faith in morality, his "moral fanaticism," is, in part, the
expression of an element of irrationalism and unrecognized
moral prejudice at the heart of his moral rationalism.
Nietzsche on Kant's "Moral Fanaticism"
Kant's moral philosophy is rationalistic.

Kant argues

that if the moral law is to be a source of obligation, then
it must be absolutely necessary, i.e., valid for the will of

21

Cri tigue of Practical Reason, 31.

22

Daybreak, pref ace no. 3, 3 .
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all rational beings.

Therefore, the moral law cannot be

based on any specific features of human nature or history,
nor on the merely contingent consequences of human actions,
but must instead be sought a priori in the concept of
rational being as such and in the idea of rational
willing. 23
As Lewis White Beck has noted, "[the] 'moral judgment
of every man' is the true starting point of the Kantian
moral philosophy.

1124

This should not be surprising

given the general strategy of Kant's critical philosophy,
which begins with the fact of coherent experience and works
back to the a priori conditions that make experience
possible.

The same is true within a moral context as well.

Kant takes the experience of obligation, consciousness of
the moral law, as a fact of reason and proceeds analytically
to its a priori basis in the concept of a rational being
with a will of its own. 25

23 Groundwork,

74-76. See also 79: "Since moral
laws have to hold for every rational being as such, we ought
. • . to derive our principles from the general concept of a
rational being as such . . . . "
24

Lewis White Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
"Critique of Practical Reason" (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1960), 164.
25

critique of Practical Reason, 31. My account of
Kant's method relies on the analytic of ordinary moral
knowledge in the first chapter of the Groundwork. Although
incomplete from the standpoint of Kant interpretation, this
approach allows me to highlight Kant's position on the
essential soundness of ordinary practical reason that is the
focus of many of Nietzsche's criticisms.
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Kant argues that mere objects act in conformity to
objective laws of nature.

A rational being, however, "has

the power to act in accordance with his idea of laws--that
is, in accordance with principles--and so has he a

will."~

A will is absolutely good if it is impossible for it to be
evil, that is, if its subjective principle ("maxim") when
raised to the level of a universal law of nature "can never
be in conflict with itself."v

If reason infallibly

determines the will (as is the case with God's "holy will"),
then objectively necessary actions are also subjectively
necessary.

In other words, for a holy will there are no

imperatives--no "I ought," but only "I will. " 28

If reason

does not infallibly determine the will (as is the case with
the human will), then objectively necessary actions are
subjectively contingent, "and the determining of such a will
in accordance with objective laws is

necessitation."~

This

necessitation is experienced by the ordinary moral
consciousness as duty, and it forms the basis of Kant's
supreme moral principle, the categorical imperative:
So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at
the same time as a principle establishing universal
law. 30
26

Groundwork, 80.

27

Ibid., 104.

28

Ibid., 81.

29

Ibid., 80.

30

critj,gue of P;racticS!l Reason, 30.
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One of the interesting features of Nietzsche's critique
of the categorical imperative, and of Kantian morality as a
whole, is that Nietzsche does not focus his critique on the
formalistic and rationalistic elements of Kant's account of
morality, as is frequently the case.

Instead, Nietzsche

emphasizes what he interprets as the uncritical aspects of
Kant's moral philosophy.

on Nietzsche's view, Kant's moral

philosophy simultaneously expresses the moral enthusiasm of
the eighteenth century, a peculiarly German tendency to
idealize the inclination to obedience, and "a subterranean
Christianity. 1131
Nietzsche's critique is guided by the principle that
"moralities

a~e

. . . merely a sign language of the

affects. 1132

When one penetrates beneath the external

logical form of a moral system one discovers that it
implicitly expresses the emotive qualities of its creator.
A moral system may be seen as an indication that its creator
desires self-justification, self-satisfaction, humiliation,
revenge, self-concealment, forgetfulness, or simply to be

31

The Will to Power, no. 101, 64. "Kant: inferior
in his psychology and knowledge of human nature; way off
when it comes to great historical values (French
Revolution); a moral fanatic a la Rousseau; a subterranean
Christianity in his values; a dogmatist through and through,
but ponderously sick of this inclination, to such an extent
that he wished to tyrannize it, but also weary right away of
skepticism; not yet touched by the slightest breath of
cosmopolitan taste and the beauty of antiquity--a delayer
and mediator, nothing original . . . . 11
32

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 187, 290.
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forgotten.

Kant is no exception.

"Even apart from the

value of such claims as 'there is a categorical imperative
in us,'" Nietzsche remarks, "one can still always ask: what
does such a claim tell us about the man who makes it? 1133
What does Nietzsche think the categorical imperative tells
us about Kant?

Nietzsche believes that the categorical

imperative is the expression of an implicit tendency to
idealize obedience and conformity: "· . . some others,
perhaps including Kant, suggest with their morality: 'what
deserves respect in me is that I can obey--and you ought not
to be different from me.

11134

Before proceeding it is important to anticipate a
possible objection to this aspect of Nietzsche's critique of
Kant.

Is Nietzsche simply conducting an ad hominem attack

on Kant's personality rather than critically addressing the
substance of Kant's moral philosophy?

Nietzsche often

refers to Kant as a "moral fanatic" and reproaches his
"innocent moral enthusiasm."

If such remarks are not ad

hominem, what is their philosophical justification?
Nietzsche's principle that moralities are a sign
language of the affects is a corollary of a more general
hermeneutic principle that takes philosophical concepts and

33

I b'd
1 . , no. 187, 289.

34 I

b'd
1 . , 289-290.
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systems as the involuntary autobiography of their
creators. 35

On Nietzsche's view, every philosophical system

expresses the mood and personality of its creator.

Working

backwards from the clue of personality one can theoretically
reconstruct the spirit of an age and the possibilities for
human development that existed at that time. 36

The

philosophical personality acts as a clue to its overall
conceptual environment, and thus serves as a critical or
diagnostic tool for the philosophical physician.

Therefore,

against the charge that he is arguing ad hominem Nietzsche
responds:
. . . I never attack persons; I merely avail myself of
the person as of a strong magnifying glass that allows
one to make visible a general but creeping and elusive
calamity. 37
In what sense is Kant's moral philosophy a magnifying
35

Ibid., no. 6, 203: "Gradually it has become clear
to me what every great philosophy so far has been: namely,
the personal confession of its author and a kind of
involuntary and unconscious memoir . . . . "
36

Philosophy in the Tragic Aae of the Greeks,
trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Gateway,
1962), preface, 23-24: "Now philosophical systems are wholly
true for their founders only. For all subsequent
philosophers they usually represent one great mistake, for
lesser minds a sum of errors and truths. . . . They always
have one wholly incontrovertible point: personal mood,
color. They may be used to reconstruct the philosophic
image, just as one may guess at the nature of the soil in a
given place by studying a plant that grows there.
'So this
has existed--once at least--and is therefore a possibility,
this way of life, this way of looking at the human scene.'
The 'system' is a growth of this soil, or at least a part of
this system • • . . "
37

no. 7, 688.

Ecce Homo, in Basic Writings, "Why I am so Wise,"
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image of his age?

According to Nietzsche, Kantian morality

is representative of the moral enthusiasm of eighteenth
century European culture and philosophy. 38

Nietzsche

interprets the eighteenth century largely in terms of a
struggle between two opposing points of view.

On one side

are the rationalists, epitomized by Voltaire, who view the
hand of Providence with a pessimistic eye and dedicate
themselves to the improvement of social conditions.

On the

other side are the sensualists, epitomized by Rousseau-optimistic, solitary spirits who believe that "man perfects
himself to the extent to which he approaches nature . . .
1139

For Nietzsche, Kant's denial of knowledge in order to
make room for faith testifies to Rousseau's victory in this
struggle.

Rousseau exercised a profound influence upon

Kant's attitude towards ordinary moral reason and human

38

The Will to Power, no. 95, 59: "The eighteenth
century is dominated by woman, given to enthusiasm, full of
espirit, shallow, but with a spirit in the service of what
is desirable, of the heart, libertine in the enjoyment of
what is most spiritual, and undermines all authorities;
intoxicated, cheerful, clear, humane, false before itself,
much cana.ille au fond, sociable.--"
Brbid., no. 100, 62. For Nietzsche's opposition
of Voltaire and Rousseau see Ibid., nos. 98-100, 61-64.
Nietzsche dedicated the first edition of Human, All Too
Human to Voltaire.
For this dedication see KSA 2,
Menschliches, Allzumenschliches, I, 10. Hollingdale omits
this dedication in his English translation.
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equality.~

moral

Nietzsche maintains that Kant's

acceptance of the essential soundness of moral consciousness
shows that Kant has been bitten by the "moral tarantula"
Rousseau. 41
Despite the influence of "French fanaticism" on Kant's
moral philosophy, Nietzsche also holds that as a philosopher
"one could not have gone to work in a less French fashion,
more thoroughly, more in a German fashion .
did."~

than Kant

This is true of the first Critique, but it is also

true of Kant's moral philosophy as well.

Kant insists that

it is not enough to simply accept the fact of moral
obligation.

He proceeds to demonstrate the rational basis

of this sense of obligation.

Nevertheless, Nietzsche

maintains that Kant's demonstration, particularly his
emphasis on the centrality of duty in the moral
consciousness, is strongly influenced by cultural and
historical factors.
4

°Kant, Handschriftlicher Nachlass, vol. 7, Kants
Schriften, vol. 20 , ed. Preussische Akademie der
Wissenschaften (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1942) 44. This
passage is quoted in Beck, Commentary on Kant's "Critique of
Practical Reason", 165: "By inclination I am an inquirer. I
feel a consuming thirst for knowledge, the unrest which goes
with desire to progress in it, and satisfaction in every
advance in it. There was a time when I believed this
constituted the honor of humanity, and I despised the
people, who know nothing. Rousseau corrected me in this.
This blinding prejudice disappeared and I learned to honor
man."
~Daybreak, preface no. 3, 3.
See also Thus Spoke
Zarathustra, "On the Tarantulas," 211-214.
42

Ibid.
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Nietzsche holds that Kant's emphasis on duty reflects a
characteristically German tendency to idealize unconditional
obedience.

The German attitude towards morality is, in

part, the expression of the sluggishness of the German
spirit, which seeks to obey whenever possible. 43

According

to Nietzsche, a German is capable of overcoming this
sluggishness and acting in a manner that is "dangerous,
evil, profound," but in most cases, "he is afraid of
depending on himself alone, of improvising: that is why
Germany uses up so many officials and so much ink." 44

The

German spirit also tends towards self-destructive
superstition, faith, and emotion.

Given these

characteristics, asks Nietzsche, what type of morality can
we expect?
The first thing it will certainly require is that in
this morality its heartfelt inclination to obedience
shall appear idealized.
'Man has to have something
which he can obey unconditionally'--that is a German
sensation, a German piece of consistency: it is to be
encountered at the basis of all German moral
teaching. 45
In contrast to the morality of antiquity,

~hat

stresses the

virtue of personal distinction, German morality stresses the
virtues of submission and obedience.

This tendency is first

expressed by Luther, whose proof of the existence of God,
Nietzsche contends, rests on his belief "that there must
~Ibid.,

no. 207, 127.

44

Ibid., 128.

45

Ibid.

I
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exist a being in which man could have unconditional
trust." 46
This tendency to idealize unconditional obedience is
inherently at odds with the spirit of moral enlightenment.~
Morality's unconditional status effectively removes it from
genuine critical scrutiny. 48

The security of morality from

criticism lies in its "art of enchantment," which it uses to
paralyze the critical will.

As Nietzsche puts it, morality

is the "Circe of philosophers" which lures them to shipwreck
on the rocks.G

Thus, in response to the question, "Why is

it that from Plato onwards every philosophical architect in
Europe has built in vain?", Nietzsche rejects Kant's answer
that philosophy's lack of progress is the result of a
failure to undertake a critique of reason.

The correct

answer, according to Nietzsche, is that all philosophical
architects, including Kant, were building under the
"seduction of morality."

While they appear to be concerned

with the foundations of reason, they are actually concerned

46

Ibid.

47

The Gay Science, no. 5, 8 o.

~Daybreak, preface no. 3, 2: "Conscience,
reputation, Hell, sometimes even the police have permitted
and continue to permit no impartiality; in the presence of
morality, as in the face of any authority, one is not
allowed to think, far less to express an opinion: here one
has to obey!" This passage appears to contain a veiled
reference to Kant's "An Answer to the Question: 'What is
Enlightenment?'"
49

Ibid.
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with the construction of "majestic moral structures.

1150

In the next section I compare and contrast Nietzsche's
position with Kant's on the rational foundations of
morality.

Nietzsche will employ a genealogical method to

challenge Kant's claims that the consciousness of the moral
law is a fact of reason.

On Nietzsche's view, the origin of

duty and the moral law can be traced to specific
developments in the history of human consciousness that do
not rest on a priori grounds.
Kant and Nietzsche on the Rational Foundations of
The Moral Consciousness
In the first chapter of the Groundwork, Kant employs
the method he mentions briefly in the conclusion of the
preface, i.e., "· . . we proceed analytically from common
knowledge [of morality] to its supreme principle . . . . 51
Kant's analytic of ordinary moral knowledge has three main
purposes.

First, it is intended to demonstrate the

essential soundness of ordinary moral knowledge. 52

Second,

it is intended to point out the limitations of ordinary
moral knowledge and thereby also demonstrate the need to
critically establish its rational foundations.

Finally, it

is intended to establish that ordinary moral knowledge, the

50

51
52

Ibid., 3.

Groundwork, 60.

! use the phrase "ordinary moral knowledge" to
translate Kant's "Gemeine sittlichen Vernunfterkenntnis."
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consciousness of duty, presupposes the existence of an g
priori moral law, the categorical imperative, if it is not
to be merely an illusion.
Kant's statement regarding his analytical approach is
somewhat misleading.

The term "analysis" might lead us to

anticipate a survey of diverse moral practices that reduces
their apparent differences to a common principle or
foundation.

This is not what we find in the early sections

of the Groundwork.

Kant does not derive his supreme moral

principle from empirical considerations regarding moral
experience, or from the observation of moral practices, but
rather by means of conceptual analysis.

He begins with

ordinary moral experience, the consciousness of the moral
law, and attempts to determine the a priori conditions that
must be operative to make such a law possible.
Kant's method of beginning with ordinary moral
knowledge can be illustrated by the discussion of the good
will that opens the Groundwork.

Kant begins with the

following declaration:
It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the
world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good
without qualification except a good will."
Kant is making three distinct claims about the good will.
If we stress the clause in which the good will is ref erred
to as "good without qualification," then the good will is
being characterized as good in itself, i.e., intrinsically
53

Groundwork, 61.
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good.

If we stress the preceding clause where Kant says

that "it is impossible to conceive" anything besides a good
will that is good without qualification, then the good will
must be interpreted as necessarily good.

The necessary

goodness of the good will qualifies its intrinsic goodness,
distinguishing it from other intrinsically good things, such
as talents or qualities of temperament, which are only
contingently good.

Finally, Kant is claiming that only a

good will is both necessarily and intrinsically good.
It is only after Kant determines the absolute goodness
of the good will that he turns to experience to confirm the
validity of his analysis.

To confirm the special status of

a good will among other intrinsic goods, Kant appeals to a
hypothetical rational spectator who "can never feel approval
in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of being
graced by no touch of a pure and good will.

•

1154

Kant

acknowledges that the idea that only a good will has moral
worth may seem strange, "in spite of all the agreement it
receives even from ordinary reason . . . • ""

Once again, it

is consistency with ordinary moral knowledge that is cited
as confirming a conceptual inquiry.
In The Gay Science we find Nietzsche's retort to Kant
in an aphorism entitled "Kant's Joke":
Kant wanted to prove, in a way that would dumbfound the
54

Ibid., 61.

55 Ib'd
1 • ,

62 .
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common man, that the common man was right: that was the
secret joke of his soul. He wrote against the scholars
in support of popular prejudice, but for scholars and
not for the people. 56
Kant might object to the polemical tone of this aphorism,
but he would probably agree that his moral philosophy is not
intended to reform or revolutionize morality, but simply to
confirm it and render it more secure by revealing its ground
in pure reason.
It is this aspect of Kant's philosophy that prevents
Nietzsche from bestowing upon "the great Chinese of
K6nigsberg" the designation of genuine philosopher.~
Instead, Kant is referred to as "merely a great critic," who
performs with distinction the "wonderful task" of the
philosophical laborer.g

As a philosophical laborer, Kant,

in this respect like Hegel, brings order and systematic
unity to the vast realm of inherited values:

56

The Gay Science, no. 193, 205-206.
In a footnote
to his English translation Kaufmann remarks that in this
aphorism Nietzsche is referring to Kant's practical
postulates and to the noumena/phenomena distinction that
makes room for faith.
Cf. David E. Cartwright, "Kant,
Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity,"
Journal of the History of Ideas (Jan. 1984): 83. Cartwright
points out that Nietzsche "may also have had in mind Kant's
claim in the first chapter of the Grundlegung . . . . " I
agree with Cartwright's general assessment that "Nietzsche's
point is . . . that what Kant saw as the source of the
practical principles a priori present in reason is nothing
but the product of the moral prejudices of our JudeoChristian culture: there is nothing, he argues, either g
priori or reasonable about these things."
57

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 210, 325.

gibid., no. 211, 326.
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Those philosophical laborers after the noble model of
Kant and Hegel determine and press into formulas,
whether in the realm of logic or political {moral)
thought or art, some great data of valuations--that is,
former positings of values, creations of value which
have become dominant and are for a time called
'truths. ' 59
Although Kant formalizes previous positings of moral
value, he does not interpret these values as positings,
i.e., as the product of contingent human decisions and
choices made in particular historical contexts, but rather
takes them as indications of the rational foundation of
morality.

In other words, Kant assumes that the

consciousness of the moral law is a fact of reason rather
than a fact of history.

According to Nietzsche, this lack

of historical consciousness is one of the crucial flaws in
Kant's moral methodology. 60
In contrast to Kant, Nietzsche holds that "there are
altogether no moral facts. " 61

What Kant has accepted

without question as a fact of reason is "merely an
interpretation of certain phenomena--more precisely a
misinterpretation." 62

On Nietzsche's view, one of the jobs

of the genuine philosopher--in contrast to laborers such as
Kant and Hegel--is to bring these purported facts and

59

Ibid.

60.rhe Will to Power, no. 101, 64.
61

Twilight of the Idols, "The 'Improvers' of
Mankind," no. 1, 501.
62

Ibid.
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misinterpretations to light.

In Nietzsche's words, genuine

philosophers are "the bad conscience of their time":
By applying the knife vivisectionally to the chest of
the very virtues of their time, they . . . exposed how
much hypocrisy, comfortableness, letting oneself go and
letting oneself drop, how many lies lay hidden under
the best honored type of their contemporary morality,
how much virtue was outlived. 63
Thus Nietzsche and Kant have diametrically opposed
views concerning ordinary moral knowledge.

Kant accepts

ordinary moral knowledge as a basic datum that must be
accounted for and ultimately confirmed.

Nietzsche,

conversely, views the virtues of his time as somehow
anachronistic, i.e., "outlived," and in need of a more
radical form of critique than that employed by Kant.

One of

Nietzsche's primary aims in vivisecting the virtues of his
time is to undermine the belief that traditionally conceived
morality rests on pure reason.

Whereas Kant seeks the

rational foundation of morality, Nietzsche tries to expose
traditionally conceived morality's non-rational roots in
custom, inherited tradition, and the internalization of
cruelty.
Nietzsche's discussion of the non-rational origins of
moral phenomena is not intended as a dogmatic refutation of
traditional morality, as represented by Kant.

Rather,

Nietzsche's refutation is more in a skeptical mode.

He

attempts to cast doubt on Kant's position by explaining the

63

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 212, 327.
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same set of phenomena from a diametrically opposed set of
assumptions.

A good statement of Nietzsche's strategy can

be found in Daybreak.

"In former times," Nietzsche writes,

one sought to prove that there is no God--today one
indicates how the belief that there is a God could
arise and how this belief acquired its weight and
importance: a counter-proof that there is no God
thereby becomes superfluous."M
This mode of argumentation does not commit the genetic
fallacy of arguing that something is false based merely on
its origins.

Instead, it offers an alternative explanation

of moral phenomena that renders claims of a priori validity
superfluous.

In effect, this transforms morality from a

necessary to a contingent feature of human existence.

This

is important because once morality is viewed as something
contingent, then it becomes possible to consider alternative
moralities that do not conform to traditionally conceived
models.
Nietzsche maintains that moral phenomena, such as the
consciousness of duty and the moral law, rest on custom and
its social enforcement.

With the passage of time, custom

becomes so deeply integrated into the collective
consciousness of a culture that it becomes reified into its
form of practical reason per se.

This implies that Kant's

search for the rational foundation of morality involves an
inversion of cause and effect.

The consciousness of duty,

Nietzsche maintains, is not "caused" by morality's a priori
Mpaybreak, no. 95, 54.
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foundation.

Rather, the duration of the enforcement of

customs has caused morality to appear as an a priori truth.
Nietzsche's chief proposition concerning the origin of
morality is as follows:
• . • morality is nothing other (therefore no more!)
than obedience to customs, of whatever kind they may
be; customs, however are the traditional way of
behaving and evaluating. 65
Within the morality of custom, a person is called "good" who
performs customary actions without resistance, "as a result
of a long inheritance, that is to say easily and gladly.
1166

A person is called "evil" who resists acting in

conformity with custom.

Thus, within the framework of the

morality of custom, the autonomous individual is considered
the most evil.

As Nietzsche puts this point in Daybreak,

"[the) free human being is immoral because in all things he
is determined to depend upon himself and not upon a
tradition . . . . 1167

What is a tradition?

on Nietzsche's

view, a tradition is simply any higher authority that
imposes commands. 68

The orig in of tradition is not to be

sought in reason, but in the customs that contribute to the
65

Ibid.,, no. 9, 10. See also Human, All Too
Human, no. 96, 51: "To be moral, to act in accordance with
custom, to be ethical means to practice obedience towards a
law or tradition established from of old."
66

Human, All Too Human, no. 96, 51.

67

Daybreak, no. 9 , 1 o .

~Ibid., 11: "What is tradition?
A higher
authority which one obeys, not because it commands what is
useful to us, but because it commands."
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preservation of the community. 69
Nietzsche appeals to tradition to explain the origin of
the consciousness of the moral law.

His basic premise is

that a class distinction has existed throughout the history
of human social life between the small number who command
and the large number who obey.

Because obedience has been

exercised by such a large number of people for such a long
period of time,
• • . it may fairly be assumed that the need for it is
now innate in the average man, as a kind of formal
conscience that commands: 'thou shalt unconditionally
do something, unconditionally not do something else,'
in short, 'thou shalt.'m
In On the Genealogy of Morals Nietzsche offers an
account of the origin of the moral consciousness that
develops some of the themes found in this analysis of the
morality of custom.

Like Kant, Nietzsche begins his

analysis with a common feature of moral life, i.e., the act
of promising. 71

He does not, however, attempt to deduce its

a priori foundations.

Rather, as a genealogist of morals,

Nietzsche inquires into the historical circumstances that
made possible the existence of a creature "with the right to

69

Human. All Too Human, no. 96, 51: "How the
tradition has arisen is here a matter of indifference, and
has in any event nothing to do with good and evil or with
any kind of immanent categorical imperative; it is above all
directed at the preservation of a community, a people. . .

"
70
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Cf. Groundwork, 89-90.
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make promises." 72
The right to make promises, i.e., the development of
the sense of moral obligation, presupposes the development
of memory.

The manner in which memory was created is,

therefore, a key element in the history of the development
of the moral consciousness.

The existence of memory

requires an explanation because human beings are a
necessarily forgetful species.

Nietzsche maintains that the

repressive function of active forgetfulness is necessary for
the development of higher mental operations.

Active

forgetfulness makes us unconscious of our bodily processes
and makes room for anticipatory functions such as foresight
and premeditation. 73
Memory acts as a counter-faculty to active
forgetfulness and is operative when promises are made.
Memory is not merely a passive faculty, "but an active
desire not to rid oneself, a desire for the continuance of
something desired once, a real memory of the will. . . . 1174
The memory of the will must be strong enough to function
even if many obstacles are interposed between the original
'I will' and the actual carrying-out of the action.

72

This

0n the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 1,
493: "To breed an animal with the right to make promises--is
not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in
the case of man? is it not the real problem regarding man?"
nibid., no. 1, 494.
74

Ibid.
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presupposes knowledge, i.e., the ability to separate
necessary from accidental events, as well as the development
of instrumental reason. 75

Such knowledge in turn

presupposes that human beings have become uniform and
predictable:
Man himself must first of all have become calculable,
regular, necessary, even in his own image of himself,
if he is to be able to stand security for his own
future, which is what one who promises does! 76
Uniformity and predictability are the product of the
forces of socialization associated with the morality of
custom.n

The end result of this process of socialization

is the autonomous, sovereign individual who possesses the
right to make promises. 78

The ability to make promises

serves as the measure of value for the sovereign individual,
who honors those who are also able to promise while holding

75

Ibid.

76

Ibid.

nibid., no. 2, 495: "· . . with the aid of the
morality of mores and the social straightjacket, man was
actually made calculable."
78

Within the morality of custom, autonomy and
morality are mutually exclusive. At this stage all morality
is heteronomous and based upon tradition. This helps to
explain Nietzsche's claim that a moral system in which the
autonomous individual is central, such as Kant's,
presupposes the morality of custom in order to make human
beings more or less uniform and equal from a moral
standpoint. See KSA 11, no. 25(437], 128: "Die Moralen
Kants, Schopenhauers gehen, ohne es zu merken, schon von
einem moralrischen] Kanon aus: der Gleichheit der Menschen,
und dass was fur den Einen Moral ist, es auch fur den
Anderen sein musse. Das ist aber schon die Conseguenz einer
Moral, vielleicht einer sehr fragwurdigen."
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in contempt those who promise without being permitted. 79
Nietzsche maintains that it is this feeling of power over
oneself and the sense of responsibility that accompanies the
right to make promises that is called the "conscience. 1180
The main element in the creation of memory is pain:
"'If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned
in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the
memory.

• • .'

1181

The prominence of pain as a tool of

"mnemotechnics" is seen in the prevalence of sacrifice,
mutilation, and cruel religious rituals. 82

Asceticism also

plays an important role here; certain ideas become fixed in
order to hypnotise the nervous system,
• and ascetic procedures and modes of life are
means of freeing these ideas from the competition of
all other ideas, so as to make them 'unforgettable.'"~
Having traced the prerequisite of the right to make
promises to the creation of memory, Nietzsche now traces the
development of the moral consciousness.
79

On Nietzsche's

0n the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 2,

496.
wibid., no. 2, 496: "The proud awareness of the
extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness
of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and over fate,
has in his case penetrated to the profoundest depths and
become instinct, the dominating instinct. What will he call
this dominating instinct, supposing he feels the need to
give it a name? The answer is beyond doubt: this sovereign
man calls it his conscience."
81
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view, the origins of the moral conceptions of guilt, bad
conscience, and duty are traceable to the sphere of legal
obligation.

Nietzsche discounts the views of former

genealogists on this issue.

They have not suspected that

"the major moral concept Schuld (guilt] has its origins in
the very material concept Schulden [debts]." 84

The debtor,

in order to inspire trust in the promise to repay the debt,
pledges something that he possesses, e.g., his body or soul,
to the creditor in case of failure to repay.

The creditor

accepts as recompense for the injury suffered by the
uncollected debt the pleasure of exercising cruelty
proportionate to the debt upon the debtor. 85
It is Nietzsche's hypothesis that the spiritualization
and deification of cruelty, as illustrated in the creditordebtor relationship, "permeates the entire history of higher
culture {and in a significant sense actually constitutes
it). " 86

This is particularly true in the sphere of culture

in which morality is found.

The sublimated cruelty latent

within culture reveals itself in morality in the inseparable
link between guilt and suffering.

This is a link that is

still visible in the dominant moralities of Nietzsche's
time, especially Kant's:
And might one not add that, fundamentally, this world
84
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has never since lost a certain odor of blood and
torture?
(Not even in good old Kant: the categorical
imperative smells of cruelty). 87
What does Nietzsche mean when he says that the
categorical imperative smells of cruelty?

This remark can

be interpreted in a number of different ways.

In terms of

Nietzsche's analysis of the morality of custom it could be
taken to mean that the relentless claim of duty within
Kantian morality prevents it from becoming customary,
habitual, or unconscious. 88

This distinguishes Kantian

morality from the morality of custom in which the "good"
person performs customary actions naturally, without
internal resistance.

It also distinguishes Kant's view of

morality from that of critics such as, e.g., Friedrich
Schiller, who see the lack of internal resistance in moral
action as the mark of a "schone Seele.

1189

Nietzsche's remark that the categorical imperative
smells of cruelty can also be taken to imply that Kant's
conception of duty still retains an element of cruelty that
Nietzsche argues plays an essential role in the formation of
the moral consciousness.

This interpretation would reflect

Nietzsche's tendency to interpret the categorical imperative
nibid., no. 6, 501.
88

Daybreak, no. 339, 163: "To demand that duty must
always be something of a burden--as Kant does--means to
demand that it should never become habit and custom: in this
demand there is concealed a remnant of ascetic cruelty."
89

Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom
{Cambridge:'Cambridge University Press, 1990), 180-184.
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in rigoristic terms.

The rigoristic interpretation of the

categorical imperative imputes to Kant the view that duty
excludes all considerations of pleasure and happiness.

A

rigoristic reading. of Kant is implied in the following
passage from The Antichrist:
An action demanded by the instinct of life is proved to
be right by the pleasure that accompanies it; yet this
nihilist [i.e., Kant] with his Christian dogmatic
entrails considered pleasure an objection. What could
destroy us more quickly than working, thinking, and
feeling without any inner necessity, without any deeply
personal choice, without pleasure--as an automaton of
'duty'? 90
Of course, a more careful reading of Kant's texts might
perhaps have indicated to Nietzsche that Kant does not
necessarily consider pleasure or happiness an objection to
moral action.

As Victoria S. Wike has shown, Kant's ethics

does not require that the moral law be the sole determining
ground of the will.~

Although Kant is occasionally

inconsistent in stating his position, it seems that his view
is that the moral law is the exclusive direct determining
ground of a good will, but it is not necessarily the sole
determining ground.

As Wike puts it, "[the moral law) is

not the only determining ground of the will in any absolute
sense since other determining grounds may operate

Wrrhe Antichrist, no. 11, 577-578.
Victoria s. Wike, "Does Kant's Ethics Require
That the Moral Law be the Sole Determining Ground of the
Will?," Journal of Value Inquiry 27 (1993): 85-92.
91
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indirectly." 92

Therefore, other factors, such as, e.g.,

happiness, can be a determining ground of a good will.

This

does not mean that happiness can be the direct end of a
categorical imperative.

If happiness could be the end of a

categorical imperative, then the distinction between
categorical and hypothetical imperatives would collapse.
But, as Wike shows, happiness still plays a large role in
Kant's categorical ethics.

on the one hand, she argues,

"happiness may be pursued out of duty in order to facilitate
the attainment of a direct end of a categorical
imperative. " 93

On the other hand, practical reason, which

for Kant is the source of categorical imperatives, "has
happiness as one of its purposes and one of its ends."~
This small point of criticism should not distract us
from the main point of Nietzsche's genealogical
investigation into the origin of the moral consciousness.
As we have seen, Nietzsche traces the formulation of the
moral consciousness to the internalization or
spiritualization of the legal conventions of the creditordebtor relationship.

This conclusion has particular

significance as a critique of Kant's moral methodology
because it implies that we need not look to a priori grounds

92
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3victoria s. Wike, "The Role of Happiness in
Kant's Groundwork," Journal of Value Inquiry 21 {1987): 78.
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for explaining the possibility of the sense of duty and the
moral law.

The sense of duty may indeed accurately

characterize the ordinary moral consciousness, but both can
be accounted for, Nietzsche argues, purely in
conventionalistic terms.

In short, by providing an

alternative account of the origin of the sense of duty in
the relationship of creditor and debtor and in the
internalization of cruelty Nietzsche renders moot Kant's
attempt to establish the a priori foundations of morality.
Nietzsche's discussion of the legal relationship
underlying the genesis of the moral consciousness returns us
to the juridical considerations I introduced in the previous
chapter.

In the previous chapter I argued that one aspect

of Nietzsche's naturalistic opposition to antinatural
moralities could be understood in terms of a distinction
between two moral frameworks, i.e., one in which legislative
considerations predominate and one in which judgmental
considerations predominate.

I discussed how the relative

importance of judgment and legislation is not fixed, but
rather changes within different moral contexts.
On Nietzsche's view, most moral frameworks have
prioritized judgment over legislation.

This is clearly seen

in the morality of custom, in which the legislation of
values is almost completely subsumed under the authority of
custom and tradition.

Legislation remains possible in the

morality of customs, but, as Nietzsche notes in Daybreak, it
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remains "a dreadful, mortally dangerous thing. " 95

By

reflecting on the history of the moral consciousness
Nietzsche is trying to make this prioritization of judgment
evident and to reveal its sordid origins:
And, briefly, if you had thought more subtly, observed
better, and learned more, you certainly would not go on
calling this 'duty' of yours and this 'conscience' of
yours duty and conscience. Your understanding of the
manner in which moral judgments have originated would
spoil these grand words for you, just as other grand
words, like 'sin' and 'salvation of the soul' and
'redemption' have been spoiled for you.%
on the Genealogy of Morals is the locus classicus of
Nietzsche's attempt to get to the root of moral judgment.
In the next section I will offer an analysis of Nietzsche's
master-slave dialectic in terms of the distinction between
legislation and judgment.

This in turn will allow me to

explore the relevance of Nietzsche's analysis of the origin
of the moral consciousness to Kant's conception of autonomy.
Legislation Versus Judgment:
Nietzsche's Master-Slave Dialectic
On the Genealogy of Morals is, ostensibly, a polemic
against the empiricist methodology and conclusions of

~Daybreak, no. 9, 11: "Originally, therefore,
everything was custom, and whoever wanted to elevate himself
above it had to become lawgiver and medicine man and a kind
of demi-god: that is to say, he had to make customs--a
dreadful, mortally dangerous thing!"

%The Gay Science, no. 335, 264.
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English moral psycho-historians.~

Its deeper purpose,

however, is to undertake a radical critique of moral values.
As Nietzsche remarks in the preface,
• . . the value of these values themselves must first
be called into guestion--and for that there is needed a
knowledge of the conditions and circumstances in which
they grew, under which they evolved and changed. 98
In this task, Nietzsche places himself in direct opposition
to Kant, characterizing his genealogical inquiry into moral
origins as the pursuit of an "anti-Kantian, enigmatic
'categorical imperative.' 1199
Nietzsche's first task in On the Genealogy of Morals is
to overturn the empiricist hypothesis concerning the origin
of the moral judgment contained in the concept "good."

The

empiricist thesis, as Nietzsche recounts it, holds that the
judgment "good" is originally associated with unegoistic or
altruistic actions.

Unegoistic actions, it is argued, were

called "good" from the standpoint of the recipient who
experienced the benefits of the action.

In other words,

goodness reduced to utility for the recipient.

Such actions

~Although Nietzsche singles out "English
psychologists" for special criticism, he also remarks in the
preface to On the Genealogy of Morals, no. 4, 453-454, that
his first impulse to publish his hypotheses about the
origins of morality derive from his opposition to Paul Ree's
Der Ursprung der moralischen Empfindungen, (1877).
Nietzsche's remarks about Ree in on the Genealogy of Morals
should be compared with his earlier, more favorable,
assessment in Human, All Too Human, vol. 1, nos. 36-37, 3133.
~Ibid.,
99

preface no. 6, 456.

Ibid., 453.
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were always praised, but the ground of the praise, namely
utility, was slowly forgotten.

Because they were habitually

praised and felt to be good, unegoistic actions came to be
perceived as good in-themselves.too
Nietzsche contends that the empiricist hypothesis
concerning the origin of the judgment "good" is both
psychologically untenable and historically inaccurate.

It

is psychologically untenable because it asks us to accept
that the most obvious feature of an action, namely its
utility, is something that could plausibly be forgotten. 10t
It is historically inaccurate as well.

Originally,

Nietzsche maintains, the meaning of the term "good" was not
determined by the recipient of the benefits of an altruistic
action.

Rather, the judgment "good" reflects the "pathos of

distance" that divides the ruling class from the ruled,
nobles from slaves:
• • • the judgment 'good' did not originate with those
to whom 'goodness' was shown! Rather it was 'the good'
themselves, that is to say, the noble, powerful, highstationed and high-minded, who felt and established
themselves and their actions as good, that is, of the
first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, lowminded, common and plebeian. t02
In other words, the origin of the value judgments "good" and
"bad" does not rest upon a distinction between unegoistic
and egoistic actions.

Rather, the value distinction between

t00Ibid., first essay, no. 2, 461-462.
totibid., no. 3, 463.
t02 Ibid., no. 2, 461-462.
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"good" and "bad" rests ultimately on the relationship of a
politically superior caste to an inferior one.

This

political relationship in turn reflects the relationship of
a superior soul to an inferior one . 103
Nietzsche justifies his claim by appealing to the
etymological roots of the designations "good" and "bad" in a
variety of different languages.

In every case, Nietzsche

argues, "good" designates qualities associated with the
aristocratic class, i.e., "'with an aristocratic soul,'
'noble,' 'with a soul of a high order,' 'with a privileged
111°"

soul'. •

In contrast to this, "bad" is universally

associated with the low, common, and plebeian. 105
Nietzsche refers to this conclusion as a "fundamental
insight. 11106

What is the meaning of this insight?

I take

it that Nietzsche is offering two related theses.

First,

the value judgment "good" is neither purely normative nor
purely descriptive, but rather mixed.

Whether the

descriptive or the normative element is emphasized is a
function of the general moral framework in which the value
judgment "good" is made.

Second, within the framework of

100 Ibid, no. 6, 467. Nietzsche expresses this
relationship as the general rule that "a concept denoting
political superiority always resolves itself into a concept
denoting superiority of soul . . • . "
1°"Ibid. , no. 4, 4 64.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
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master morality, the normative content of the judgment
"good" is subordinated to its descriptive content.

Thus,

when a noble refers to a slave as "bad" and holds the slave
in contempt, a value judgment with normative content is
made.

But the noble does not use the judgment "bad" to

morally judge or condemn, but primarily to refer to the
slave.

Similarly, "good" within master morality is

primarily a descriptive term that refers to the qualities
possessed by members of the aristocratic class.

As

Nietzsche puts it, originally the term "good" referred to a
"typical character trait.

11107

Once we understand that within master morality the
normative content of the value judgment "good" is
subordinated to its descriptive content, the transition from
master morality to slave morality becomes much clearer.
Within slave morality the normative content of the value
judgment "good" begins to dominate its descriptive content.
"Good" takes on a distinctively moral sense and, as a
result, value judgment takes on an increasingly moral tone.
This shift in the relative priority of the descriptive
and normative components of the judgment "good" is the
result of a shift in the mode of value positing.

Slave

morality begins when the ressentiment of those ruled by the
nobles "becomes creative and gives birth to values.
107

rbid., no. 5, 465.

108

I b.1 d . , no. 10, 472.

11108
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Nietzsche characterizes this as a kind of compensatory
valuation that takes the form of disguised revenge against
the noble ruling class.

The noble posits values in an

active way, as "a triumphant affirmation of itself.
11109

The slave, in contrast, posits values defensively, in

reaction to the noble:
. slave morality from the outset says No to what is
'outside,' what is 'different,' what is 'not itself';
and this No is its creative deed. This inversion of
the value-positing eye--this need to direct one's view
outward instead of back to oneself--is of the essence
110
of ressentiment. .
The shift from an active to a reactive mode of value
positing that marks the transition from a master to a slave
morality generates a two-fold shift in the meaning of the
value judgment "good."

The positive judgment "good" loses

its priority over the opposing negative value judgment.
Within the framework of master morality, "good" is the
primary or fundamental value, while its negative counterpart
"bad" is merely an afterthought.

The noble "conceives the

basic concept 'good' in advance and spontaneously out of
himself and only then creates for himself an idea of
'bad'! 11111

Within the framework of slave morality, however,

the negative value judgment "evil" becomes primary, while
"good" is relegated to secondary status:

109

Ibid.

llO!bid.
111

1

472-473.

Ibid., no. 11, 475-476.
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. • • picture 'the enemy' as the man of ressentiment
conceives him--and here precisely is his deed, his
creation: he has conceived 'the evil enemy,' 'the Evil
One,' and this in fact is his basic concept, from which
he then evolves, as an afterthought and pendant, a
'good one' --himself! 112
Accompanying this shift in the relative priority of
positive and negative values is a shift within the elements
internal to these value judgments.
slave morality the

normati~e

Within the framework of

component implicit in the value

judgment "good" comes to dominate the descriptive component.
The same is true of the judgment "evil," which has almost an
exclusively normative content.

Within slave morality, the

judgment "evil" is not used merely descriptively to refer to
the noble, but to morally condemn the noble.

In other

words, within the framework of slave morality we discover
the origin of moral value judgments.
So far I have characterized the shift from noble to
slave morality in terms of three related conceptual shifts.
The first is a shift from an active to a reactive mode of
value positing.

The second is a shift in the relative

priority of positive and negative value judgments.

The

third is a shift in the relative balance of normative to
descriptive content within value judgments.
All three transformations that mark the shift from
master to slave morality can be understood in terms of a
more fundamental shift from a moral framework in which

112

Ib'1 d •

,

no. 10, 475.
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legislation is the dominant mode of valuation to one in
which moral judgment is dominant.

The shift from master to

slave morality is not a shift from a moral framework
composed exclusively of legislative considerations to one
composed exclusively of judgmental considerations, but
rather a shift to a moral framework in which legislation is
subsumed under judgment.
The shift from the primarily legislative framework of
the master to the primarily judgmental framework of the
slave involves a change in the degree to which legislative
considerations are allowed to enter into moral deliberation.
The primary activity of the noble is legislation:
The noble type of man experiences itself as determining
values; it does not need approval; it judges, 'what is
harmful to me is harmful in itself'; it knows itself to
be that which first accords honor to things; it is
value-creating. 113
Conversely, the primary activity of the slave is judgment.
The slave creates values, but in a deficient manner.

The

slave's value creation is merely an inversion and
condemnation of the existing value structure.

The slave's

value creation is not an original deed, but rather merely a
means of self-defense against noble values, which are
condemned.

It does not express autonomous self-creation but

rather a creation via negation.
In the judgmental framework of the slave, the normative
content latent in the noble's conception of value comes to
113

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 260, 395.
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dominate and a value judgment becomes primarily a moral
value judgment.

With the emphasis on normative

considerations comes a concern for the universal validity of
values.

Genuine values are now thought of as those that can

be universally affirmed.

This is directly opposed to the

noble mode of valuation in which values were thought of as
unique creations valid only for their creator.

Only within

the framework of slave morality is goodness identified with
universality.
This conclusion returns us to the issue of Nietzsche's
relationship to Kantian morality.

Given Nietzsche's

emphasis on the noble's self-legislative activity in
opposition to the slave's reactive value judgments, it might
be argued that Nietzsche's master-slave distinction
replicates Kant's autonomy-heteronomy distinction.

There

are more than merely superficial similarities between their
views.

In the Groundwork, Kant defines autonomy as "the

property the will has of being a law to itself. 11114

In

contrast, he defines heteronomy as the will's seeking its
law from some object outside of itself . 115

There is at

first glance a close parallel between Nietzsche's conception
of the slave type and Kant's conception of a heteronomous
will.

As we have seen, Nietzsche's slave creates its

conception of the good heteronomously, via negation of noble
114

Groundwork, 108.

115

Ibid.
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values.

There is also an apparent parallel between

Nietzsche's portrayal of the noble type and Kant's
conception of an autonomous will.

Both Nietzsche and Kant

associate the highest value with a will that is selflegislating.

For Kant, only such a will can possess genuine

moral worth, while for Nietzsche only such a will possesses
the noble qualities of character.
The parallel between Nietzsche's master-slave
distinction and Kant's autonomy-heteronomy distinction
begins to break down, however, as we look closer at the
content of their respective positions.

For Nietzsche,

master morality and slave morality represent two distinctive
and contrasting moral frameworks that are distinguished by
the relative priority given to value legislation.

They are

also distinguished by the fact that the former attributes
the highest value to "the well-being of the few" while the
latter attributes the highest value to "the well-being of
the many." 116

There is ample evidence that Nietzsche views

the moral systems of his time as forms of slave morality and
that he wants to return to the framework of master
morality. 1n

This is consistent with Nietzsche's

116

0n the Genealogy of Morals, first essay,
concluding note, 492.
117

Ibid., no. 17, 490-491: "Whoever begins at this
point, like my readers, to reflect and pursue his train of
thought will not soon come to the end of it--reason enough
for me to come to the end, assuming it has long since·been
abundantly clear what my aim is, what the aim of that
dangerous slogan is that is inscribed at the head of my last
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naturalistic reaction against antinaturalism.

In particular

it is consistent with Nietzsche's rejection of universal
moral norms and their presupposition of moral equality.
Within the framework of the master-slave dialectic it is the
slaves who, out of ressentiment against the noble, are the
preachers of equality par excellence.
In contrast, Kant's distinction between autonomy and
heteronomy does not represent two distinctive, independent
moral frameworks.

According to Kant, "autonomy of the will

is the sole principle of all moral laws. 11118

Heteronomy,

conversely, "is opposed to the principle of duty and to the
morality of the will. " 119

In terms of content, autonomy is

characterized negatively as independence from all material
determinations of the will and positively by "the
accompanying determination of choice by the mere form of
giving universal law which a maxim must be capable of
having. 11120

In other words, for Kant, an autonomous will is

the same as a will directed by pure, practical reason. 121
Therefore, from a Kantian perspective, Nietzsche's
conception of slave morality would be a contradiction in

book Beyond Good and Evil.--At least this does not mean
'Beyond Good and Bad'--."
118

Critigue of Practical Reason, 31.

119

Ibid.

120

Ibid.

121

Ibid.
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terms, i.e., it would represent an attempt to merge
heteronomy and autonomy.

Within the Kantian framework,

autonomy and heteronomy are strictly separated.

Thus, for

Kant, Nietzsche's distinction of master and slave moralities
would represent a complete misunderstanding of moral
reasoning.
There is a definite affinity between Nietzsche and Kant
because both prioritize self-legislation.

But there is also

a conflict in the content of their respective criterion for
self-legislation.

To appreciate this conflict it is crucial

to recognize that Nietzsche interprets Kant's views on the
will's enactment of law in terms of both universalizability
and generalizability.in

Thus, as Nietzsche interprets it,

a maxim that passes the test of Kant's categorical
imperative, i.e., a maxim that can consistently be conceived
to be a universal law, becomes from that moment on a
possible general law governing the actions of every human
being.

It is precisely in these terms that Nietzsche reads

Kant when he reduces Kant's norm of universalizability to
the formula, "here everyone must judge as I do.

11123

If we

provisionally accept Nietzsche's interpretation of
universalizability it becomes easy to see why he would be
inclined to view Kant's conception of the moral law
inThe Will to Power, no. 283, 161: "· . . the
'categorical imperative,' the essence of morality 'universal
and general.'"
inThe Gay Science, no. 335, 265.
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contained in the categorical imperative as an expression of
slave morality, because it is only with the transition from
master to slave morality that making universal moral
judgments becomes the dominant form of moral discourse.

In

other words, from Nietzsche's perspective, Kant's account of
universalizability of maxims inadvertently undermines
autonomy and, therefore, genuine human moral agency as both
Kant and Nietzsche conceive of it.
One of the main drawbacks of Kant's conception of
universalizability, according to Nietzsche, is that it
overlooks the difficulty of analyzing action.

On

Nietzsche's view, universalizability cannot be achieved,
even in principle, because every action is unique.
Nietzsche holds that every action past, present, and future
has been or will be performed in "an altogether unique and
irretrievable way." 1M We can call this Nietzsche's
uniqueness principle of action.

Because no two actions are

the same, the categorical demand that "in this case
everybody would have to act like this" can never be met.
Regulation and rules may provide a semblance of identity
between actions, but not actual identity.

All regulations

and rules of action "relate only to their coarse
exterior. " 125

This implies that the true motives of action

IM!bid.
125

Ibid.
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resist all attempts at analysis . 126

Our opinions,

valuations, and tables of values play a role in action in a
general sense, but in any specific instance "the law of
their mechanism is indemonstrable. 111 n

Considerations such

as these would justify Nietzsche's rejection of Kant's
criterion of universalizability as both inapplicable in
practice and a product of slave morality.
From a strictly Kantian perspective, it might be
possible to challenge some of the fine points of Nietzsche's
reading of Kant.

It might be pointed out that it is one of

the ironies of Nietzsche's critique is that the principle of
opacity that he employs against Kant is one of the main
principles underlying Kant's rejection of the attempt to
ground morality on experience.

Experience cannot provide a

single unquestionable example of an action performed for the
sake of duty.

It is impossible to determine with any degree

of certainty whether an action was performed for the sake of
duty or from self-love because,
• . . we can never, even by the most strenuous selfexamination, get to the bottom of our secret
impulsions; for when moral value is in question, we are
concerned, not with the actions which we see, but with
their inner principles, which we cannot see. 128
Like Nietzsche, therefore, Kant believes that the true

1

~Ibid.: "· . . as one contemplates or looks back
upon any action at all, it is and remains impenetrable."
127

Ibid.

128

Groundwork, 7 5 .
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intentions of an action remain opaque to analysis.

This is

one important reason why Kant avoids making either actions
or intentions the object of moral evaluation. 129

As the

above quoted passage clearly shows, for Kant, the issue of
moral value is not a matter of action but of the principles
of action.

By making subjective principles, i.e., maxims,

not actions, the object of moral evaluation, Kant could
effectively challenge this aspect of Nietzsche's critique.
Nietzsche's critical interpretation of the categorical
imperative also loses some of its impact because it insists
on reading Kant in heteronomous terms.

This is seen in

Nietzsche's potentially misleading reading of the test
imposed by the categorical imperative in terms of the
generalizability of actions rather than in terms of the
universalizability of maxims.

The former asks whether it is

in fact possible for everyone to act in a certain way, the
latter asks whether or not it is conceivable that a
principle could be followed without exception without
resulting in a self-contradiction.

on Nietzsche's reading,

Kant maintains that an action passes the test of the
categorical imperative when an agent can judge that "in this
case everybody would have to act like this.

11130

This is a

common interpretation of Kant's categorical imperative, but
it is not Kant's position.
129

1

on Kant's view, duty is

Ibid., 67-8.

J0.rhe Gay Science, no. 335, 265.
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incompatible with the notion of generalizability that
Nietzsche attributes to it because duty is purely selfreferential.

An autonomous will gives itself the law, but

does not impose commands upon others.

Since Kant identifies

duty with autonomy, he associates any acceptance of the law
from an alien source with heteronomy. 131

Moreover, the

categorical imperative cannot be read as saying that
"everybody would have to act like this" because it does not
impose any positive commands.

It merely provides a test to

determine which maxims are permitted or forbidden if a will
is to be considered as having genuine moral worth. 132
Such misunderstandings implicit in Nietzsche's attack
on the categorical imperative cause Nietzsche to exaggerate
his differences with Kant and overlook their commonalities.
I began this chapter with a quote from the transcendental
dialectic of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in which Kant
remarks that the purpose of the dialectic is to lay the
foundations for "moral edifices of .
dimensions."

. . majestic

It is this passage that Nietzsche seizes on in

order to demonstrate that Kant, like all philosophical
architects since Plato, is laboring under the seductions of
morality.

The apparent intention of these philosophical

system builders is the pursuit of truth.
131
132

In fact, however,

Groundwork, 108.

Ibid., 107: "An action which is compatible. with
the autonomy of the will is permitted; one which does not
harmonize with it is forbidden."
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Nietzsche maintains their intentions have always involved
the construction of "'majestic moral structures': to employ
once again the innocent language of Kant . .

"133

What Nietzsche does not remark upon is that the entire
purpose of Kant's transcendental dialectic is to show that
the kind of metaphysical knowledge required to construct the
"majestic moral structures" dreamt of by the metaphysical
tradition is beyond our reach.

Kant's argument in the

transcendental analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason is
meant to show that a priori knowledge is possible only of
objects of possible experience.

Therefore, transcendent

knowledge of God, freedom, and the immortality of the soul
is not possible for human beings, given the nature of our
manner of knowing.

Thus, we lack the material with which to

construct any majestic moral structures and must settle for
something more modest:
We have found, indeed, that although we had
contemplated building a tower which should reach to the
heavens, the supply of materials suffices only for a
dwelling-house, just sufficiently commodious for our
business on the level of experience, and just
sufficiently high to allow of our overlooking it. 134
In other words, according to Kant, we should design our
moral "dwelling houses" to suit the needs appropriate to the
kind of being that we are.

This is the task that Kant

alludes to in the introduction to the transcendental

'"Daybreak, preface no. 3, 3.
'~critique

of Pure Reason, A 707/ B 735.
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doctrine of method:
• we must plan our building in conformity with the
material which is given to us, and which is also at the
same time appropriate to our needs.rn
As I noted at the conclusion of the previous chapter,
there is a close affinity between the spirit of Kantian
autonomy and Nietzsche's call to become those we are, "human
beings who are new, unique, incomparable, who give
themselves laws, who create themselves.

11136

Both Kant and

Nietzsche argue that autonomy is the defining feature of
human moral agency.

Despite this similarity, however,

Nietzsche and Kant are divided over the issue of
universalizability as a criterion of autonomy.

As we have

seen, Kant links autonomy to the universalizability of the
will's maxims.

Conversely, Nietzsche identifies

universalizability with slave morality and antinaturalism.
The antinaturalism of Kantian morality is one of the primary
motivations behind Nietzsche's attempt to eliminate
universality from the content of autonomy.

In the next

chapter I will argue that the final result of this effort
can be found in the idea of the eternal recurrence.

I will

argue that the eternal recurrence can be read as an attempt
to reconceptualize autonomy without the problematic aspects
of universalizability that Nietzsche associates with Kant.

136

The Gay Science, no. 335, 266.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE
AND NIETZSCHE'S NATURALIZATION OF AUTONOMY
Introduction
The eternal recurrence is perhaps the most enigmatic of
all of Nietzsche's ideas.

One reason for the mysteriousness

of the eternal recurrence is its ambiguity.

Beginning in

the early 1880's the eternal recurrence appears in
Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings and manifests
itself in a number of different guises.

The eternal

recurrence is cast as a scientifically provable cosmological
hypothesis; as a metaphysical truth; as a quasi-religious
prophecy; as a means of cultural enhancement; as a personal
mystical experience; as a rejection of teleological
conceptions of history; and as an existential principle of
the affirmation of life.
As I noted in my introductory chapter, one way that
interpreters have tried to reduce this diversity of meanings
is to interpret the eternal recurrence in either of two
distinctive ways.

For convenience, I refer to these two

interpretations of the eternal recurrence as the
"theoretical" and the "practical" interpretations,
respectively.
145

146
The theoretical interpretation of the eternal
recurrence emphasizes texts in which Nietzsche appears to
treat the eternal recurrence as a metaphysical or
cosmological thesis.

This version of the eternal recurrence

holds that all events within the physical world repeat
themselves in unending and invariable cycles.

The practical

interpretation of the eternal recurrence, conversely,
emphasizes texts in which Nietzsche treats it as a practical
prescription or imperative.

On this interpretation, the

eternal recurrence is thought to assert that we ought to
live our lives as if all events repeated themselves in an
unending cycle.

Our ability to affirm the eternal

recurrence of an action is taken as a test of the action's
value. 1
It has frequently been noted that some of Nietzsche's
formulations of the eternal recurrence are very similar to
at least some of the formulations of Kant's categorical
imperative. 2

For example, in a note from 1881, Nietzsche

1

0ne important distinction between the theoretical
and the practical interpretations of the eternal recurrence
is that the latter, unlike the former, is not dependent upon
the factual truth of recurrence. At least on some prominent
practical interpretations of the eternal recurrence, as we
will see in the course of this chapter, it is not necessary
for the eternal recurrence to be true.
It must simply be
taken to be true. That is, we are urged to act as if the
eternal recurrence were true.
2See,

e.g., Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential
Imperative (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978).
Georg Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, trans. Helmut
Loiskandl, Deena Weinstein, and Michael Weinstein (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1986), 171-172; Henry
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writes:
Meine Lehre sagt: so leben, dass du wtinschen musst,
wieder zu leben ist die Auf gabe--du wirst es
jedenfalls! 3
In purely formal or syntactic terms this formulation of the
eternal recurrence appears to be a hybrid of two versions of
the categorical imperative, i.e.,
• • • handle nur nach derjeniqen Maxime, durch die du
zuqleich wollen kannst, dass sie ein allqemeines Gesetz
werde.
And,
. • . handle so, als ob die Maxime deiner Handlung
durch deinen Willen zum allgemeinen Naturgesetze werden
David Aiken, "An Introduction to Zarathustra," in Nietzsche:
A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. Robert C. Solomon
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973), 129-130;
J. M. Bernstein, "Autonomy and Solitude," in Nietzsche and
Modern German Thought, ed. Keith Ansell-Pearson (New York:
Routledge, 1991), 221; Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche &
Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1983), 68: "The eternal recurrence gives
the will a rule as rigorous as the Kantian one." See also
Karl Jaspers, Nietzsche: Einfilhrunq in das Verstandnis
seines Philosophierens, third edition (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1950), 356. Jaspers implies that there is a
parallel between the eternal recurrence and the categorical
imperative when he writes that the eternal recurrence is "·
. . wie ein neuer ethischer Imperativ, der fordert, alles,
was ich filhle, will, tue, bin, unter den Massstab zu
stellen, ob ich es so vollziehe, dass ich es unendliche Male
immer wieder so vollziehen mochte; anders ausgedrilckt, ob
ich wollen kann, dass dies Dasein immer wieder so sei. Es
ist eine blosse Form, deren Erfilllungsmoglichkeiten
inhaltlich grenzenlos sind." See also Oscar Ewald,
Nietzsches Lehre in ihren Grundbegriffen.
Die ewige
Wiederkunft des Gleichen und der Sinn des tibermenschen.
Eine kritische Untersuchung (Berlin: Ernst Hofmann & Co.,
1903), 62: "Jede unserer Handlungen und Regungen soll den
Anspruch auf Ewigkeit erheben dilrfen, soll der Ewigkeit wert
sein. Der Mensch soll sein Dasein betrachten, als ob er es
in jedem Augenblick filr ungezahlte Male reproduzierte."
3

KSA 9, no. 11(163], 505.
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sollte. 4
This parallel seems to lend credence to the idea that
Nietzsche intends the eternal recurrence to function in a
manner similar to the categorical imperative, i.e., as a
directive principle of action.

A parallel reading is also

suggested by the special emphasis that both philosophers
place on the will's autonomy.

As I indicated in the

preceding chapter, both Nietzsche and Kant associate genuine
moral agency with the will's autonomous self-direction.

But

as I also indicated in the preceding chapter, the
relationship between Nietzsche and Kant is complicated by
Nietzsche's critique of Kant's antinaturalism.

Therefore,

the relationship between the eternal recurrence and the
categorical imperative cannot be characterized as an
unqualified parallel.

The questions that this chapter will

address is the following: In what way does Nietzsche's
eternal recurrence offer a genuine alternative to Kant's
conception of autonomy?
The thesis that I will argue for in this chapter is
that Nietzsche offers a reconceptualization of autonomy
within a naturalistic framework.

The eternal recurrence

represents Nietzsche's attempt to use the insights of modern
science, especially modern physics, to provide a
naturalistic response to antinaturalism.
4Kant,

In this sense, the

Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten,
Werkausgabe vol. 7, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Wissenschaft, 1991), 51.
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eternal recurrence completes the naturalistic revolution
started by the hypothesis of the will to power.

My

interpretation focuses on Nietzsche's assertion that the
eternal recurrence is "the most scientific of all possible
hypotheses." 5

I reject both the conventional theoretical

and practical interpretations of the eternal recurrence as
incompatible with Nietzsche's naturalistic framework.

I

interpret Nietzsche's thesis about the scientific character
of the eternal recurrence in three complementary senses.
Each sense corresponds to a different aspect of
antinaturalism.
First, the eternal recurrence is a thesis about
knowledge, and the conditions of knowledge, within the
naturalistic interpretive framework of the will to power.
In this sense, the eternal recurrence is a response to the
antinatural epistemological assumption that truth is the
correspondence of a proposition with being, or a fixed,
unchanging observational given.
Second, the eternal recurrence is a response to the
antinatural metaphysical assumption that the meaning of the
world and human existence lies somewhere beyond the world in
a metaphysical "true world" or Kantian "intelligible realm."
The eternal recurrence represents the affirmation of
existence, the insight that "(n]othing in existence may be

5

The Will to Power, no. 55, 36.

150

subtracted, nothing is dispensable • . . . " 6

Nietzsche calls

this spirit of affirmation "amor fati." 7
Finally, the eternal recurrence is the idea that makes
possible a reconceptualization of autonomy in light of the
experience of modern physics.

Nietzsche's

reconceptualization of autonomy begins with a rejection of
the "atomistic need" for a neutral, independent moral
subject in favor of a naturalistic reconceptualization of
the self as a synthetic social structure of drives and
affects.

The eternal recurrence then draws upon the

implication of modern physics that we can find no
independent laws within nature and that, consequently, we
must give ourselves laws in the face of total, eternally
recurring meaninglessness if we want to live.

In other

words, the eternal recurrence offers a response to the
antinatural privileging of moral judgment over moral
legislation by giving full expression to the legislative
character of human existence.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the
conventional theoretical interpretation of the eternal
recurrence and a critical discussion of some of its
problematic features.

I then turn to a close reading of

aphorism number 341 of The Gay Science, "The Greatest
Weight," as the source of the conventional practical
6

7

Ecce Homo, "The Birth of Tragedy," no. 2, 728.

The Gay Science, no. 276, 223.
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interpretation of the eternal recurrence.

This will allow

me to criticize some recent attempts to separate the
theoretical and the practical aspects of the eternal
recurrence.

I then proceed to examine Nietzsche's thesis

that the eternal recurrence is the most scientific of all
possible hypotheses along the lines outlined above.
The Theoretical Interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence
In Ecce Homo Nietzsche refers to the eternal recurrence
as "the unconditional and infinitely repeated circular
course of all things.

n8

This statement could be taken

to indicate that Nietzsche thinks that the eternal
recurrence is a scientific theory about the universe as a
whole.

In other words, Nietzsche's statement about the

scientific character of the eternal recurrence could be
taken to mean that the eternal recurrence is intended as a
cosmological hypothesis.

When construed mechanistically,

this cosmological hypothesis postulates the circularity of
time and the infinite, identical repetition of all events
within time.

What immediately stands out in this rendering

of the eternal recurrence is its deterministic character.

8

Ecce Homo, "The Birth of Tragedy," no. 3, 729-730:
"The doctrine of the 'eternal recurrence,' that is, of the
unconditional and infinitely repeated circular course of all
things • • . . " Cf. Seigfried, "Law, Regularity, and
Sameness: A Nietzschean Account," 386. Seigfried argues
that Nietzsche's description of the eternal recurrence in
terms of the circularity of time represents a mechanistic
misunderstanding of the idea of the eternal play of creation
that is the true lesson of the eternal recurrence.
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The spontaneity of actions and events is dissolved by the
awareness that they have appeared within the same identical
configuration of events an infinite number of times in the
past and will reappear identically an infinite number of
times in the future.

All that remains unique is the

totality of all events considered as a single, monolithic
event.
The premisses of the theoretical interpretation of the
eternal recurrence can be reconstructed as follows. 9
1. Time is infinite.
2. Time is objective.
3. Space is finite.
4. The total amount of energy is limited.
5. Energy is conserved.
6. Logical principles and deductions are valid when
applied to reality as a whole. 10
From these premisses Nietzsche draws three related

9My discussion of the cosmological interpretation of
the eternal recurrence follows Jaspers, Nietzsche:
EinfUhrung in das Verstandnis seines Philosophierens, 351354. I also rely upon Rose Pfeffer, "Eternal Recurrence in
Nietzsche's Philosophy," The Review of Metaphysics 19
(December 1965): 276-300.
10

Jaspers, Nietzsche, 352. Jaspers points out that
Nietzsche's first three premisses are a Priori and
indemonstrable. Jaspers also notes that Nietzsche's last
premise, which Nietzsche implicitly assumes without
argument, is at odds with Kant's insight, "dass Uber qas
Ganze weder mit dem blossen Satz des Wiederspruchs noch auf
andere Weise gUltige bestimmte Aussagen gemacht werden
konnen, obgleich er [Nietzsche] deise Einsicht in anderem
Zusammenhang besitzt."
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conclusions.

From the presupposition of the conservation of

energy Nietzsche concludes that infinitely new becoming is
impossible. 11

Infinitely new becoming presupposes a

constant, infinite increase of power.

If the total amount

of energy is limited, however, only two alternatives remain.
Either reality is tending towards a final end state of
permanent equilibrium, or reality recurs in identical
cycles.

Nietzsche excludes the possibility of a final end

state by appealing to the premise of infinite time.
Granting the infinity of past time, if a final state of
equilibrium were possible, it would have already been
reached. 12

Therefore, if we accept Nietzsche's premisses,

we appear forced to conclude that everything recurs.
From the premise that space is finite and energy is
limited, Nietzsche concludes that although the total number
of possible energy configurations is enormous, it remains
finite.

Since, ex hypothesi, past time is infinite, every

possible configuration of energy has already occurred.
Therefore, every present occurrence of an event is, in fact,
11

The Gay Science, no. 109, 167. KSA 9, no. 11(213],
525: "Das unendliche neue Werden ist ein Widerspruch, es
wiirde eine unendlich wachsende Kraft voraussetzen. Aber
wovon sollte sie wachsen!" See also The Will to Power, no.
1063, 547: "The law of the conservation of energy demands
eternal recurrence."
12

KSA 9, no. 11(245], 534: "Ware ein Gleichgewicht
der Kraft irgendwann einmal erreicht worden, so dauerte es
noch . • • denn bis jetzt ist schon eine Unendlichkeit
verflossen. Wenn das Gleichgewicht moglich ware, so milsste
es eingetreten sein." See also The Will to Power, no. 1062,
546.
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a recurrence.

Pfeffer points out that Nietzsche's claim

should not be interpreted in the mechanistic terms of
classical atomism, as the reconfiguration of atoms in an
infinite void.

Nietzsche rejects atomism, she argues, in

favor of a "dynamic energetic theory of explanation. " 13
What recurs, according to Pfeffer, is not the same
configuration of atoms, but identical configurations of
energy • 14
Finally, because any state of equilibrium has been
ruled out by the premise of infinite time, Nietzsche also
rules out the possibility of being in the superlative,
metaphysical sense of enduring, unchanging substance.

The

world, as Nietzsche puts it in The Will to Power, is "'in
flux,' as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood
always changing but never getting near the truth . . . . 1115
13

Pfeffer, "Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's
Philosophy," 279.
Mibid.
15

See The Will to Power, no. 1067, 550.

The Will to Power, no. 616, 330. See also Ibid.,
no. 1066, 549. Nietzsche's arguments for the cosmological
version of the idea of eternal recurrence are summed up in
the following passage: "If the world may be thought of as a
certain definite quantity of force and as a certain definite
number of centers of f orce--and every other representation
remains indefinite and therefore useless--it follows that,
in the great dice game of existence, it must pass through a
calculable number of combinations.
In infinite time, every
possible combination would at some time or another be
realized; more: it would be realized an infinite number of
times. And since between every combination and its next
recurrence all other possible combinations would have to
take place, and each of these combinations conditions·the
entire sequence of combinations in the same series, a
circular movement of absolutely identical series is thus
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Although Nietzsche refers to the eternal recurrence as
a cosmological hypotheses, it has frequently been remarked
that this interpretation is open to numerous objections.
is inconsistent with many of Nietzsche's other ideas.

It

For

example, the endless repetition of all events implicit in
this interpretation of the eternal recurrence is
inconsistent with Nietzsche's thesis in "Long Live Physics!"
that "· . . every action that has ever been done was done in
an altogether unique and irretrievable way, and . . . this
will be equally true of every future action.

.

.

. " 16

Furthermore, it appears to be inconsistent with Nietzsche's
frequent calls to humanity to create for itself new
directives and goals of action.

How can we create genuinely

new goals of action if this life is merely the repetition of
a previous life?
The theoretical interpretation of the eternal
recurrence is also inconsistent with Nietzsche's more
general views about science and scientific procedure.

In

The Gay Science Nietzsche rejects consideration of any
hypothesis that does not allow of experimental testing. 17

demonstrated: the world as a circular movement that has
already repeated itself infinitely often and plays its game
in infinitum."
~The

Gay Science, no. 335, 265.

17 Ibid,

no. 51, 115: "I favor any skeosis to which I
may reply: 'Let us try it!' But I no longer wish to hear
anything of all those things and questions that do not
permit any experiment."
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The eternal recurrence, however, does not seem amenable to
such testing.

There is no way to escape from the current

total energy configuration to compare it with previous or
future energy configurations to determine if they are, in
fact, the same.

Furthermore, science lacks the conceptual

means to confirm or reject such a general hypothesis about
the totality of the world.

Therefore, the possibility of an

empirical validation of eternal recurrence by conventional
experimental procedures is ruled out.
The theoretical interpretation of the eternal
recurrence is also inconsistent with Nietzsche's views about
logic.

Nietzsche rejects the idea that logical principles,

such as the principle of identity and the law of the
excluded middle, establish substantive propositions about
the world.

Moreover, he has ruled out equilibrium, i.e.,

any fixed state of being.

Therefore, to speak of a "state"

and its "recurrence" appears to become meaningless if there
is no way to anchor the idea of two states being the same
state in a determinate conception of identity. 18
Finally, Simmel has objected that a counter-example to
Nietzsche's hypothesis based on his own premisses can be
constructed. 19

Simmel asks us to imagine three wheels of

equal size aligned on an axis with a mark on each wheel

18

Pfeffer, "Eternal Recurrence in Nietzsche's
Philosophy," 281.
19

simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 172-173.
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indicating the spot of alignment.

If the wheels are set in

motion at a ratio of n, 2n, and n/rr the initial alignment of

°

points will never recur. 2

From this thought experiment

Simmel concludes that "if there exists anywhere in the world
three motions that are identical to the motion-relation of
these three wheels, the relative positions taken by them
could never return to their original relations." 21
Objections such as these may be taken as an indication
why in his published works Nietzsche explicitly rejects the
theoretical interpretation of the eternal recurrence as a
trivialization of what he calls in Thus Spoke Zarathustra
"my abysmal thought.

1122

Within the context of Thus Spoke

Zarathustra, we find perhaps the most literal expression of
the theoretical interpretation of the eternal recurrence in
the chapter entitled "The Convalescent."

In this text the

eternal recurrence is parroted by Zarathustra's animals:
Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls
the wheel of being. Everything dies, everything
wibid. The configuration will never recur given the
nature of rr, which precludes n/rr being a whole number if n
is a whole number greater than zero.
21

Ibid., 173. See also Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche:
Philosopher, Psychologist, Antichrist, Fourth Edition
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 327.
Kaufmann accepts Simmel's counter-example as a definitive
refutation of the truth of eternal recurrence as a
cosmological hypothesis. Cf. Bernd Magnus, Nietzsche's
Existential Imperative, 91-93, and Gilnter Abel, Nietzsche:
Die Oynamik der Willen zur Macht und die ewige Wiederkehr,
197-199.
22

Thus Spoke Zarathustra, "On the Vision and the
Riddle," no. 2, 269.
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blossoms again; eternally runs the year of being.
Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally
the same house of being is built. Everything parts,
everything greets every other thing again; eternally
the ring of being remains faithful to itself.
In every
Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere
There. The center is everywhere. Bent is the path of
eternity.n
Upon hearing this, Zarathustra calls his animals
and barrel organs!"M

"buffoons

I agree with Jaspers' assessment that

the simplicity of the theoretical interpretation of the
eternal recurrence, especially as summarized in the above
quoted passage, destroys its philosophical significance. 25
The Practical Interpretation of the Eternal Recurrence
In light of the difficulties associated with the
theoretical interpretation of the eternal recurrence, an
attempt has been made in recent years to establish the
thesis that the primary significance of the eternal
recurrence lies in the practical, rather than the
theoretical, sphere.

One prominent strategy shifts the

focus completely away from considerations of the truth or
falsity of the eternal recurrence.

On this view, the

theoretical aspects of the eternal recurrence are irrelevant
to the practical and psychological impact that Nietzsche
nibid., "The Convalescent," no. 2, 329-330.
Mibid., 330.
~Jaspers, Nietzsche: Einfilhrunq in Das Verstandnis
Seines Philosophierens, 350: "Meint man jedoch, in dieser
einfachen Vorstellung den philosophischen Gehalt der Lehre
zu haben, so irrt man.
Die Glatte der Lehre zerstort ihren
Sinn."
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thinks belief in the eternal recurrence would have on human
life.
There is some textual evidence that can be cited in
support of this change in tactics.

Nietzsche remarks in his

notes, for example, that the potentially transformative
effect on human life of the eternal recurrence does not
necessarily require that it be true.

He holds that the

probability of its truth, or even the mere possibility of
its truth, is sufficient to have a dramatic and
transformative effect on human beings. 26

In support of this

he cites the effect on people that the possibility of
eternal damnation has had. 27
Textual support for the separation of the practical
from the theoretical interpretation of the eternal
recurrence is also based on the fact that Nietzsche's
literary corpus is divided into his published works and a
large body of unpublished notes referred to collectively as
the "Nachqelassene Fragmente."

As Ivan Soll notes,

Nietzsche's concern with the theoretical aspects of the
eternal recurrence as a cosmological hypothesis is
restricted almost exclusively to the Nachgelassene
Fragmente.

There we find Nietzsche's numerous efforts to

2

6KSA 9, no. 11(203), 523-524: "· . . auch der
Gedanke einer Moglichkeit kann uns erschilttern und
umgestalten, nicht nur Empf indungen oder bestimmte
Erwartungen!"
27

Ibid., 524.
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demonstrate the truth of the eternal recurrence through
arguments based on empirical generalizations and a priori
premisses.

Conversely, in Nietzsche's published works we

find virtually no effort to argue for the truth of the
eternal recurrence.

In his published works the eternal

recurrence is often presented as a hypothetical thought
experiment or in an oracular fashion.

On the basis of

Nietzsche's apparent reluctance to publish his theoretical
speculations, Soll concludes that we are justified in the
belief that Nietzsche is less concerned with the theoretical
truth of the theory than with "people's attitudes and
reactions to this theory.nu

In other words, Nietzsche's

publishing history seems to indicate that he gives priority
to the practical over the theoretical interpretation of the
eternal recurrence.
A similar line of argumentation is pursued by
Maudemarie Clark.

She extends Soll's conclusion by arguing

that the existential affirmation of the eternal recurrence
does not depend upon the theoretical truth of the doctrine.
Instead, she holds that affirming the eternal recurrence,
"requires the willingness to live one's life again, not the
belief that one will, even as a 'mere possibility.'"~

As

uivan Soll, "Reflections on Recurrence: A
Reexamination of Nietzsche's Doctrine, die Ewige Wiederkehr
des Gleichen," in Nietzsche: A Collection of Critical
Essays, 323.
2

9Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 252.
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is the case with Soll, we find in Clark's argument an effort
to separate the practical or existential relevance of the
idea of recurrence from its theoretical implications.

on

her view, as on Soll's, the theoretical status of the
eternal recurrence is practically irrelevant.
Most practical interpretations of the eternal
recurrence take as their point of departure a text from The
Gay Science entitled "The Greatest Weight."

This is a

critical text for understanding the practical interpretation
of the eternal recurrence.

It is one of the first

appearances of the eternal recurrence in Nietzsche's
published works, and it contains what I take to be one of
Nietzsche's clearest statements of the practical force of
the eternal recurrence as a directive principle.

For the

sake of accuracy and convenience, I will first quote the
entire text in full, and then undertake an analysis of it.
What, if some day or night a demon were to steal
after you into your loneliest loneliness and say to
you: 'This life as you now live it and have lived it,
you will have to live once more and innumerable times
more; and there will be nothing new in it, but every
pain and every joy and every thought and sigh and
everything unutterably small or great in your life will
have to return to you, all in the same succession and
sequence--even this spider and this moonlight between
the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The
eternal hourglass of existence is turned upside down
again and again, and you with it, speck of dust!'
Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth
and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once
experienced a tremendous moment when you would have
answered him: 'You are a god and never have I heard
anything more divine.'
If this thought gained
possession of you, it would change you as you are or
perhaps crush you. The question in each and every
thing, 'Do you desire this once more and innumerable
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times more would lie upon your actions as the greatest
weight. Or how well disposed would you have to become
to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently
than this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal? 30
In this passage, Nietzsche poses a thought experiment.
He asks us to envision our possible reaction to a
hypothetical situation in which a demon confronts us with
the fact of the eternal recurrence.

Nietzsche himself does

not present the eternal recurrence as a fact, but as an
imaginary situation.

There is no indication here that

Nietzsche takes the eternal recurrence to be a cosmological
hypothesis of any kind.

Rather, it is the demon who

presents the eternal recurrence as a fact, when it states
"'This life as you now live it and have lived it, you will
have to live once more and innumerable times more.

I II

Nietzsche's use of a demon to report the fact of the
eternal recurrence to us is significant for a number of
reasons.

It calls to mind the malicious demon of the second

of Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy.

Descartes'

malicious demon was a posit of the methodological doubt that
Descartes employs as a means of establishing an indubitable
foundation for the sciences.

The malicious demon possesses

unlimited power to deceive us about the veracity of our
perceptions.

By employing a demon as the messenger of the

eternal recurrence Nietzsche may be alluding to Descartes'

3

°The Gay Science, no. 341, 273-274. Unless
otherwise indicated, all quotations in this section will
refer to this text.
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demon, perhaps implicitly warning us not to be taken in by
what the demon is reporting.

This reading finds some

support in the fact that both demons share the quality of
being malicious, although Descartes does not animate his
demon or allow it to speak for itself.

Aside from this

circumstantial evidence, however, there does not appear to
be any reason to identify Nietzsche's demon with Descartes'.
The choice of a demon as the messenger of the eternal
recurrence can perhaps be explained better by reference to
the inherently antiteleological sentiment contained in the
demon's message.

If all events in the universe are going to

eternally recur, and have in fact occurred innumerable times
in the past, then this means that history does not begin
with any original event nor is it progressing towards a
goal.

such an idea is at odds with a Christian

understanding of history as beginning with the creation and
culminating with the final judgment.

Therefore, given the

tacit opposition of the eternal recurrence and the Christian
conception of history, a demon may in fact be the ideal
choice as messenger.
Nietzsche's demon informs us of two things: the fact of
the eternal recurrence and the implications of this fact.
The demon tells us that our lives as we have lived them up
to the present moment will be infinitely repeated.

He then

immediately informs us what this infinite repetition
involves.

On the one hand, it means the elimination of the
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possibility of novel content in our lives.

Our lives will

eternally recur and in them "there will be nothing new . . .
"

On the other hand, it means that, not only the content,

but the succession of the content will be absolutely
identical: "every joy and every thought and sigh and
everything unutterably small or great in your life will have
to return to you, all in the same succession and sequence. .

"
The demon does not initially ask us if we could live
the rest of our lives knowing that the eternal recurrence is
true.

Nor does the demon ask us to deliberate and make

choices in light of it.

Rather, the demon is gauging our

reaction to the lives we have led up to the present in terms
of the newly revealed fact of the eternal recurrence.

It is

as if we have been living in ignorance of a crucial piece of
information that now changes our understanding of the
meaning of our entire existence.
The eternal recurrence is announced to us in a state of
unpreparedness.

We have simply been pursuing the course of

our lives when, suddenly, at a random moment ("some day or
night") we are confronted with the eternal recurrence as a
fact.

Nietzsche amplifies the severity of the effect of the

news by having it revealed to us when we are feeling most
insignificant, in our "loneliest loneliness."

The demon

emphasizes our insignificance by referring to us as a _speck
of dust.
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Our reaction to the demon's message acts as a test of
our attitude towards the lives we have led up to this point.
What would our reaction be to the demon's message?

One

possible reaction is that we would experience the eternal
recurrence as the greatest weight.

Imagine the case of a

person who had spent an entire life miserably performing
some duty for the sake of a future reward, a final, eternal
rest, which, because of the fact of the eternal recurrence,
is never going to be attained.
to the demon's message?

How would this person react

Would this person be filled with

regret for the things that they have done or left undone?
Would they now view the life they have pursued as pointless
and wasted?

Would they collapse into a furious heap and

"curse the demon who spoke thus?"
To experience the eternal recurrence as the greatest
weight is symptomatic of a negative attitude towards life.
Such a reaction would be understandable.

But, on

Nietzsche's view, it is not the only possible reaction.
Even in the case of the person described above it is
possible for that person to have experienced a "tremendous
moment" such that the demon's message would be embraced as
the greatest blessing rather than the greatest weight.

In

this case, it is possible that this person would say to the
demon, "'You are a god and never have I heard anything more
divine.'"
Up to this point, Nietzsche has characterized the
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eternal recurrence as a test of our disposition or attitude
towards our past.

The thought experiment of the demon

forces us to consider the lives we have lived, so to speak,
under the aspect of the eternal recurrence.

This experiment

prepares us for Nietzsche's real objective, which is to
determine whether or not we can live the rest of our lives
as if they are going to eternally recur.

In this sense the

eternal recurrence serves as a life-directing principle.
Nietzsche writes that if the eternal recurrence "gained
possession" of us we would be transformed or perhaps even
destroyed.

Concerning every future choice we are faced

with, the question we are supposed to ask ourselves is this:
"'Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more . .
1131

As in the case of our past lives, this question

might be experienced as the greatest weight, one that is
paralyzing.

If, however, we are able to become well-

disposed to ourselves and our lives, we might view the
eternal recurrence as the "ultimate eternal confirmation and
seal" of our life.
One problem with this test is that it is not clear how
the question, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable
times more?" could transform one's way of life or direct
what one does.

31

One interesting suggestion is that the

KSA 9, no. 11(143], 496: "Wenn du dir den Gedanken
der Gedanken einverleibst, so wird er dich verwandeln~ Die
Frage bei allem, was du thun willst: 'ist es so, dass ich es
unz~hlige Male thun will', ist das gr6sste Schwergewicht."

167
eternal recurrence functions as an evaluative criterion or
test of value analogous to Kant's categorical imperative.
The similarities between the practical interpretation of the
eternal recurrence and Kant's categorical imperative have
not gone unnoticed.
Simmel argues that the eternal recurrence gives weight
to seemingly insignificant actions by asking us to consider
the possibility of their infinite repetition.

He argues

that the eternal recurrence forces us to understand our
responsibility for our actions in a different way.

Simmel

holds that this different way of understanding our
responsibility amounts to a transposition of the categorical
imperative's criterion of universalizability into a temporal
dimension. 32

On Simmel's view, the Kantian criterion of

universalizability is simply a means to allow the true
meaning of individual actions to stand out.

Considering an

action in terms of its suitability as universal law
multiplies the action and makes its inner value more
prominent. 33

He argues that the eternal recurrence performs

essentially the same function.

The intrinsic character of

an action is not changed by considering its possible
infinite repetition, "but in light of such repetition, as

32
33

Simmel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, 171.

0ne of the shortcomings of Simmel's argument is a
conflation of actions and the maxims of actions. Only the
latter can be considered as possible universal laws of
nature, on Kant's view.
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under a microscope meanings become visible that are
overlooked in a fleeting world of the only-once. 1134

The

main difference between the eternal recurrence and the
categorical imperative, Simmel holds, lies in the fact that
repetition, unlike universalizability, does not generate
universal norms of action. 35
Simmel's analogy between the eternal recurrence and the
categorical imperative is not without controversy.

In

contrast to Simmel, Magnus argues that the eternal
recurrence is an "existential imperative": live in such a
way that you must wish to live again.~

Magnus sums up his

existential interpretation of the eternal recurrence in the
following passage:
That which possesses value is that which can be willed
into eternity. With the loss of an absolute instrument
for judgment of conduct, the 'that' which can be willed
is no longer a single act, but a mode of being; a life.
Whether or not life is worthy of infinite repetition
becomes Nietzsche's principle of redemption and
selection. 37
Magnus points out that the eternal recurrence possesses an
ethical meaning when interpreted in this manner, but he
sharply distinguishes it from the normative meaning of

"Ibid.: "Kant places action into the dimension of
infinite repetition in the one-alongside-the-other of
society, whereas Nietzsche has action repeat itself in the
infinite one-after-the-other of the same person."
3

6Magnus, Nietzsche's Existential Imperative,
preface, xiii-ix.
37 I

b'd
l. . , 139.
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Kant's categorical imperative.

on Magnus' view, an analogy

between the eternal recurrence and the categorical
imperative cannot be supported because, unlike the eternal
recurrence, "the positive value of Kant's deontological
ethics is to be found in the criterion of universalizability
when applied to specific acts, without regard to their
consequences. " 38
A similar conclusion is reached by Kaufmann.

Kaufmann

argues that any analogy between the eternal recurrence and
the categorical imperative is misleading because the eternal
recurrence appeals to one's psychological reaction to the
consequences of the mere thought of the infinite repetition
of an action.~

Like Magnus, Kaufmann also stresses that

Nietzsche's primary concern is not with particular actions
but with "the state of being of the whole man--and those who
achieve self-perfection and affirm their own being and all
eternity, backward and forward, have no thought of the
morrow. " 40
Leaving aside the issue of how one can have 'no thought
of the morrow' and be a consequentialist, it is important to
note that both Magnus and Kaufmann assume that the eternal
recurrence is intended as a test of the value of one's life

38

Ibid.

~Kaufmann,

Antichrist, 322.
40

Ibid.

Nietzsche: Philosopher, Psychologist,
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as a whole, or one's mode of being.

They maintain that this

is opposed to the categorical imperative, which tests the
moral value of specific acts.

Magnus' and Kaufmann's

arguments are inconclusive, however, because they fail to
take into account ambiguities present in both Nietzsche's
formulations of the eternal recurrence and Kant's
formulations of the categorical imperative.

In "The

Greatest Weight" Nietzsche appears to hold that the eternal
recurrence is, contrary to Magnus' and Kaufmann's
assertions, a test of actions, rather than one's mode of
life: "The question in each and every thing,

'Do you desire

this once more and innumerable times more would lie upon
your actions as the greatest weight" (my emphasis) .
Therefore, a dissimilarity between the eternal recurrence
and the categorical imperative could not be established on
these grounds, if we take the eternal recurrence as a test
of the value of actions.
Of course, there is an ambiguity in Nietzsche's
practical formulations of the eternal recurrence.

At times

it appears to serve as a test of the value of individual
actions, while at other times it appears to serve as a test
of life, or of the value of one's mode of being.

This

latter version is especially apparent in the formulations of
the eternal recurrence that most closely resemble the
categorical imperative, e.g.:
Meine Lehre sagt: so leben, dass du wtinschen musst,
wieder zu leben ist die Auf gabe--du wirst es

171
jedenfalls ! 41
Therefore, Magnus' and Kaufmann's cases for a difference
between the eternal recurrence and the categorical
imperative might be stronger if they were to argue that the
eternal recurrence serves as a test of value of one's mode
of life as a whole, while the categorical imperative serves
as a test of the moral value of particular actions.
Unfortunately, this strategy appears to be equally
unsuccessful, but for different reasons.
The key issue is the meaning one gives to Kant's
conception of a maxim.

The traditional interpretation of a

maxim holds that it is a simple descriptive statement of a
proposed action that is tested for moral worth by being
raised to the level of universal law.

This interpretation

attempts to convict Kant of the absurd position that
statements such as, e.g.,

"Open doors with your left hand

rather than your right!" become moral obligations. 42
To the contrary, however, it has been forcefully argued
that this interpretation confuses what Kant would consider a
"precept" with genuine maxims.

41
42

This line of argumentation

KSA 9, no. 11(163], 505.

See, e.g., William Frankena, Ethics, Second Edition
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1973), 32: "Is
every maxim that does pass Kant's test a duty, as he
sometimes seems to think?
'When alone in the dark whistle'-this seems to be a maxim one can will to be a universal
law.
If not, 'Tie your left shoestring first' clearly is.
Yet, surely, neither of these rules can be regarded as a
duty."
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has been explored by Otfried Hoffe and Rildiger Bittner,
among others. 43

They argue that propositions such as "Open

doors with your left hand rather than your right!" are not
to be regarded as maxims, but rather as precepts, i.e, rough
and ready rules of thumb without any pretence of moral
obligation.

Genuine maxims, in contrast, are limited to

those principles of action that possess the highest level of
generality.

They are not simple descriptive statements of

an action but rather self-given principles of life.

As

Hoffe puts it, "Maximen beinhalten die Art und Weise, sein
Leben als ganzes zu filhren--bezogen auf bestimmte
Grundaspekte und allgemeine Situationstypen des Leben.
1144

In Bittner's terms, maxims are "Lebensregeln" that

express in general terms the kind of human being one wants
to be:
Sie enthalten den Sinn meines Lebens; wenn namlich
'Sinn' nicht als transzendente Erfilllung, sondern
einfach als die Weise genommen wird, in der ich mir
dies Leben als ganzes denke, 'Sinn' nicht als Ziel,
sondern als Richtungssinn verstanden.~

csee e.g., Onora O'Niell, Constructions of Reason:
Explorations of Kant's Practical Philosophy, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1989), chapter five,
"Consistency in Action," 81-104.
44

0tfried Hoffe, "Kant's kategorischen Imperativ als
Kriterium des Sittlichen," in Ethik und Politik:
Grundmodelle und -probleme der praktischen Philosophie
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag, 1979), 9091.
45

Rildiger Bittner, "Maximen, " in Akten des 4.
Internationalen Kant Kongresses, ed. Gerhard Funke (BerlinNew York: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 489.
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One effect of this interpretation of Kant's concept of
a maxim is that it allows the possibility of an
interpretation of Kantian morality from the perspective of
virtue theory.~

For my purposes the Roffe-Bittner line of

argumentation is important because it undermines the other
support upon which Magnus and Kaufmann could rest their case
for a difference between the eternal recurrence and the
categorical imperative.

Both argue that the categorical

imperative is intended as a means of testing individual
actions while the eternal recurrence is intended as a means
of giving direction to one's life as a whole.

As Hoffe and

Bittner make clear, however, the object of the test imposed
by the categorical imperative is not a specific act, but
rather the self-given life principles that determine the
character of our lives.

Therefore, a difference between the

categorical imperative and the eternal recurrence cannot be
established on this basis.
Of course, Nietzsche's philosophical vocabulary differs
radically from Kant's.

He clearly does not describe the

function of the eternal recurrence as a means of testing
maxims or Lebensregeln for their moral value.

Nevertheless,

like the categorical imperative, the eternal recurrence
appears to be directed at similarly general aspects of human
life as a means of creating a personal ethos:
~For a critique of this implication of the HoffeBittner line see Robert B. Louden, "Kant's Virtue Ethics,"
Philosophy 61 (October, 1986): 473-489.
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Wem das Streben das hochste Gefilhl giebt, der strebe:
wem Ruhe das hochste Gefilhl giebt, der ruhe; wem
Einordnung Folgen Gehorsam das hochste Gefilhl giebt,
der gehorche. Nur moge er bewusst darilber werden. was
ihm das hochste Gefilhl giebt, und kein Mittel scheuen!
Es gilt die Ewigkeit! 47
In light of the preceding discussion, Simmel's thesis
also demands modification.

As we have seen, the categorical

imperative tests for moral worth by asking if an agent's
maxim or life-rule is self-consistent when considered as a
universal law of nature.

If the maxim cannot be a universal

law without generating a self-contradiction, then, according
to Kant, it has no moral worth.
eter~al

In a similar fashion, the

recurrence provides a way to give direction to an

entire life by asking us to consider every choice we make as
if our choice, and the life in which it is integrated, were
going to recur an infinite number of times.

Nietzsche

maintains that if we can press the form of eternity upon our
choices, then our lives will possesses the highest value.
Although this interpretation lends support to Simmel's
hypothesis, the formulation of the eternal recurrence in
"The Greatest Weight" still leaves many other crucial issues
obscure and many questions unanswered.

One question relates

to an idea implicit in this passage, i.e., the idea that the
value of an action is directly proportional to the degree
that we can desire the action's hypothetical repetition.
The highest value is thereby accorded to the action that we

~KSA 9,

no. 11(163), 505.
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can desire to be infinitely repeated.

And the person who is

most well-disposed toward life is the person who could
desire the infinite repetition of all of their actions.
Unfortunately, Nietzsche gives no argument for why he takes
the value of an action to be proportional to its desired
repeatability, and when we look closer at this idea it is,
in fact, far from obvious why he thinks this is the case.
It seems counter-intuitive to say that value is
proportional to desired repeatability.

Generally speaking,

the value of an action seems to be relative to its rarity,
its uniqueness, or its difficulty.

It might be possible to
I

imagine that numerous repetitions could increase the value
of an action and that we could desire this.
desire the infinite repetition of an action?

But could we
More

importantly, is it possible to desire the infinite
repetition of every action, which is precisely what
Nietzsche is asking us to consider?

This is problematic.

If we could desire the infinite repetition of every action,
this would in effect eliminate the possibility of
distinguishing between everyday, mundane acts and truly
important, once in a lifetime acts.

Contrary to what

Nietzsche seems to think, this levelling of action is at
odds with his stated intention of providing a way to test
our disposition toward life.

The most well-disposed person

is one who can desire the infinite repetition of each and
every action.

But if every action has infinite value,
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because we can desire its infinite repetition, then no
individual action is especially valuable.

In other words,

it becomes difficult to distinguish Nietzsche's conception
of a person who is well-disposed toward life and a nihilist
who believes that all actions are equally meaningless.
Ultimately, this conclusion may be close to, although
not identical with, Nietzsche's belief that the eternal
recurrence represents "the most extreme form of nihilism:
the nothing (the 'meaningless') , eternally! " 48

But this

should not be taken as implying that significant problems do
not remain with the practical interpretation of the eternal
recurrence.

For although it is undeniable that Nietzsche

lays a great deal of emphasis on the practical effects of
the idea of eternal recurrence, I believe that an
interpretation that is purely practical, as well as one that
is purely theoretical, is at odds with the naturalistic
spirit of Nietzsche's philosophy.

Both the theoretical

interpretation and the practical interpretation read into
Nietzsche's texts a distinction between facts and values,
theory and practice, that is precisely what Nietzsche
condemns in his attacks on antinaturalism.

It is just this

separation of theory and practice that Nietzsche identifies
with Kant's critical philosophy and that he endeavors to
avoid in his own philosophy:
Dangerous distinction between 'theoretical' and
48

The Will to Power, no. 55, 36.
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'practical,' e.g., in the case of Kant, but also in the
case of the ancients: --they act as if pure
spirituality presented them with the problems of
knowledge and metaphysics; they act as if practice must
be judged by its own measure, whatever the answer of
theory may be. 49
On the basis of such remarks, I believe that we must reject
the practical interpretation of the eternal recurrence
inspired by "The Greatest Weight" as Nietzsche's definitive
formulation.
"The Most Scientific of All Possible Hypotheses"
I believe that it is possible to avoid the problems
inherent in the practical interpretation of the eternal
recurrence by a closer examination of Nietzsche's statements
that the eternal recurrence is "the most scientific of all
possible hypotheses," and the Yes-saying spirit of amor fati
is the idea "most strictly confirmed and born out by truth
and science.nm

Most interpretations of these remarks

insist on an overly narrow construal.

Thus the eternal

recurrence is taken to be the most scientific hypothesis in
the sense of being the most general or encompassing
scientific hypothesis about the universe.

In effect, this

shifts the idea of eternal recurrence into the domain of
metaphysics.

Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics is thus

rendered self-def eating if the eternal recurrence can only

Gibid., no. 458, 251.
50

Ibid. , no. 55, 3 6.
Tragedy," no. 2, 728.

Ecce Homo, "The Birth of
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be understood as a metaphysical principle about reality as a
whole.
Beginning from the supposition that Nietzsche's
naturalism precludes a metaphysical reading of the eternal
recurrence, I would like to suggest the following
reconstruction of Nietzsche's assertion that the eternal
recurrence is the most scientific of all possible
hypotheses.

I argue in this section that Nietzsche's

remarks on the scientific character of the eternal
recurrence must be taken in three senses, each of which
corresponds to a different aspect of antinaturalism.

First,

the eternal recurrence is a theory about knowledge
(including scientific knowledge), and the conditions of
knowledge, within the interpretive framework of the will to
power.

Second, the eternal recurrence represents

affirmative spirit of science and presents a life-affirming
alternative to antinatural metaphysics.

Finally, the

eternal recurrence is a reconceptualization of autonomy in
light of the experience of modern physics.

In short, the

eternal recurrence is the culmination of Nietzsche's attempt
to provide a naturalistic alternative to antinaturalism.
The Naturalization of Epistemology
The eternal recurrence is a thesis about knowledge and
the conditions of knowledge within the interpretive
framework of the will to power.

As a theory about science

and knowledge, the eternal recurrence addresses the question
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of how knowledge is possible if we reject the possibility of
being in the sense of an enduring substrate of appearance.
It has often been maintained that the degree of knowledge
corresponds to the degree of being of what is known.
Knowledge of appearance is of a lower quality.

Only

knowledge of being, i.e., of that which is fixed and
eternal, is considered genuine knowledge.

In the context of

science, a related idea can be found in the form of the
belief that a true hypothesis is one that corresponds to a
fixed, independently existing observational given. 51

The

validity or truth of a hypothesis corresponds directly to
its accuracy in accounting for this fixed, observational
given and in its ability to allow us to make predictions
about its future behavior.
In the context of my discussion of Nietzsche's critique
of antinaturalism in chapter two I indicated why he rejects
the identification of truth with the correspondence of a
proposition with conceiver independent being.

I also

indicated why Nietzsche rejects as antinatural the idea that
truth, in the superlative metaphysical sense, is the supreme
value.

on Nietzsche's view, human life requires the

creation of simplifying schemas, logical fictions, which are
necessary to organize experience, but are not literally
true.

Given that untruth is a necessary condition of life,

in the sense described above, the idea that truth is the
51

Seigfried, "Law, Regularity, and Sameness," 374.
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supreme value is antilife, and therefore, antinatural.
Nietzsche maintains that the association of the highest
values, such as truth, with being results in a corresponding
condemnation of the realm of becoming. 52

This does not

imply that Nietzsche thinks that we should shift our
attention from reality to appearance.

Such a move would

simply be the implicit re-affirmation of a radical
opposition between a true world and the world of appearance.
By rejecting the true world of being, Nietzsche makes it
clear that he is rejecting the opposition of the true world
and the apparent world as well:
The true world--we have abolished. What world has
remained? The apparent one perhaps? But no! With the
true world we have also abolished the apparent one. 53
Consequently, we are left with this world as a world without
being, in a perpetual state of becoming.

And if truth

requires being, then, in a world without being, it follows
that there can be no truth:
The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e.,
is not a fact but a fable and approximation on the
basis of a meager sum of observations; it is 'in flux,'
as something in a state of becoming, as falsehood
always changing but never getting near the truth: for
there is no 'truth.'~

52

The Will to Power, no. 617, 330: "From the values
attributed to being proceed the condemnation of and
discontent with becoming, after such a world of being had
first been invented."
53

Twilight of the Idols, "How the True World Finally
Became a Fable: History of an Error," 486.
~T~h~e~W~1-·1~1~t~o~P~o~w~e~r,

54

no. 616, 330.
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Therefore, it seems as though without being there can be no
truth either in the superlative, metaphysical sense or as
understood by the realistic conception of science.
Thus far Nietzsche's point is that without being there
can be no knowledge either in the metaphysical sense or in
the realistic sense.

Does this imply that the quest for

knowledge must be abandoned altogether?

Some have reached

this conclusion, Nietzsche maintains, and it is for them a
source of despair.

For some, the collapse of the belief

that there is one definitive meaning of existence has been
generalized into the belief that there is no meaning in
existence at all.

At this point, nihilism appears:

One interpretation has collapsed; but because it was
considered the interpretation it now seems as if there
were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything
were in vain. 55
But, on Nietzsche's view, this conclusion is premature.
If there is no truth in the superlative sense, this
should not unduly disturb us, according to Nietzsche,
because the value of the world does not lie in truth, but
"in our interpretation."~

Even the truths that have been

the most enduring are simply interpretations, i.e.,
simplifying schemas thought to have value for life.

And

every new interpretation and valuation must overcome a
preceding interpretation.

This implies that this new

"Ibid, no. 55, 35.
~Ibid.,

no. 616, 330.
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interpretation must be, in a sense,

'stronger' than the one

it replaces, i.e., more comprehensive, more capable of
opening up new perspectives and new horizons of exploration.
In other words, it must represent a greater will to power:
That the value of the world lies in our interpretation
(--that other interpretations than merely human ones
are perhaps somewhere possible--); that previous
interpretations have been perspective valuations by
virtue of which we can survive in life, i.e., in the
will to power, for the growth of power; that every
elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of
narrower interpretations; that every strengthening and
increase of power opens up new perspectives and means
believing in new horizons--this idea permeates my
writings. 57
The interpretive paradigm created by the hypothesis of
the will to power bears directly on the problem of truth. 58
If truth requires being, then there can be no truth if one
denies being, as Nietzsche does.

But an approximation of

being can be provided by means of an interpretation that we
bring to experience.

Through our interpretative frameworks

we can attain "truths" and "knowledge," with the proviso
that the knowledge gained will never be absolute, but always
perspectival, i.e., always the product of our valuations.
Our truths will no longer be Truth, i.e., propositions about
a fixed, conceiver-independent reality, but truths relative
to the presuppositions and postulates of our

57
58

Ibid.

The following operational and interpretational
account of the eternal recurrence is indebted to Hans·
Seigfried, "Law, Regularity, and Sameness: A Nietzschean
Account."
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interpretational schemes.
Interpreting the character of stability into becoming
by means of logical fictions is what makes "knowledge" in a
limited sense possible. 59

such knowledge requires a

"deception" on the part of the senses and reason "to
preserve a world of that which abides, which is
equivalent. 1160

The relative permanence of the phenomenal

world, the regularity and stability of appearance, need not
be located in an enduring substrate of being.

On

Nietzsche's view, the stability of the phenomenal world lies
in the relative stability of the simplifying schemas that we
use to organize experience.

In other words, the reality of

the phenomenal world,
• • . lies in the continual recurrence of identical,
familiar, related things in their logicized character,
in the belief that here we are able to reckon and
calculate. 61
From Nietzsche's fragmentary account we now have all of
the parts necessary to state the first sense of the eternal
recurrence as the most scientific of all possible
hypotheses.

The eternal recurrence represents the idea that

by continually bringing simplifying schemas to the
meaningless flux of becoming, we make it thinkable, and
hence are able to live.

59

The eternal recurrence must be

Human, Al 1 Too Human, no. 1 , 1 .

~he Will to Power,
~Ibid.,

no. 617, 330.

no. 569, 307.

My emphasis.
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postulated to account for identity, stability, and
predictability in a naturalistic conceptual framework that
has rejected being.

In other words, the eternal recurrence

must be assumed in order to understand Nietzsche's account
of identity, stability, and predictability in terms of the
will to power.

As Nietzsche puts it in The Will to Power,

"[to) impose upon becoming the character of being--that is
the supreme will to power. " 62

Actual being is not created

by these simplifying schemas, but rather the appearance of
being, i.e., the stability and permanence of phenomena.
In this sense, the eternal recurrence, together with the
idea of the will to power, is the most scientific of all
possible hypotheses because it is the basis of all
knowledge.
The Naturalization of Metaphysics
The eternal recurrence represents a naturalistic, lifeaffirming alternative to antinatural metaphysics.

An

antinatural metaphysics, as I discussed in chapter two, is
one that devalues life and the world by projecting a
metaphysical "true world" as the source of the highest and
most genuine values.

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche

refers to those who talk of the true world and speak of
otherworldly hopes as "poison-mixers" and "despisers of

62

I b'd
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life."~

Their creation of a metaphysical world is

attributed to suffering and a weariness "that wants to reach
the ultimate with one leap, one fatal leap.

" 64

.

A naturalistic metaphysics, in contrast, would be lifeaffirming.

Rather than attempting to locate the meaning of

the world somewhere beyond nature in a true world, or
Kantian intelligible realm, or beyond history, as the end or
telos of history, a naturalistic metaphysics would seek the
value of the world within the world itself.

The eternal

recurrence demands that the meaning of the world must be
created by the will to power within the world.

It is the

extreme antidote to the extreme position of antinatural
metaphysics. 65
Rejecting the ascetic, life-denying ideals of
antinatural metaphysics, a naturalistic metaphysics contains
the opposite ideal:
the ideal of the most high-spirited, alive, and world
affirming human being who has not only come to terms
and learned to get along with whatever was and is, but
who wants to have what was and is repeated into all
eternity, shouting insatiably da capo--not only to
himself but to the whole play and spectacle . • . . M
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra Nietzsche's ideal of a world
~Thus

Spoke Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Prologue,"

no. 3, 125.
64

Ibid., "On the Afterworldly," 143.

MThe Will to Power, no. 55, 35: "Extreme positions
are not succeeded by moderate ones but by extreme positions
of the opposite kind."
MBeyond Good and Evil, no. 56, 258.
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affirming human being, one who could affirm the eternal
recurrence, is symbolized by the figure of the "overman."
In the prologue of Thus Spoke Zarathustra Zarathustra
proclaims the coming of the overman.

"Man" is described as

merely a transitional stage between beast and overman.

The

overman is symbolic of Nietzsche's attempt to naturalize
metaphysics and provide humanity with an ideal that does not
express contempt for the earth:
'Behold, I teach you the overman. The overman is the
meaning of the earth. Let your will say: the overman
shall be the meaning of the earth!~
The overman embodies the Dionysian affirmation of existence
that Nietzsche refers to as "amor fati"--love of fate.
N~etzsche

asserts that his experimental philosophy

anticipates the possibility of the deepest nihilism.

The

negation of the true world could be seen as the most
devastating blow to all ideals.

But Nietzsche insists as

well that it is not the intent of his philosophy to halt at
negation.

Rather, his philosophy attempts

to cross over to the opposite of this--to a Dionysian
affirmation of the world as it is, without subtraction,
exception, or selection--it wants the eternal
circulation. . • .~
One aspect of amor fati is the affirmation of the
necessity of the seemingly chance events of existence.
Occasionally, Nietzsche expresses this as the somewhat banal
~Thus

Spoke Zarathustra, "Zarathustra's Prologue,"

no. 3, 125.
68

The Will to Power, no. 1041, 536.
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notion that "everything that happens to us turns out for the
best." 69

Another aspect of amor fati is more demanding.

It

is a desire to affirm not merely existence, but the
necessity and desirability "of those sides of existence
hitherto denied.

.

• • 1170

Denial of the true world, and the

corresponding faith in opposite values forces us to
contemplate the possibility that the value of everything
hitherto revered as good might lie in the fact that the good
is "insidiously related, tied to, and involved with • . •
wicked, seemingly opposite things . . . . " 71

In this sense,

amor fati forces us to move beyond good and evil.
Amor fati is also Nietzsche's challenge "to learn more
and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things • .
n

This desire to see as beautiful what is necessary

explains why Nietzsche emphasizes science.

According to

Nietzsche, science, especially physics, can teach us how to
be "the best learners and discoverers of everything that is
lawful and necessary in the world.

1173

By recognizing

necessity, science expresses the Dionysian affirmation of
existence:
This ultimate, most joyous, most wantonly extravagant
69

The Gay Science, no. 277, 224.

7°The
71

Will to Power, no. 1041, 536.

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 2, 200.

nThe Gay Science, no. 276, 223.
nibid., no. 335, 266.
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Yes to life represents not only the highest insight but
also the deepest, that which is most strictly confirmed
and born out by truth and science. Nothing in existence
may be subtracted, nothing is dispensable. . . .~
The Naturalization of Autonomy
The Dionysian affirmation of existence contained in the
spirit of science is not sufficient to explain completely
Nietzsche's thesis that the eternal recurrence is the most
scientific of all possible hypotheses.

To understand this

remark more fully we must recall Nietzsche's critique of the
optimism contained in the theoretical attitude of
positivistically conceived science in The Birth of Tragedy.
The theoretical attitude holds that being can be corrected
by knowledge and thus strives relentlessly to increase its
store of knowledge.

Eventually, however, the theoretical

attitude forces its best representatives to face the insight
that absolute knowledge will always remain out of their
reach.

In The Will to Power Nietzsche characterizes the "in

vain" of the theoretical attitude in its most extreme form
as the eternal recurrence of meaninglessness:
Let us think this thought in its most terrible form:
existence as it is, without meaning or aim, yet
recurring inevitably without any finale of nothingness:
'the eternal recurrence. ' 75
On Nietzsche's view, this insight into the meaninglessness,
the "in vain" of the theoretical attitude is demanded by

~Ecce
~The

Homo, "The Birth of Tragedy," no. 2, 728.
Will to Power, no. 55, 35.
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"the energy of knowledge and strength.

•

•

• 1176

It

represents, as Nietzsche puts it, "the most extreme form of
nihilism: the nothing (the 'meaningless'), eternally!""
The insight generated by the theoretical attitude of
the eternal recurrence of the meaningless has important
implications for Nietzsche's reconceptualization of
autonomy.

If we are willing to accept Nietzsche's Dionysian

insight into the meaninglessness of existence, then we
confront the idea that we can no longer look behind the
world, to a Kantian intelligible realm. for example, for
directives of human action.

The lesson of the theoretical

attitude, especially as contained in modern physics, is that
we alone are responsible for creating the conceptual rules
and laws that make experience possible and manageable, and
thus empower us to continue with life. 78

From this it

follows that, if we are to live authentically, we must
actively give ourselves laws to live by.

Only by learning

the lesson of modern physics can•we attain the goal of
becoming those we are, i.e., "human beings who are new,

76
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"Ibid. See also Hans Seigfried, "Nietzsche's
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unique, incomparable, who give themselves laws, who create
themselves.

1179

Nietzsche's reconceptualization of human autonomy in
light of the experience of modern physics does not stop with
this insight into the source of autonomy.

Nietzsche extends

his conclusions to the fundamental basis of moral agency-the neutral, independent moral subject.
Within the framework of antinaturalism, moral agency is
conceived in terms of a neutral, independent moral subject,
or self, that is subject to universal moral norms.
Nietzsche's naturalism rejects this conception of the moral
subject.

As a result, Nietzsche is able to reject the

metaphysical conception of a free will and offer a
conception of human agency constructed within the limits of
naturalism.
On Nietzsche's view, the idea of a neutral, independent
moral subject is a product of slave morality "prompted by an
instinct of self-preservation in which every lie is

79

The Gay Science, no. 335, 266. See also, Hans
Seigfried, Autonomy and Quantum Physics, 624: "For if there
were any laws in the world of experience which were not the
product of human organization to which we must submit and
which limit our self-creation, then they would have to be
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it is in the natural sciences and physics where we finally
come to realize that the whole world of experience is the
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It is therefore in the
spirit of physics that we can 'become those we are' at last,
and say about ourselves what the voice in the burning bush
said to Moses ('I Am who I Am', Exodus 3:14)."
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sanctified. 1180

The slave has created the concept of the

moral subject in order to hold the master morally
responsible for his expressions of strength.

In creating

the concept of the moral self, the slaves exploit a
fundamental "seduction of language. 1181

The essence of this

fundamental linguistic error is to assume that all effects
are the product of something that can spontaneously chose to
cause an effect.

This cause is referred to as the neutral,

independent subject.
The assumption of a neutral, independent moral subject
can be understood as the product of uncritical thinking,
which implicitly projects an underlying substratum behind a
deed.

Nietzsche uses the example of a flash of lightning.

The popular mind, Nietzsche maintains, separates the deed,
the flash, from an underlying substratum, the lightning--in
effect doubling the deed. 82

But, on Nietzsche's view,

there is no such substratum; there is no "being" behind
doing, effecting, becoming; "the doer'' is merely a
fiction added to the deed--the deed is everything. 83
In their ressentiment against the master, the slaves exploit
this feature of language in order to morally condemn the
master.

The slave maintains that

80

on the Genealogy of Morals, second essay, no. 13,

482.
81

Ibid., 481.

83

Ibid.

192
the strong man is free to be weak and the bird of prey
to be a lamb--for thus they gain the right to make the
bird of prey accountable for being a bird of prey.M
To overcome slave morality it is necessary to overcome the
notion of the neutral, independent moral subject that is
intrinsic to it.

Nietzsche finds the clue to overcoming the

slave's conception of the neutral, independent moral subject
in an unexpected source--modern physics.
Nietzsche cites the work of Boscovich as crucial for
overcoming materialistic atomism in physics.

By

understanding atoms as centers of force, rather than as
infinitely small particles, Boscovich allows us "to abjure
the belief in the last part of the earth that 'stood fast'-the belief in 'substance,' in 'matter,' in the earthresiduum and particle-atom. " 85
Nietzsche believes that Boscovich's achievement in
physics should be extended, and used to root out the last
vestiges of the metaphysical "atomistic need."

Nowhere is

this need more apparent than in "the soul atomism," i.e., in
the neutral, independent moral subject.

on Nietzsche's

view, it is not necessary to eliminate "the soul," per se.
Rather, he suggests refining the soul-hypothesis.

This

would allow the possibility of conceiving of the soul as
"subjective multiplicity" or "as social structure of drives

85

Beyond Good and Evil, no. 12, 210.

193

and affects."M
This latter conception of the soul as a social
structure of drives and affects has dramatic implications
for the traditional conception of freedom of the will and
autonomy.

This can be seen by comparing Nietzsche's

conception of the free will with Kant's.
Recall that for Kant, autonomy requires the rational
self-legislation of the will.

Autonomy requires the will be

free in the superlative metaphysical sense, i.e., not
determined by the necessary physical laws that govern the
world of appearance.
two reasons.

This is problematic for Nietzsche for

On the one hand, it forces Kant to emphasize

the role of universalizability in moral agency.

On

Nietzsche's view, as I discussed in the previous chapter,
this effectively undermines Kant's attempt to establish a
morality based on the priority of the will's selflegislation because universalizability is the primary
vehicle of moral judgment.
On the other hand, by identifying an autonomous will
and a free will, Kant separates morality from the empirical
world of nature and history.

In Daybreak Nietzsche makes

his point in a polemical manner when he writes:
In the face of nature and history, in the face of the
thorough immorality of nature and history, Kant was,
like every good German of the old stamp, a pessimist;
he believed in morality, not because it is demonstrated
in nature and history, but in spite of the fact that
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nature and history continually contradict it.n
Thus, according to Nietzsche, by separating the will from
all empirical determinations, Kant must appeal to a
metaphysical afterworld and create a conception of the
autonomous will as a causa sui.

It is this picture of the

will that Nietzsche has in mind in Beyond Good and Evil when
makes the following remark:
The desire for 'freedom of the will' in the superlative
metaphysical sense . . . the desire to bear the entire
and ultimate responsibility for one's actions oneself,
and to absolve God, the world, ancestors, chance, and
society involves nothing less than to be precisely this
causa sui and, with more than Milnchhausen's audacity,
to pull oneself up into existence by the hair, out of
the swamps of nothingness. 88
This notion of freedom of the will represents to Nietzsche
"the best self-contradiction that has been conceived so
far," and demands a reconceptualization within a
naturalistic framework.~
Nietzsche's critique of the metaphysical idea of the
free will is the result of an analysis of human volitional
action.

The will is spoken of "as if it were the best known

thing in the world, . . . "

But Nietzsche counters that

philosophers have oversimplified the complex structure of
willing.~

This oversimplification is the result of

noaybreak, preface no. 3, 3.
uBeyond Good and Evil, no. 21, 218.
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Willing is described as a
complex phenomenon that is "a unit only as a word."
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interpreting the act of willing in mechanistic terms as the
relation of a neutral, independent subject (cause) and an
action (effect).

On Nietzsche's analysis, willing is not

the product of a unified subject acting as a cause, but
rather a synthesis of sensitive, rational, and emotive
components of the "social structure" of the self into a
hierarchy.
The first component of willing is sensation.

The

sensitive component of willing is active on more than one
level.

At the first level of analysis are the states "away

from which" and "towards which.

1191

This level of sensation

appears to refer to what is conventionally called the object
of intention.

At the next level of analysis is "the

sensation of this 'from' and 'towards' themselves.

1192

The

sensations of "from" and "towards" appear to refer to the
intentional act itself, rather than to the object of
intention.

The final sensitive component in willing is

physiological.

It consists in the muscular sensations that

correspond to the sensations of "from" and "towards" but
which are prior to any actual motion. 93
Since this muscular sensation corresponds to the
sensations of "from" and "towards" and yet precedes physical
movement, it appears that Nietzsche is implying that the
~Ib1'd.,

93
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various sensations that comprise the sensitive component of
willing do not occur simultaneously, but rather
sequentially.

The introduction of a temporal element would

necessitate the introduction of a causal means to connect
the various sensitive elements into a unity.

It is highly

unlikely that this is what Nietzsche intends, however, given
that he is attempting to undermine the causal efficacy of
willing.

Therefore, it seems best to conclude that the

appearance of a sequential relationship between the various
sensitive factors in willing is an illusion resulting from
Nietzsche's analysis, and that the sensitive factors occur
concurrently in any act of willing.
The second main component in the synthetic structure of
willing is a rational component.

Unfortunately, Nietzsche

does not say much about this aspect of willing, except to
indicate that in every act of the will there is a "ruling
thought" that is indispensable: "--let us not imagine it
possible to sever this thought from the 'willing' as if any
will would then remain over!" 94

Although Nietzsche's

remarks on this rational component are sketchy, they at
least indicate that he thinks that reason is a necessary
component of volition.

Moreover, by referring to the

rational component as a "ruling" thought, Nietzsche implies
that the rational component of willing in some sense governs
the sensitive component.
94

Ibid.
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Nietzsche does not discuss the relationship between the
sensitive and rational components of the will in detail.
The introduction of a third main component in willing,
however, gives an indication of how this relationship might
be understood.
The third main component of willing is the emotive
component--the "affect of command."

Nietzsche indicates

that the emotive component of the will is its most
significant feature. 95

In all willing there is a relation

of commanding and obeying.

It is accompanied by the

focusing of attention on a single aim and by the "inward
certainty that obedience will be rendered.

.

n96

In

short,
A man who wills commands something within himself that
renders obedience, or that he believes renders
obedience. 97
The tendency to attribute willing to a unified,
substantial ego has resulted in a misunderstanding of the
causality of the will.

Philosophers have come the think

that "willing suffices for action."~

Nietzsche argues that

since in a great majority of cases there is an exercise of
will only when the resulting action was to be expected, "the
appearance [i.e., of a necessary connection of the will as
95

Ibid.

1

215.

96
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cause and the action as effect] has translated itself into
the feeling, as if there were a necessity of
Willing and action have become identified.

effect."~

The successful

outcome of volition comes to be identified with the will
itself as a unique form of causality.
Having interpreted the will as a synthetic social
structure of drives and affects consisting of sensitive,
rational, and emotive elements, Nietzsche draws the
implications of his analysis for the moral-metaphysical
doctrine of the free will.

If willing is not conceived as

the action of a unified, substantial ego, but rather as a
synthesis of commanding and obeying elements within the
synthetic social structure of the self, then one eliminates
the need to create a unique form of causality {i.e.,
freedom) to account for the will's ability to legislate for
itself.

The conception of free will becomes unnecessary to

account for autonomy.
Does Nietzsche's rejection of the free will imply that
he is embracing determinism?

This is not the case.

With

the dissolution of the free will, the opposing idea of an
unfree will vanishes as well.

Nietzsche argues that the

idea of the unfree will, i.e., the will completely
determined by causal necessity, is the result of a
reif ication of the "conventional fictions" of cause and

~Ibid.

199
effect. 100

This is precisely what Kant does when he employs

the appearance-thing-in-itself distinction as a means to
postulate the possibility of transcendent freedom.

Kant

seeks to escape what he interprets as the disastrous
implications for morality of universal causal necessity.

On

Nietzsche's view, however, Kant's reaction against the
implications of causality is exaggerated:
In the 'in-itself' there is nothing of 'causal
connections,' of 'necessity,' or of 'psychological nonfreedom'; there the effect does not follow the cause,
there is no rule of 'law. ' 101
Nietzsche's reference to the "in-itself" should not be
read in terms of Kant's thing-in-itself.

Nietzsche is not

referring to a transcendent, conceiver independent realm,
but rather to the empirical world in the absence of an
interpretation.

Nietzsche's point is that our observation

of causal necessity is the result of an interpretation that
has been imposed upon the empirical world:
It is we alone who have devised cause, sequence, foreach-other, relativity, constraint, number, law,
freedom, motive, and purpose; and when we project and
mix this symbol world into things as if it existed 'initself,' we act once more as we have always acted-m¥00thologically. The 'unfree will' is mythology . . .
This conclusion implies that we should abandon the
identification of an autonomous will and a will that is free

IOOibid. , 219.
101
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in the superlative, metaphysical sense.

On Nietzsche's

view, the notion that autonomy requires a special form of
causality, namely freedom, is simply misguided because it
has uncritically presupposed a unified conception of the
will.

Interpreted in terms of an internal relation of

commanding and obeying, autonomy can be expressed as "the
affect of superiority in relation to him who must obey: 'I
am free, "he" must obey'--this consciousness is inherent in
every will. 11100

This affect of superiority produces a

"complex state of delight" in the person who exercises
volition and interprets any overcoming of obstacles as the
direct result of this volition. 1™ As a result, the
opposition of a free will and an unfree will is eliminated
and replaced with a distinction between strong and weak
wills:
The "unfree will" is mythology; in real life it is only
a matter of strong and weak wills. 105
Nietzsche does not conceive of an autonomous will as
one that is free, but rather as one that is strong.

This is

interesting because, unlike freedom, strength is not a
metaphysical absolute.

Strength is a relative term that

admits of varying degree.

If autonomy is thought of as a

quality possessed by a strong will, and if there are varying
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degrees of strength, then it seems reasonable to conclude
that there are varying degrees of autonomy as well.
This is exactly the conclusion we should expect as a
result of my earlier examination of Nietzsche's naturalistic
opposition to antinatural moralities.

As I argued above,

the essential feature of Nietzsche's naturalism is a shift
in moral discourse from a framework in which moral judgment
is given priority over legislative considerations to a
framework that gives priority to legislation over judgment.
This shift is consistent with the idea that there can be
varying degrees of autonomy depending upon the particular
moral framework under consideration.
The idea of varying degrees of autonomy harmonizes well
with Nietzsche's more general project of dissolving value
oppositions and establishing a new order of rank among
values. 1 ~

This project is morally relevant because it

implies that moral deliberation can no longer be reduced to
subsuming particular actions or intentions under one of two
mutually exclusive polarized categories, such as good and
evil.

In other words, the dissolution of opposed moral

categories forces moral discourse to move beyond moral
judgment in this sense.
Conclusion
The idea that it is possible to reconstruct the eternal

1

06ttuman, All Too Human, preface nos. 6-7, 9-10.
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recurrence as a coherent response and alternative to
traditionally conceived, i.e., antinatural, morality, might
be anathema to many who read Nietzsche.

I think that such a

reaction is inappropriate and wholly out of keeping with the
spirit of revaluation that inspires Nietzsche's philosophy.
Nowhere is this clearer than in Nietzsche's attitude towards
morality.

I take it that Nietzsche is not asking us to

abandon morality tout court, but rather to understand
morality in a different way.

This is why he can write in

Daybreak:
It goes without saying that I do not deny--unless I am
a fool--that many actions called immoral ought to be
avoided and resisted, or that many called moral ought
to be done and encouraged--but I think the one should
be encouraged and the other avoided for other reasons
than hitherto. 107
This dissertation has been an attempt to understand what
these other reasons might be.

In trying to clarify this

issue I have examined three separate but related aspects of
Nietzsche's philosophy.

The first aspect of Nietzsche's

philosophy that I examined centered around his conception of
a naturalistic morality.

I argued that Nietzsche's

naturalism could be understood as an application of the
principle of the will to power to the domain of human
conduct.

I attempted to show how the most important

implication of the will to power was that it shifted moral
discourse from a framework in which moral judgment is given

107

oaybreak, no. 103, 60.

203

priority over moral legislation to a framework in which
moral legislation is given priority over moral judgment.
Nietzsche's attempt to prioritize moral legislation
made it crucial to examine his critique of Kantian morality.
I argued that both Nietzsche and Kant attempt to construct
moral philosophies in which legislative discourse
predominates over judgment.

In contrast to Kant, however,

Nietzsche rejects the premise of human moral equality.
Nietzsche views Kant's conception of universalizability, as
formulated in the categorical imperative, as having
implications that undermine Kant's attempt to create a
morality based on legislative considerations.
The last aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy that I
examined was the eternal recurrence.

I rejected the

conventional theoretical and practical interpretations of
the eternal recurrence as inconsistent with Nietzsche's
naturalism.

I argued that the eternal recurrence can

plausibly be understood as one of the key principles, along
with the will to power, of Nietzsche's naturalistic
reconceptualization of autonomy.
Each aspect of this study reflects a different facet of
Nietzsche's hammer metaphor.

As I showed in my opening

chapter, the hammer metaphor represents the diagnostic,
destructive, and creative aspects of Nietzsche's thought.
Nietzsche's naturalism allows him to diagnose the problems
of antinaturalism.

Nietzsche's critique of Kantian morality
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illustrates the destructive aspects of his philosophical
project.

Finally, the creative aspect of Nietzsche's

philosophy was illustrated by the idea of the eternal
recurrence and the will to power that it requires.
I think that when taken together, these three aspects
of Nietzsche's hammer metaphor reveal the revaluative
character of his philosophy.

It is particularly important

to emphasize this aspect of Nietzsche's thought in the face
of reductionistic accounts which attempt to trace each of
Nietzsche's ideas to a previous philosopher.

Clearly, there

is a strong syncretistic element in Nietzsche's writings,
but this should not be exaggerated to the point of
overlooking his original contribution to philosophy.
Conversely, it is also important to emphasize the
revaluative and reconstructive character of Nietzsche's
philosophy against many post-modern readings which tend to
exaggerate the idiosyncratic aspects of his thought at the
cost of detaching him completely from his historical
context.

By reading Nietzsche's ideas of the will to power

and the eternal recurrence against the background of Kantian
autonomy, I have attempted to do justice to the concerns
with both the syncretistic and idiosyncratic elements of
Nietzsche's thought while at the same time remaining
faithful to his texts.

This has not always been easy and

this study is not the last word on anything--but it may be
the first word on at least a few things.
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